curl: fix security problems

This fixes the following security problems:
 * CVE-2017-1000100 TFTP sends more than buffer size
 * CVE-2017-1000101 URL globbing out of bounds read

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This commit is contained in:
Hauke Mehrtens 2017-09-30 15:23:07 +02:00
parent e232c6754d
commit f483a35f08
3 changed files with 75 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=curl
PKG_VERSION:=7.52.1
PKG_RELEASE:=4
PKG_RELEASE:=5
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://curl.haxx.se/download/ \

View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 358b2b131ad6c095696f20dcfa62b8305263f898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 17:16:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tftp: reject file name lengths that don't fit
... and thereby avoid telling send() to send off more bytes than the
size of the buffer!
CVE-2017-1000100
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20170809B.html
Reported-by: Even Rouault
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for the discovery
---
lib/tftp.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/lib/tftp.c
+++ b/lib/tftp.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
@@ -490,6 +490,11 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(tftp_sta
if(result)
return result;
+ if(strlen(filename) > (state->blksize - strlen(mode) - 4)) {
+ failf(data, "TFTP file name too long\n");
+ return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL; /* too long file name field */
+ }
+
snprintf((char *)state->spacket.data+2,
state->blksize,
"%s%c%s%c", filename, '\0', mode, '\0');

View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 453e7a7a03a2cec749abd3878a48e728c515cca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 17:16:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] glob: do not continue parsing after a strtoul() overflow
range
Added test 1289 to verify.
CVE-2017-1000101
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20170809A.html
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
---
src/tool_urlglob.c | 5 ++++-
tests/data/Makefile.inc | 2 +-
tests/data/test1289 | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/data/test1289
--- a/src/tool_urlglob.c
+++ b/src/tool_urlglob.c
@@ -272,7 +272,10 @@ static CURLcode glob_range(URLGlob *glob
}
errno = 0;
max_n = strtoul(pattern, &endp, 10);
- if(errno || (*endp == ':')) {
+ if(errno)
+ /* overflow */
+ endp = NULL;
+ else if(*endp == ':') {
pattern = endp+1;
errno = 0;
step_n = strtoul(pattern, &endp, 10);