openwrt/package/network/utils/curl/patches/110-CVE-2018-1000007.patch

103 lines
4.5 KiB
Diff

From af32cd3859336ab963591ca0df9b1e33a7ee066b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 13:19:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] http: prevent custom Authorization headers in redirects
... unless CURLOPT_UNRESTRICTED_AUTH is set to allow them. This matches how
curl already handles Authorization headers created internally.
Note: this changes behavior slightly, for the sake of reducing mistakes.
Added test 317 and 318 to verify.
Reported-by: Craig de Stigter
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-b3bf.html
---
docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.3 | 12 +++-
lib/http.c | 10 ++-
lib/setopt.c | 2 +-
lib/urldata.h | 2 +-
tests/data/Makefile.inc | 2 +-
tests/data/test317 | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/data/test318 | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/data/test317
create mode 100644 tests/data/test318
--- a/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.3
+++ b/docs/libcurl/opts/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.3
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
.\" * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
.\" * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
.\" *
-.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2015, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+.\" * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
.\" *
.\" * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
.\" * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ the headers. They may be private or othe
Use \fICURLOPT_HEADEROPT(3)\fP to make the headers only get sent to where you
intend them to get sent.
+
+Custom headers are sent in all requests done by the easy handles, which
+implies that if you tell libcurl to follow redirects
+(\fBCURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION(3)\fP), the same set of custom headers will be sent
+in the subsequent request. Redirects can of course go to other hosts and thus
+those servers will get all the contents of your custom headers too.
+
+Starting in 7.58.0, libcurl will specifically prevent "Authorization:" headers
+from being sent to other hosts than the first used one, unless specifically
+permitted with the \fBCURLOPT_UNRESTRICTED_AUTH(3)\fP option.
.SH DEFAULT
NULL
.SH PROTOCOLS
--- a/lib/http.c
+++ b/lib/http.c
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ Curl_http_output_auth(struct connectdata
if(!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
conn->bits.netrc ||
!data->state.first_host ||
- data->set.http_disable_hostname_check_before_authentication ||
+ data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts ||
strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)) {
result = output_auth_headers(conn, authhost, request, path, FALSE);
}
@@ -1624,6 +1624,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_add_custom_headers(struct
checkprefix("Transfer-Encoding:", headers->data))
/* HTTP/2 doesn't support chunked requests */
;
+ else if(checkprefix("Authorization:", headers->data) &&
+ /* be careful of sending this potentially sensitive header to
+ other hosts */
+ (data->state.this_is_a_follow &&
+ data->state.first_host &&
+ !data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts &&
+ !strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)))
+ ;
else {
CURLcode result = Curl_add_bufferf(req_buffer, "%s\r\n",
headers->data);
--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_setopt(struct Curl_easy *d
* Send authentication (user+password) when following locations, even when
* hostname changed.
*/
- data->set.http_disable_hostname_check_before_authentication =
+ data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts =
(0 != va_arg(param, long)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
break;
--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
@@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ struct UserDefined {
bool http_keep_sending_on_error; /* for HTTP status codes >= 300 */
bool http_follow_location; /* follow HTTP redirects */
bool http_transfer_encoding; /* request compressed HTTP transfer-encoding */
- bool http_disable_hostname_check_before_authentication;
+ bool allow_auth_to_other_hosts;
bool include_header; /* include received protocol headers in data output */
bool http_set_referer; /* is a custom referer used */
bool http_auto_referer; /* set "correct" referer when following location: */