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openwrt/package/libs/wolfssl/patches/200-ecc-rng.patch
Eneas U de Queiroz e89f3e85eb wolfssl: bump to 5.2.0
Fixes two high-severity vulnerabilities:

- CVE-2022-25640: A TLS v1.3 server who requires mutual authentication
  can be bypassed.  If a malicious client does not send the
  certificate_verify message a client can connect without presenting a
  certificate even if the server requires one.

- CVE-2022-25638: A TLS v1.3 client attempting to authenticate a TLS
  v1.3 server can have its certificate heck bypassed. If the sig_algo in
  the certificate_verify message is different than the certificate
  message checking may be bypassed.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
2022-04-11 21:41:03 +02:00

51 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff

Since commit 6467de5a8840 ("Randomize z ordinates in scalar
mult when timing resistant") wolfssl requires a RNG for an EC
key when the hardened built option is selected.
wc_ecc_set_rng is only available when built hardened, so there
is no safe way to install the RNG to the key regardless whether
or not wolfssl is compiled hardened.
Always export wc_ecc_set_rng so tools such as hostapd can install
RNG regardless of the built settings for wolfssl.
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
@@ -11655,21 +11655,21 @@ void wc_ecc_fp_free(void)
#endif /* FP_ECC */
-#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
int wc_ecc_set_rng(ecc_key* key, WC_RNG* rng)
{
int err = 0;
+#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
if (key == NULL) {
err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
else {
key->rng = rng;
}
+#endif
return err;
}
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ECC_ENCRYPT
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h
@@ -650,10 +650,8 @@ WOLFSSL_API
void wc_ecc_fp_free(void);
WOLFSSL_LOCAL
void wc_ecc_fp_init(void);
-#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
WOLFSSL_API
int wc_ecc_set_rng(ecc_key* key, WC_RNG* rng);
-#endif
WOLFSSL_API
int wc_ecc_set_curve(ecc_key* key, int keysize, int curve_id);