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kernel: 5.4: import wireguard backport 

Rather than using the clunky, old, slower wireguard-linux-compat out of
tree module, this commit does a patch-by-patch backport of upstream's
wireguard to 5.4. This specific backport is in widespread use, being
part of SUSE's enterprise kernel, Oracle's enterprise kernel, Google's
Android kernel, Gentoo's distro kernel, and probably more I've forgotten
about. It's definately the "more proper" way of adding wireguard to a
kernel than the ugly compat.h hell of the wireguard-linux-compat repo.
And most importantly for OpenWRT, it allows using the same module
configuration code for 5.10 as for 5.4, with no need for bifurcation.

These patches are from the backport tree which is maintained in the
open here: https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/log/?h=backport-5.4.y
I'll be sending PRs to update this as needed.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jason A. Donenfeld 2021-02-19 14:29:04 +01:00 committed by David Bauer
parent 7d4143234c
commit 3888fa7880
124 changed files with 63670 additions and 0 deletions
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112
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0001-crypto-lib-tidy-up-lib-crypto-Kconfig-and-Makefile.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 7b5de278d022b3f31bc5b42cd160bea2e8bc4c74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 001/124] crypto: lib - tidy up lib/crypto Kconfig and Makefile
commit 746b2e024c67aa605ac12d135cd7085a49cf9dc4 upstream.
In preparation of introducing a set of crypto library interfaces, tidy
up the Makefile and split off the Kconfig symbols into a separate file.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 13 +------------
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
lib/crypto/Makefile | 16 ++++++++--------
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 lib/crypto/Kconfig
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -878,9 +878,6 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA1_PPC_SPE
SHA-1 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-4) implemented
using powerpc SPE SIMD instruction set.
-config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
- tristate
-
config CRYPTO_SHA256
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
@@ -1019,9 +1016,6 @@ config CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL
comment "Ciphers"
-config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
- tristate
-
config CRYPTO_AES
tristate "AES cipher algorithms"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
@@ -1150,9 +1144,6 @@ config CRYPTO_ANUBIS
<https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/reports/>
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/AnubisPage.html>
-config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
- tristate
-
config CRYPTO_ARC4
tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
@@ -1339,9 +1330,6 @@ config CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64
This module provides the Cast6 cipher algorithm that processes
eight blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
-config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
- tristate
-
config CRYPTO_DES
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
@@ -1845,6 +1833,7 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
bool
+source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
source "certs/Kconfig"
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+comment "Crypto library routines"
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
+ tristate
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
+ tristate
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
+ tristate
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+ tristate
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES) += libaes.o
-libaes-y := aes.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES) += libaes.o
+libaes-y := aes.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o
-libarc4-y := arc4.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o
+libarc4-y := arc4.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES) += libdes.o
-libdes-y := des.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES) += libdes.o
+libdes-y := des.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o
-libsha256-y := sha256.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o
+libsha256-y := sha256.o

669
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0002-crypto-chacha-move-existing-library-code-into-lib-cr.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,669 @@
From 6f71439c260ddd0f9a21fee3e34449fe9c017ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 002/124] crypto: chacha - move existing library code into
lib/crypto
commit 5fb8ef25803ef33e2eb60b626435828b937bed75 upstream.
Currently, our generic ChaCha implementation consists of a permute
function in lib/chacha.c that operates on the 64-byte ChaCha state
directly [and which is always included into the core kernel since it
is used by the /dev/random driver], and the crypto API plumbing to
expose it as a skcipher.
In order to support in-kernel users that need the ChaCha streamcipher
but have no need [or tolerance] for going through the abstractions of
the crypto API, let's expose the streamcipher bits via a library API
as well, in a way that permits the implementation to be superseded by
an architecture specific one if provided.
So move the streamcipher code into a separate module in lib/crypto,
and expose the init() and crypt() routines to users of the library.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 2 +-
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
crypto/chacha_generic.c | 60 ++--------------------
include/crypto/chacha.h | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
include/crypto/internal/chacha.h | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
lib/Makefile | 3 +-
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 26 ++++++++++
lib/crypto/Makefile | 4 ++
lib/{ => crypto}/chacha.c | 20 ++++----
lib/crypto/libchacha.c | 35 +++++++++++++
12 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
rename lib/{ => crypto}/chacha.c (88%)
create mode 100644 lib/crypto/libchacha.c
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1393,6 +1393,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SALSA20
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
help
The ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream cipher algorithms.
--- a/crypto/chacha_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c
@@ -8,29 +8,10 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-static void chacha_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
-{
- /* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */
- u8 stream[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long));
-
- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- chacha_block(state, stream, nrounds);
- crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, stream, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
- if (bytes) {
- chacha_block(state, stream, nrounds);
- crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, stream, bytes);
- }
-}
-
static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
@@ -48,8 +29,8 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
if (nbytes < walk.total)
nbytes = round_down(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
- chacha_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
+ chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
}
@@ -58,41 +39,10 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
- state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
- state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
- state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
- state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
- state[4] = ctx->key[0];
- state[5] = ctx->key[1];
- state[6] = ctx->key[2];
- state[7] = ctx->key[3];
- state[8] = ctx->key[4];
- state[9] = ctx->key[5];
- state[10] = ctx->key[6];
- state[11] = ctx->key[7];
- state[12] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 0);
- state[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 4);
- state[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8);
- state[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha_init);
-static int chacha_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize, int nrounds)
-{
- struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- int i;
-
- if (keysize != CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->key); i++)
- ctx->key[i] = get_unaligned_le32(key + i * sizeof(u32));
-
- ctx->nrounds = nrounds;
- return 0;
-}
-
int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize)
{
@@ -126,7 +76,7 @@ int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher
/* Compute the subkey given the original key and first 128 nonce bits */
crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
- hchacha_block(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
/* Build the real IV */
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -15,9 +15,8 @@
#ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H
#define _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H
-#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */
#define CHACHA_IV_SIZE 16
@@ -29,26 +28,70 @@
/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32
-struct chacha_ctx {
- u32 key[8];
- int nrounds;
-};
-
-void chacha_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds);
+void chacha_block_generic(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds);
static inline void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream)
{
- chacha_block(state, stream, 20);
+ chacha_block_generic(state, stream, 20);
}
-void hchacha_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out, int nrounds);
-void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv);
+void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+void hchacha_block_generic(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+
+static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA))
+ hchacha_block_arch(state, out, nrounds);
+ else
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds);
+}
-int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize);
-int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize);
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv);
+static inline void chacha_init_generic(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
+ state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
+ state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
+ state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
+ state[4] = key[0];
+ state[5] = key[1];
+ state[6] = key[2];
+ state[7] = key[3];
+ state[8] = key[4];
+ state[9] = key[5];
+ state[10] = key[6];
+ state[11] = key[7];
+ state[12] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 0);
+ state[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 4);
+ state[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8);
+ state[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12);
+}
-int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
-int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
+static inline void chacha_init(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA))
+ chacha_init_arch(state, key, iv);
+ else
+ chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+
+void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds);
+void chacha_crypt_generic(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds);
+
+static inline void chacha_crypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA))
+ chacha_crypt_arch(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+ else
+ chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+}
+
+static inline void chacha20_crypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes)
+{
+ chacha_crypt(state, dst, src, bytes, 20);
+}
#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_CHACHA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_CHACHA_H
+
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+struct chacha_ctx {
+ u32 key[8];
+ int nrounds;
+};
+
+void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv);
+
+static inline int chacha_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize, int nrounds)
+{
+ struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ int i;
+
+ if (keysize != CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->key); i++)
+ ctx->key[i] = get_unaligned_le32(key + i * sizeof(u32));
+
+ ctx->nrounds = nrounds;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize)
+{
+ return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 20);
+}
+
+static int inline chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize)
+{
+ return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12);
+}
+
+int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize);
+int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize);
+
+int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
+int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ endif
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \
- idr.o extable.o \
- sha1.o chacha.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
+ idr.o extable.o sha1.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o dec_and_lock.o \
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,32 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
tristate
+config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+ tristate
+ help
+ Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
+ accelerated implementation of the ChaCha library interface,
+ either builtin or as a module.
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
+ tristate
+ select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+ help
+ This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
+ ChaCha library interface that require the generic code as a
+ fallback, e.g., for SIMD implementations. If no arch specific
+ implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
+ of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
+ tristate "ChaCha library interface"
+ depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
+ help
+ Enable the ChaCha library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
+ by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
+ is available and enabled.
+
config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
tristate
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# chacha is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin
+obj-y += chacha.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC) += libchacha.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES) += libaes.o
libaes-y := aes.o
--- a/lib/chacha.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
-/*
- * The "hash function" used as the core of the ChaCha stream cipher (RFC7539)
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha.h>
-
-static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds)
-{
- int i;
-
- /* whitelist the allowed round counts */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12);
-
- for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) {
- x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16);
- x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 16);
- x[2] += x[6]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[2], 16);
- x[3] += x[7]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[3], 16);
-
- x[8] += x[12]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[8], 12);
- x[9] += x[13]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[9], 12);
- x[10] += x[14]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[10], 12);
- x[11] += x[15]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[11], 12);
-
- x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 8);
- x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 8);
- x[2] += x[6]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[2], 8);
- x[3] += x[7]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[3], 8);
-
- x[8] += x[12]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[8], 7);
- x[9] += x[13]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[9], 7);
- x[10] += x[14]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[10], 7);
- x[11] += x[15]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[11], 7);
-
- x[0] += x[5]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[0], 16);
- x[1] += x[6]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[1], 16);
- x[2] += x[7]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[2], 16);
- x[3] += x[4]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[3], 16);
-
- x[10] += x[15]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[10], 12);
- x[11] += x[12]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[11], 12);
- x[8] += x[13]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[8], 12);
- x[9] += x[14]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[9], 12);
-
- x[0] += x[5]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[0], 8);
- x[1] += x[6]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[1], 8);
- x[2] += x[7]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[2], 8);
- x[3] += x[4]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[3], 8);
-
- x[10] += x[15]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[10], 7);
- x[11] += x[12]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[11], 7);
- x[8] += x[13]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[8], 7);
- x[9] += x[14]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[9], 7);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * chacha_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter
- * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words)
- * @stream: output keystream block (64 bytes)
- * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended)
- *
- * This is the ChaCha core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte strings.
- * The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This function
- * also handles incrementing the block counter in the input matrix.
- */
-void chacha_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds)
-{
- u32 x[16];
- int i;
-
- memcpy(x, state, 64);
-
- chacha_permute(x, nrounds);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
- put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]);
-
- state[12]++;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block);
-
-/**
- * hchacha_block - abbreviated ChaCha core, for XChaCha
- * @in: input state matrix (16 32-bit words)
- * @out: output (8 32-bit words)
- * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended)
- *
- * HChaCha is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa and is an intermediate step
- * towards XChaCha (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha
- * skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words
- * of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly.
- */
-void hchacha_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out, int nrounds)
-{
- u32 x[16];
-
- memcpy(x, in, 64);
-
- chacha_permute(x, nrounds);
-
- memcpy(&out[0], &x[0], 16);
- memcpy(&out[4], &x[12], 16);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * The "hash function" used as the core of the ChaCha stream cipher (RFC7539)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+
+static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* whitelist the allowed round counts */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) {
+ x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16);
+ x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 16);
+ x[2] += x[6]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[2], 16);
+ x[3] += x[7]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[3], 16);
+
+ x[8] += x[12]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[8], 12);
+ x[9] += x[13]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[9], 12);
+ x[10] += x[14]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[10], 12);
+ x[11] += x[15]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[11], 12);
+
+ x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 8);
+ x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 8);
+ x[2] += x[6]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[2], 8);
+ x[3] += x[7]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[3], 8);
+
+ x[8] += x[12]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[8], 7);
+ x[9] += x[13]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[9], 7);
+ x[10] += x[14]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[10], 7);
+ x[11] += x[15]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[11], 7);
+
+ x[0] += x[5]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[0], 16);
+ x[1] += x[6]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[1], 16);
+ x[2] += x[7]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[2], 16);
+ x[3] += x[4]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[3], 16);
+
+ x[10] += x[15]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[10], 12);
+ x[11] += x[12]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[11], 12);
+ x[8] += x[13]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[8], 12);
+ x[9] += x[14]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[9], 12);
+
+ x[0] += x[5]; x[15] = rol32(x[15] ^ x[0], 8);
+ x[1] += x[6]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[1], 8);
+ x[2] += x[7]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[2], 8);
+ x[3] += x[4]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[3], 8);
+
+ x[10] += x[15]; x[5] = rol32(x[5] ^ x[10], 7);
+ x[11] += x[12]; x[6] = rol32(x[6] ^ x[11], 7);
+ x[8] += x[13]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[8], 7);
+ x[9] += x[14]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[9], 7);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * chacha_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter
+ * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words)
+ * @stream: output keystream block (64 bytes)
+ * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended)
+ *
+ * This is the ChaCha core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte strings.
+ * The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This function
+ * also handles incrementing the block counter in the input matrix.
+ */
+void chacha_block_generic(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+ u32 x[16];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(x, state, 64);
+
+ chacha_permute(x, nrounds);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++)
+ put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]);
+
+ state[12]++;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block_generic);
+
+/**
+ * hchacha_block_generic - abbreviated ChaCha core, for XChaCha
+ * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words)
+ * @out: output (8 32-bit words)
+ * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended)
+ *
+ * HChaCha is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa and is an intermediate step
+ * towards XChaCha (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha
+ * skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words
+ * of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly.
+ */
+void hchacha_block_generic(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+ u32 x[16];
+
+ memcpy(x, state, 64);
+
+ chacha_permute(x, nrounds);
+
+ memcpy(&stream[0], &x[0], 16);
+ memcpy(&stream[4], &x[12], 16);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_generic);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/libchacha.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * The ChaCha stream cipher (RFC7539)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h> // for crypto_xor_cpy
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+
+void chacha_crypt_generic(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
+{
+ /* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */
+ u8 stream[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long));
+
+ while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
+ crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, stream, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ if (bytes) {
+ chacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
+ crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, stream, bytes);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_generic);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

192
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0003-crypto-x86-chacha-depend-on-generic-chacha-library-i.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
From 29c84baf5e125aa43265192a08cc4bd904db1d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 003/124] crypto: x86/chacha - depend on generic chacha library
instead of crypto driver
commit 28e8d89b1ce8d2e7badfb5f69971dd635acb8863 upstream.
In preparation of extending the x86 ChaCha driver to also expose the ChaCha
library interface, drop the dependency on the chacha_generic crypto driver
as a non-SIMD fallback, and depend on the generic ChaCha library directly.
This way, we only pull in the code we actually need, without registering
a set of ChaCha skciphers that we will never use.
Since turning the FPU on and off is cheap these days, simplify the SIMD
routine by dropping the per-page yield, which makes for a cleaner switch
to the library API as well. This also allows use to invoke the skcipher
walk routines in non-atomic mode.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 90 ++++++++++++++---------------------
crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -123,37 +123,38 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
}
}
-static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
+static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
- int next_yield = 4096; /* bytes until next FPU yield */
- int err = 0;
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ int err;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
- while (walk->nbytes > 0) {
- unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
+ while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
+ unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
- if (nbytes < walk->total) {
- nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk->stride);
- next_yield -= nbytes;
- }
-
- chacha_dosimd(state, walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
- nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
+ if (nbytes < walk.total)
+ nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
- if (next_yield <= 0) {
- /* temporarily allow preemption */
- kernel_fpu_end();
+ if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+ ctx->nrounds);
+ } else {
kernel_fpu_begin();
- next_yield = 4096;
+ chacha_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+ ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
}
-
- err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes - nbytes);
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
}
return err;
@@ -163,55 +164,34 @@ static int chacha_simd(struct skcipher_r
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- struct skcipher_walk walk;
- int err;
-
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_chacha_crypt(req);
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- err = chacha_simd_stream_xor(&walk, ctx, req->iv);
- kernel_fpu_end();
- return err;
+ return chacha_simd_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv);
}
static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- struct skcipher_walk walk;
- struct chacha_ctx subctx;
u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ struct chacha_ctx subctx;
u8 real_iv[16];
- int err;
-
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_xchacha_crypt(req);
-
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true);
- if (err)
- return err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
- kernel_fpu_begin();
-
- hchacha_block_ssse3(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ if (req->cryptlen > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE && crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ hchacha_block_ssse3(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+ } else {
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ }
subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8);
- err = chacha_simd_stream_xor(&walk, &subctx, real_iv);
-
- kernel_fpu_end();
-
- return err;
+ return chacha_simd_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv);
}
static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
@@ -227,7 +207,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = chacha_simd,
.decrypt = chacha_simd,
}, {
@@ -242,7 +222,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = xchacha_simd,
.decrypt = xchacha_simd,
}, {
@@ -257,7 +237,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
.encrypt = xchacha_simd,
.decrypt = xchacha_simd,
},
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms (x86_64/SSSE3/AVX2/AVX-512VL)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
help
SSSE3, AVX2, and AVX-512VL optimized implementations of the ChaCha20,
XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers.

205
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@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
From e7f5b03590beee54da6d02aabe0e1392bc3251e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 004/124] crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as
library function
commit 84e03fa39fbe95a5567d43bff458c6d3b3a23ad1 upstream.
Wire the existing x86 SIMD ChaCha code into the new ChaCha library
interface, so that users of the library interface will get the
accelerated version when available.
Given that calls into the library API will always go through the
routines in this module if it is enabled, switch to static keys
to select the optimal implementation available (which may be none
at all, in which case we defer to the generic implementation for
all invocations).
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
include/crypto/chacha.h | 6 +++
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -21,24 +21,24 @@ asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_ssse3(u
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void hchacha_block_ssse3(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
+
asmlinkage void chacha_2block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_8block_xor_avx2(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
-static bool chacha_use_avx2;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512
+
asmlinkage void chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
-static bool chacha_use_avx512vl;
-#endif
-#endif
+
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_simd);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_avx2);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_avx512vl);
static unsigned int chacha_advance(unsigned int len, unsigned int maxblocks)
{
@@ -49,9 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int chacha_advance(unsig
static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512
- if (chacha_use_avx512vl) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
+ static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_avx512vl)) {
while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) {
chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(state, dst, src, bytes,
nrounds);
@@ -79,8 +78,9 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
return;
}
}
-#endif
- if (chacha_use_avx2) {
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
+ static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_avx2)) {
while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) {
chacha_8block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
return;
}
}
-#endif
+
while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
@@ -123,6 +123,43 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
}
}
+void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+ state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
+ } else {
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ hchacha_block_ssse3(state, stream, nrounds);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
+
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
+
+ chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
+
+void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
+ int nrounds)
+{
+ state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable() ||
+ bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ chacha_dosimd(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
+
static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
@@ -143,7 +180,8 @@ static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct
if (nbytes < walk.total)
nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
- if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) ||
+ !crypto_simd_usable()) {
chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
ctx->nrounds);
@@ -246,18 +284,21 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
- return -ENODEV;
+ return 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
- chacha_use_avx2 = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
- cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL);
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512
- chacha_use_avx512vl = chacha_use_avx2 &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW); /* kmovq */
-#endif
-#endif
+ static_branch_enable(&chacha_use_simd);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
+ cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL)) {
+ static_branch_enable(&chacha_use_avx2);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW)) /* kmovq */
+ static_branch_enable(&chacha_use_avx512vl);
+ }
return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
help
SSSE3, AVX2, and AVX-512VL optimized implementations of the ChaCha20,
XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers.
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS ((CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE + 12) / sizeof(u32))
+#else
+#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
+#endif
+
/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32

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@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
From 527b7f4f3e244c58e07fdb7d850acb45821e1c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 005/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - depend on generic chacha
library instead of crypto driver
commit c77da4867cbb7841177275dbb250f5c09679fae4 upstream.
Depend on the generic ChaCha library routines instead of pulling in the
generic ChaCha skcipher driver, which is more than we need, and makes
managing the dependencies between the generic library, generic driver,
accelerated library and driver more complicated.
While at it, drop the logic to prefer the scalar code on short inputs.
Turning the NEON on and off is cheap these days, and one major use case
for ChaCha20 is ChaCha20-Poly1305, which is guaranteed to hit the scalar
path upon every invocation (when doing the Poly1305 nonce generation)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 40 +++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON
tristate "ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers using NEON instructions"
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function using NEON instructions (for Adiantum)"
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
@@ -76,10 +76,16 @@ static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct
if (nbytes < walk.total)
nbytes = rounddown(nbytes, walk.stride);
- kernel_neon_begin();
- chacha_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+ ctx->nrounds);
+ } else {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ }
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
}
@@ -91,9 +97,6 @@ static int chacha_neon(struct skcipher_r
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_chacha_crypt(req);
-
return chacha_neon_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv);
}
@@ -105,14 +108,15 @@ static int xchacha_neon(struct skcipher_
u32 state[16];
u8 real_iv[16];
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_xchacha_crypt(req);
-
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
- kernel_neon_begin();
- hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ if (crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ } else {
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ }
subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
.walksize = 5 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = chacha_neon,
.decrypt = chacha_neon,
}, {
@@ -150,7 +154,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
.walksize = 5 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = xchacha_neon,
.decrypt = xchacha_neon,
}, {
@@ -166,7 +170,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
.walksize = 5 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
.encrypt = xchacha_neon,
.decrypt = xchacha_neon,
}

138
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From 8b3fda990212ced164ec776a3ba0acedae022614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 006/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as
library function
commit b3aad5bad26a01a4bd8c49a5c5f52aec665f3b7c upstream.
Expose the accelerated NEON ChaCha routine directly as a symbol
export so that users of the ChaCha library API can use it directly.
Given that calls into the library API will always go through the
routines in this module if it is enabled, switch to static keys
to select the optimal implementation available (which may be none
at all, in which case we defer to the generic implementation for
all invocations).
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function using NEON instructions (for Adiantum)"
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@ asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(u
int nrounds, int bytes);
asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_neon);
+
static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
int bytes, int nrounds)
{
@@ -59,6 +62,37 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
}
}
+void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&have_neon) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
+ } else {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ hchacha_block_neon(state, stream, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
+
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
+
+void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
+ int nrounds)
+{
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&have_neon) || bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE ||
+ !crypto_simd_usable())
+ return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
+
static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
@@ -76,7 +110,8 @@ static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct
if (nbytes < walk.total)
nbytes = rounddown(nbytes, walk.stride);
- if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&have_neon) ||
+ !crypto_simd_usable()) {
chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
ctx->nrounds);
@@ -109,14 +144,7 @@ static int xchacha_neon(struct skcipher_
u8 real_iv[16];
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
-
- if (crypto_simd_usable()) {
- kernel_neon_begin();
- hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
- } else {
- hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
- }
+ hchacha_block_arch(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
@@ -179,14 +207,17 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
{
if (!cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
- return -ENODEV;
+ return 0;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&have_neon);
return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ if (cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);

480
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0007-crypto-arm-chacha-import-Eric-Biggers-s-scalar-accel.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
From 140ec1877054d2fe67538541b94b4967c0219ff4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 007/124] crypto: arm/chacha - import Eric Biggers's scalar
accelerated ChaCha code
commit 29621d099f9c642b22a69dc8e7e20c108473a392 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S | 461 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 461 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Google, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/assembler.h>
+
+/*
+ * Design notes:
+ *
+ * 16 registers would be needed to hold the state matrix, but only 14 are
+ * available because 'sp' and 'pc' cannot be used. So we spill the elements
+ * (x8, x9) to the stack and swap them out with (x10, x11). This adds one
+ * 'ldrd' and one 'strd' instruction per round.
+ *
+ * All rotates are performed using the implicit rotate operand accepted by the
+ * 'add' and 'eor' instructions. This is faster than using explicit rotate
+ * instructions. To make this work, we allow the values in the second and last
+ * rows of the ChaCha state matrix (rows 'b' and 'd') to temporarily have the
+ * wrong rotation amount. The rotation amount is then fixed up just in time
+ * when the values are used. 'brot' is the number of bits the values in row 'b'
+ * need to be rotated right to arrive at the correct values, and 'drot'
+ * similarly for row 'd'. (brot, drot) start out as (0, 0) but we make it such
+ * that they end up as (25, 24) after every round.
+ */
+
+ // ChaCha state registers
+ X0 .req r0
+ X1 .req r1
+ X2 .req r2
+ X3 .req r3
+ X4 .req r4
+ X5 .req r5
+ X6 .req r6
+ X7 .req r7
+ X8_X10 .req r8 // shared by x8 and x10
+ X9_X11 .req r9 // shared by x9 and x11
+ X12 .req r10
+ X13 .req r11
+ X14 .req r12
+ X15 .req r14
+
+.Lexpand_32byte_k:
+ // "expand 32-byte k"
+ .word 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574
+
+#ifdef __thumb2__
+# define adrl adr
+#endif
+
+.macro __rev out, in, t0, t1, t2
+.if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
+ rev \out, \in
+.else
+ lsl \t0, \in, #24
+ and \t1, \in, #0xff00
+ and \t2, \in, #0xff0000
+ orr \out, \t0, \in, lsr #24
+ orr \out, \out, \t1, lsl #8
+ orr \out, \out, \t2, lsr #8
+.endif
+.endm
+
+.macro _le32_bswap x, t0, t1, t2
+#ifdef __ARMEB__
+ __rev \x, \x, \t0, \t1, \t2
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro _le32_bswap_4x a, b, c, d, t0, t1, t2
+ _le32_bswap \a, \t0, \t1, \t2
+ _le32_bswap \b, \t0, \t1, \t2
+ _le32_bswap \c, \t0, \t1, \t2
+ _le32_bswap \d, \t0, \t1, \t2
+.endm
+
+.macro __ldrd a, b, src, offset
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
+ ldrd \a, \b, [\src, #\offset]
+#else
+ ldr \a, [\src, #\offset]
+ ldr \b, [\src, #\offset + 4]
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro __strd a, b, dst, offset
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
+ strd \a, \b, [\dst, #\offset]
+#else
+ str \a, [\dst, #\offset]
+ str \b, [\dst, #\offset + 4]
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro _halfround a1, b1, c1, d1, a2, b2, c2, d2
+
+ // a += b; d ^= a; d = rol(d, 16);
+ add \a1, \a1, \b1, ror #brot
+ add \a2, \a2, \b2, ror #brot
+ eor \d1, \a1, \d1, ror #drot
+ eor \d2, \a2, \d2, ror #drot
+ // drot == 32 - 16 == 16
+
+ // c += d; b ^= c; b = rol(b, 12);
+ add \c1, \c1, \d1, ror #16
+ add \c2, \c2, \d2, ror #16
+ eor \b1, \c1, \b1, ror #brot
+ eor \b2, \c2, \b2, ror #brot
+ // brot == 32 - 12 == 20
+
+ // a += b; d ^= a; d = rol(d, 8);
+ add \a1, \a1, \b1, ror #20
+ add \a2, \a2, \b2, ror #20
+ eor \d1, \a1, \d1, ror #16
+ eor \d2, \a2, \d2, ror #16
+ // drot == 32 - 8 == 24
+
+ // c += d; b ^= c; b = rol(b, 7);
+ add \c1, \c1, \d1, ror #24
+ add \c2, \c2, \d2, ror #24
+ eor \b1, \c1, \b1, ror #20
+ eor \b2, \c2, \b2, ror #20
+ // brot == 32 - 7 == 25
+.endm
+
+.macro _doubleround
+
+ // column round
+
+ // quarterrounds: (x0, x4, x8, x12) and (x1, x5, x9, x13)
+ _halfround X0, X4, X8_X10, X12, X1, X5, X9_X11, X13
+
+ // save (x8, x9); restore (x10, x11)
+ __strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 0
+ __ldrd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 8
+
+ // quarterrounds: (x2, x6, x10, x14) and (x3, x7, x11, x15)
+ _halfround X2, X6, X8_X10, X14, X3, X7, X9_X11, X15
+
+ .set brot, 25
+ .set drot, 24
+
+ // diagonal round
+
+ // quarterrounds: (x0, x5, x10, x15) and (x1, x6, x11, x12)
+ _halfround X0, X5, X8_X10, X15, X1, X6, X9_X11, X12
+
+ // save (x10, x11); restore (x8, x9)
+ __strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 8
+ __ldrd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 0
+
+ // quarterrounds: (x2, x7, x8, x13) and (x3, x4, x9, x14)
+ _halfround X2, X7, X8_X10, X13, X3, X4, X9_X11, X14
+.endm
+
+.macro _chacha_permute nrounds
+ .set brot, 0
+ .set drot, 0
+ .rept \nrounds / 2
+ _doubleround
+ .endr
+.endm
+
+.macro _chacha nrounds
+
+.Lnext_block\@:
+ // Stack: unused0-unused1 x10-x11 x0-x15 OUT IN LEN
+ // Registers contain x0-x9,x12-x15.
+
+ // Do the core ChaCha permutation to update x0-x15.
+ _chacha_permute \nrounds
+
+ add sp, #8
+ // Stack: x10-x11 orig_x0-orig_x15 OUT IN LEN
+ // Registers contain x0-x9,x12-x15.
+ // x4-x7 are rotated by 'brot'; x12-x15 are rotated by 'drot'.
+
+ // Free up some registers (r8-r12,r14) by pushing (x8-x9,x12-x15).
+ push {X8_X10, X9_X11, X12, X13, X14, X15}
+
+ // Load (OUT, IN, LEN).
+ ldr r14, [sp, #96]
+ ldr r12, [sp, #100]
+ ldr r11, [sp, #104]
+
+ orr r10, r14, r12
+
+ // Use slow path if fewer than 64 bytes remain.
+ cmp r11, #64
+ blt .Lxor_slowpath\@
+
+ // Use slow path if IN and/or OUT isn't 4-byte aligned. Needed even on
+ // ARMv6+, since ldmia and stmia (used below) still require alignment.
+ tst r10, #3
+ bne .Lxor_slowpath\@
+
+ // Fast path: XOR 64 bytes of aligned data.
+
+ // Stack: x8-x9 x12-x15 x10-x11 orig_x0-orig_x15 OUT IN LEN
+ // Registers: r0-r7 are x0-x7; r8-r11 are free; r12 is IN; r14 is OUT.
+ // x4-x7 are rotated by 'brot'; x12-x15 are rotated by 'drot'.
+
+ // x0-x3
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 32
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 40
+ add X0, X0, r8
+ add X1, X1, r9
+ add X2, X2, r10
+ add X3, X3, r11
+ _le32_bswap_4x X0, X1, X2, X3, r8, r9, r10
+ ldmia r12!, {r8-r11}
+ eor X0, X0, r8
+ eor X1, X1, r9
+ eor X2, X2, r10
+ eor X3, X3, r11
+ stmia r14!, {X0-X3}
+
+ // x4-x7
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 48
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 56
+ add X4, r8, X4, ror #brot
+ add X5, r9, X5, ror #brot
+ ldmia r12!, {X0-X3}
+ add X6, r10, X6, ror #brot
+ add X7, r11, X7, ror #brot
+ _le32_bswap_4x X4, X5, X6, X7, r8, r9, r10
+ eor X4, X4, X0
+ eor X5, X5, X1
+ eor X6, X6, X2
+ eor X7, X7, X3
+ stmia r14!, {X4-X7}
+
+ // x8-x15
+ pop {r0-r7} // (x8-x9,x12-x15,x10-x11)
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 32
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 40
+ add r0, r0, r8 // x8
+ add r1, r1, r9 // x9
+ add r6, r6, r10 // x10
+ add r7, r7, r11 // x11
+ _le32_bswap_4x r0, r1, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10
+ ldmia r12!, {r8-r11}
+ eor r0, r0, r8 // x8
+ eor r1, r1, r9 // x9
+ eor r6, r6, r10 // x10
+ eor r7, r7, r11 // x11
+ stmia r14!, {r0,r1,r6,r7}
+ ldmia r12!, {r0,r1,r6,r7}
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 48
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 56
+ add r2, r8, r2, ror #drot // x12
+ add r3, r9, r3, ror #drot // x13
+ add r4, r10, r4, ror #drot // x14
+ add r5, r11, r5, ror #drot // x15
+ _le32_bswap_4x r2, r3, r4, r5, r9, r10, r11
+ ldr r9, [sp, #72] // load LEN
+ eor r2, r2, r0 // x12
+ eor r3, r3, r1 // x13
+ eor r4, r4, r6 // x14
+ eor r5, r5, r7 // x15
+ subs r9, #64 // decrement and check LEN
+ stmia r14!, {r2-r5}
+
+ beq .Ldone\@
+
+.Lprepare_for_next_block\@:
+
+ // Stack: x0-x15 OUT IN LEN
+
+ // Increment block counter (x12)
+ add r8, #1
+
+ // Store updated (OUT, IN, LEN)
+ str r14, [sp, #64]
+ str r12, [sp, #68]
+ str r9, [sp, #72]
+
+ mov r14, sp
+
+ // Store updated block counter (x12)
+ str r8, [sp, #48]
+
+ sub sp, #16
+
+ // Reload state and do next block
+ ldmia r14!, {r0-r11} // load x0-x11
+ __strd r10, r11, sp, 8 // store x10-x11 before state
+ ldmia r14, {r10-r12,r14} // load x12-x15
+ b .Lnext_block\@
+
+.Lxor_slowpath\@:
+ // Slow path: < 64 bytes remaining, or unaligned input or output buffer.
+ // We handle it by storing the 64 bytes of keystream to the stack, then
+ // XOR-ing the needed portion with the data.
+
+ // Allocate keystream buffer
+ sub sp, #64
+ mov r14, sp
+
+ // Stack: ks0-ks15 x8-x9 x12-x15 x10-x11 orig_x0-orig_x15 OUT IN LEN
+ // Registers: r0-r7 are x0-x7; r8-r11 are free; r12 is IN; r14 is &ks0.
+ // x4-x7 are rotated by 'brot'; x12-x15 are rotated by 'drot'.
+
+ // Save keystream for x0-x3
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 96
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 104
+ add X0, X0, r8
+ add X1, X1, r9
+ add X2, X2, r10
+ add X3, X3, r11
+ _le32_bswap_4x X0, X1, X2, X3, r8, r9, r10
+ stmia r14!, {X0-X3}
+
+ // Save keystream for x4-x7
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 112
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 120
+ add X4, r8, X4, ror #brot
+ add X5, r9, X5, ror #brot
+ add X6, r10, X6, ror #brot
+ add X7, r11, X7, ror #brot
+ _le32_bswap_4x X4, X5, X6, X7, r8, r9, r10
+ add r8, sp, #64
+ stmia r14!, {X4-X7}
+
+ // Save keystream for x8-x15
+ ldm r8, {r0-r7} // (x8-x9,x12-x15,x10-x11)
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 128
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 136
+ add r0, r0, r8 // x8
+ add r1, r1, r9 // x9
+ add r6, r6, r10 // x10
+ add r7, r7, r11 // x11
+ _le32_bswap_4x r0, r1, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10
+ stmia r14!, {r0,r1,r6,r7}
+ __ldrd r8, r9, sp, 144
+ __ldrd r10, r11, sp, 152
+ add r2, r8, r2, ror #drot // x12
+ add r3, r9, r3, ror #drot // x13
+ add r4, r10, r4, ror #drot // x14
+ add r5, r11, r5, ror #drot // x15
+ _le32_bswap_4x r2, r3, r4, r5, r9, r10, r11
+ stmia r14, {r2-r5}
+
+ // Stack: ks0-ks15 unused0-unused7 x0-x15 OUT IN LEN
+ // Registers: r8 is block counter, r12 is IN.
+
+ ldr r9, [sp, #168] // LEN
+ ldr r14, [sp, #160] // OUT
+ cmp r9, #64
+ mov r0, sp
+ movle r1, r9
+ movgt r1, #64
+ // r1 is number of bytes to XOR, in range [1, 64]
+
+.if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 6
+ orr r2, r12, r14
+ tst r2, #3 // IN or OUT misaligned?
+ bne .Lxor_next_byte\@
+.endif
+
+ // XOR a word at a time
+.rept 16
+ subs r1, #4
+ blt .Lxor_words_done\@
+ ldr r2, [r12], #4
+ ldr r3, [r0], #4
+ eor r2, r2, r3
+ str r2, [r14], #4
+.endr
+ b .Lxor_slowpath_done\@
+.Lxor_words_done\@:
+ ands r1, r1, #3
+ beq .Lxor_slowpath_done\@
+
+ // XOR a byte at a time
+.Lxor_next_byte\@:
+ ldrb r2, [r12], #1
+ ldrb r3, [r0], #1
+ eor r2, r2, r3
+ strb r2, [r14], #1
+ subs r1, #1
+ bne .Lxor_next_byte\@
+
+.Lxor_slowpath_done\@:
+ subs r9, #64
+ add sp, #96
+ bgt .Lprepare_for_next_block\@
+
+.Ldone\@:
+.endm // _chacha
+
+/*
+ * void chacha20_arm(u8 *out, const u8 *in, size_t len, const u32 key[8],
+ * const u32 iv[4]);
+ */
+ENTRY(chacha20_arm)
+ cmp r2, #0 // len == 0?
+ reteq lr
+
+ push {r0-r2,r4-r11,lr}
+
+ // Push state x0-x15 onto stack.
+ // Also store an extra copy of x10-x11 just before the state.
+
+ ldr r4, [sp, #48] // iv
+ mov r0, sp
+ sub sp, #80
+
+ // iv: x12-x15
+ ldm r4, {X12,X13,X14,X15}
+ stmdb r0!, {X12,X13,X14,X15}
+
+ // key: x4-x11
+ __ldrd X8_X10, X9_X11, r3, 24
+ __strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 8
+ stmdb r0!, {X8_X10, X9_X11}
+ ldm r3, {X4-X9_X11}
+ stmdb r0!, {X4-X9_X11}
+
+ // constants: x0-x3
+ adrl X3, .Lexpand_32byte_k
+ ldm X3, {X0-X3}
+ __strd X0, X1, sp, 16
+ __strd X2, X3, sp, 24
+
+ _chacha 20
+
+ add sp, #76
+ pop {r4-r11, pc}
+ENDPROC(chacha20_arm)
+
+/*
+ * void hchacha20_arm(const u32 state[16], u32 out[8]);
+ */
+ENTRY(hchacha20_arm)
+ push {r1,r4-r11,lr}
+
+ mov r14, r0
+ ldmia r14!, {r0-r11} // load x0-x11
+ push {r10-r11} // store x10-x11 to stack
+ ldm r14, {r10-r12,r14} // load x12-x15
+ sub sp, #8
+
+ _chacha_permute 20
+
+ // Skip over (unused0-unused1, x10-x11)
+ add sp, #16
+
+ // Fix up rotations of x12-x15
+ ror X12, X12, #drot
+ ror X13, X13, #drot
+ pop {r4} // load 'out'
+ ror X14, X14, #drot
+ ror X15, X15, #drot
+
+ // Store (x0-x3,x12-x15) to 'out'
+ stm r4, {X0,X1,X2,X3,X12,X13,X14,X15}
+
+ pop {r4-r11,pc}
+ENDPROC(hchacha20_arm)

691
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0008-crypto-arm-chacha-remove-dependency-on-generic-ChaCh.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
From a92bd97c758d32511f0deeef84f25c3a1d5e7879 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 008/124] crypto: arm/chacha - remove dependency on generic
ChaCha driver
commit b36d8c09e710c71f6a9690b6586fea2d1c9e1e27 upstream.
Instead of falling back to the generic ChaCha skcipher driver for
non-SIMD cases, use a fast scalar implementation for ARM authored
by Eric Biggers. This removes the module dependency on chacha-generic
altogether, which also simplifies things when we expose the ChaCha
library interface from this module.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 4 +-
arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 304 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 202 ------------------
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S | 65 +++---
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 240 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
delete mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -127,10 +127,8 @@ config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE
select CRYPTO_HASH
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON
- tristate "NEON accelerated ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
- depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
+ tristate "NEON and scalar accelerated ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON
tristate "NEON accelerated NHPoly1305 hash function (for Adiantum)"
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ aes-arm-ce-y := aes-ce-core.o aes-ce-glu
ghash-arm-ce-y := ghash-ce-core.o ghash-ce-glue.o
crct10dif-arm-ce-y := crct10dif-ce-core.o crct10dif-ce-glue.o
crc32-arm-ce-y:= crc32-ce-core.o crc32-ce-glue.o
-chacha-neon-y := chacha-neon-core.o chacha-neon-glue.o
+chacha-neon-y := chacha-scalar-core.o chacha-glue.o
+chacha-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) += chacha-neon-core.o
nhpoly1305-neon-y := nh-neon-core.o nhpoly1305-neon-glue.o
ifdef REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ARM NEON accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers,
+ * including ChaCha20 (RFC7539)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap.h>
+#include <asm/neon.h>
+#include <asm/simd.h>
+
+asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ int nrounds);
+asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ int nrounds);
+asmlinkage void hchacha_block_arm(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+
+asmlinkage void chacha_doarm(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
+ const u32 *state, int nrounds);
+
+static inline bool neon_usable(void)
+{
+ return crypto_simd_usable();
+}
+
+static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
+{
+ u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
+ chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
+ bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+ src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+ dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+ state[12] += 4;
+ }
+ while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
+ bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ state[12]++;
+ }
+ if (bytes) {
+ memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
+ chacha_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf, nrounds);
+ memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
+ }
+}
+
+static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
+ const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv,
+ bool neon)
+{
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ u32 state[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
+
+ while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
+ unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
+
+ if (nbytes < walk.total)
+ nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
+
+ if (!neon) {
+ chacha_doarm(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+ nbytes, state, ctx->nrounds);
+ state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ }
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int do_chacha(struct skcipher_request *req, bool neon)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return chacha_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv, neon);
+}
+
+static int chacha_arm(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return do_chacha(req, false);
+}
+
+static int chacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return do_chacha(req, neon_usable());
+}
+
+static int do_xchacha(struct skcipher_request *req, bool neon)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ struct chacha_ctx subctx;
+ u32 state[16];
+ u8 real_iv[16];
+
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
+
+ if (!neon) {
+ hchacha_block_arm(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ } else {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ }
+ subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
+
+ memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8);
+ return chacha_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv, neon);
+}
+
+static int xchacha_arm(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return do_xchacha(req, false);
+}
+
+static int xchacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return do_xchacha(req, neon_usable());
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg arm_algs[] = {
+ {
+ .base.cra_name = "chacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-arm",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = chacha_arm,
+ .decrypt = chacha_arm,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-arm",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_arm,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_arm,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha12",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-arm",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_arm,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_arm,
+ },
+};
+
+static struct skcipher_alg neon_algs[] = {
+ {
+ .base.cra_name = "chacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon",
+ .base.cra_priority = 300,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = chacha_neon,
+ .decrypt = chacha_neon,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-neon",
+ .base.cra_priority = 300,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_neon,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_neon,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha12",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-neon",
+ .base.cra_priority = 300,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_neon,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_neon,
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_register_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) {
+ int i;
+
+ switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A7:
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A5:
+ /*
+ * The Cortex-A7 and Cortex-A5 do not perform well with
+ * the NEON implementation but do incredibly with the
+ * scalar one and use less power.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs); i++)
+ neon_algs[i].base.cra_priority = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_register_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
+ if (err)
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON))
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
+}
+
+module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);
+module_exit(chacha_simd_mod_fini);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (scalar and NEON accelerated)");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-arm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-arm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-arm");
+#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-neon");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-neon");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-neon");
+#endif
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * ARM NEON accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers,
- * including ChaCha20 (RFC7539)
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * Based on:
- * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, SIMD glue code
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-
-#include <asm/hwcap.h>
-#include <asm/neon.h>
-#include <asm/simd.h>
-
-asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int nrounds);
-asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int nrounds);
-asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
-
-static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
-{
- u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-
- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
- chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- state[12] += 4;
- }
- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- state[12]++;
- }
- if (bytes) {
- memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf, nrounds);
- memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
- }
-}
-
-static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
- const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
-{
- struct skcipher_walk walk;
- u32 state[16];
- int err;
-
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv);
-
- while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
- unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
-
- if (nbytes < walk.total)
- nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
-
- kernel_neon_begin();
- chacha_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
- err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
- }
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static int chacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
- struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_chacha_crypt(req);
-
- return chacha_neon_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv);
-}
-
-static int xchacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
- struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- struct chacha_ctx subctx;
- u32 state[16];
- u8 real_iv[16];
-
- if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_xchacha_crypt(req);
-
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
-
- kernel_neon_begin();
- hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
- subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
-
- memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
- memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8);
- return chacha_neon_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv);
-}
-
-static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
- {
- .base.cra_name = "chacha20",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon",
- .base.cra_priority = 300,
- .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
- .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
- .encrypt = chacha_neon,
- .decrypt = chacha_neon,
- }, {
- .base.cra_name = "xchacha20",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-neon",
- .base.cra_priority = 300,
- .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
- .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
- .encrypt = xchacha_neon,
- .decrypt = xchacha_neon,
- }, {
- .base.cra_name = "xchacha12",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-neon",
- .base.cra_priority = 300,
- .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
- .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
- .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey,
- .encrypt = xchacha_neon,
- .decrypt = xchacha_neon,
- }
-};
-
-static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
-{
- if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON))
- return -ENODEV;
-
- return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
-}
-
-static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
-{
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
-}
-
-module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);
-module_exit(chacha_simd_mod_fini);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (NEON accelerated)");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-neon");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-neon");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-neon");
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-scalar-core.S
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@
X14 .req r12
X15 .req r14
-.Lexpand_32byte_k:
- // "expand 32-byte k"
- .word 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574
-
-#ifdef __thumb2__
-# define adrl adr
-#endif
-
.macro __rev out, in, t0, t1, t2
.if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6
rev \out, \in
@@ -391,61 +383,65 @@
.endm // _chacha
/*
- * void chacha20_arm(u8 *out, const u8 *in, size_t len, const u32 key[8],
- * const u32 iv[4]);
+ * void chacha_doarm(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
+ * const u32 *state, int nrounds);
*/
-ENTRY(chacha20_arm)
+ENTRY(chacha_doarm)
cmp r2, #0 // len == 0?
reteq lr
+ ldr ip, [sp]
+ cmp ip, #12
+
push {r0-r2,r4-r11,lr}
// Push state x0-x15 onto stack.
// Also store an extra copy of x10-x11 just before the state.
- ldr r4, [sp, #48] // iv
- mov r0, sp
- sub sp, #80
-
- // iv: x12-x15
- ldm r4, {X12,X13,X14,X15}
- stmdb r0!, {X12,X13,X14,X15}
+ add X12, r3, #48
+ ldm X12, {X12,X13,X14,X15}
+ push {X12,X13,X14,X15}
+ sub sp, sp, #64
- // key: x4-x11
- __ldrd X8_X10, X9_X11, r3, 24
+ __ldrd X8_X10, X9_X11, r3, 40
__strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 8
- stmdb r0!, {X8_X10, X9_X11}
- ldm r3, {X4-X9_X11}
- stmdb r0!, {X4-X9_X11}
-
- // constants: x0-x3
- adrl X3, .Lexpand_32byte_k
- ldm X3, {X0-X3}
+ __strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 56
+ ldm r3, {X0-X9_X11}
__strd X0, X1, sp, 16
__strd X2, X3, sp, 24
+ __strd X4, X5, sp, 32
+ __strd X6, X7, sp, 40
+ __strd X8_X10, X9_X11, sp, 48
+ beq 1f
_chacha 20
- add sp, #76
+0: add sp, #76
pop {r4-r11, pc}
-ENDPROC(chacha20_arm)
+
+1: _chacha 12
+ b 0b
+ENDPROC(chacha_doarm)
/*
- * void hchacha20_arm(const u32 state[16], u32 out[8]);
+ * void hchacha_block_arm(const u32 state[16], u32 out[8], int nrounds);
*/
-ENTRY(hchacha20_arm)
+ENTRY(hchacha_block_arm)
push {r1,r4-r11,lr}
+ cmp r2, #12 // ChaCha12 ?
+
mov r14, r0
ldmia r14!, {r0-r11} // load x0-x11
push {r10-r11} // store x10-x11 to stack
ldm r14, {r10-r12,r14} // load x12-x15
sub sp, #8
+ beq 1f
_chacha_permute 20
// Skip over (unused0-unused1, x10-x11)
- add sp, #16
+0: add sp, #16
// Fix up rotations of x12-x15
ror X12, X12, #drot
@@ -458,4 +454,7 @@ ENTRY(hchacha20_arm)
stm r4, {X0,X1,X2,X3,X12,X13,X14,X15}
pop {r4-r11,pc}
-ENDPROC(hchacha20_arm)
+
+1: _chacha_permute 12
+ b 0b
+ENDPROC(hchacha_block_arm)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * ARM NEON accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers,
+ * ARM NEON and scalar accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers,
* including ChaCha20 (RFC7539)
*
* Copyright (C) 2016 - 2017 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

108
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0009-crypto-arm-chacha-expose-ARM-ChaCha-routine-as-libra.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From 360be1a8f326ec5c0d20a134e228fb96a2eb351d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 009/124] crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as
library function
commit a44a3430d71bad4ee56788a59fff099b291ea54c upstream.
Expose the accelerated NEON ChaCha routine directly as a symbol
export so that users of the ChaCha library API can use it directly.
Given that calls into the library API will always go through the
routines in this module if it is enabled, switch to static keys
to select the optimal implementation available (which may be none
at all, in which case we defer to the generic implementation for
all invocations).
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON
tristate "NEON and scalar accelerated ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON
tristate "NEON accelerated NHPoly1305 hash function (for Adiantum)"
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -29,9 +30,11 @@ asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const
asmlinkage void chacha_doarm(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
const u32 *state, int nrounds);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(use_neon);
+
static inline bool neon_usable(void)
{
- return crypto_simd_usable();
+ return static_branch_likely(&use_neon) && crypto_simd_usable();
}
static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
@@ -60,6 +63,40 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
}
}
+void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) || !neon_usable()) {
+ hchacha_block_arm(state, stream, nrounds);
+ } else {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ hchacha_block_neon(state, stream, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
+
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
+
+void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
+ int nrounds)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) || !neon_usable() ||
+ bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha_doarm(dst, src, bytes, state, nrounds);
+ state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
+
static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv,
bool neon)
@@ -269,6 +306,8 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(v
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs); i++)
neon_algs[i].base.cra_priority = 0;
break;
+ default:
+ static_branch_enable(&use_neon);
}
err = crypto_register_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));

452
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0010-crypto-mips-chacha-import-32r2-ChaCha-code-from-Zinc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
From f9b4c68865fdb7f3327f7d82fbc82c76c8773d53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 010/124] crypto: mips/chacha - import 32r2 ChaCha code from
Zinc
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit 49aa7c00eddf8d8f462b0256bd82e81762d7b0c6 upstream.
This imports the accelerated MIPS 32r2 ChaCha20 implementation from the
Zinc patch set.
Co-developed-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S | 424 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 424 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#define MASK_U32 0x3c
+#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+#define STACK_SIZE 32
+
+#define X0 $t0
+#define X1 $t1
+#define X2 $t2
+#define X3 $t3
+#define X4 $t4
+#define X5 $t5
+#define X6 $t6
+#define X7 $t7
+#define X8 $t8
+#define X9 $t9
+#define X10 $v1
+#define X11 $s6
+#define X12 $s5
+#define X13 $s4
+#define X14 $s3
+#define X15 $s2
+/* Use regs which are overwritten on exit for Tx so we don't leak clear data. */
+#define T0 $s1
+#define T1 $s0
+#define T(n) T ## n
+#define X(n) X ## n
+
+/* Input arguments */
+#define STATE $a0
+#define OUT $a1
+#define IN $a2
+#define BYTES $a3
+
+/* Output argument */
+/* NONCE[0] is kept in a register and not in memory.
+ * We don't want to touch original value in memory.
+ * Must be incremented every loop iteration.
+ */
+#define NONCE_0 $v0
+
+/* SAVED_X and SAVED_CA are set in the jump table.
+ * Use regs which are overwritten on exit else we don't leak clear data.
+ * They are used to handling the last bytes which are not multiple of 4.
+ */
+#define SAVED_X X15
+#define SAVED_CA $s7
+
+#define IS_UNALIGNED $s7
+
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#define MSB 0
+#define LSB 3
+#define ROTx rotl
+#define ROTR(n) rotr n, 24
+#define CPU_TO_LE32(n) \
+ wsbh n; \
+ rotr n, 16;
+#else
+#define MSB 3
+#define LSB 0
+#define ROTx rotr
+#define CPU_TO_LE32(n)
+#define ROTR(n)
+#endif
+
+#define FOR_EACH_WORD(x) \
+ x( 0); \
+ x( 1); \
+ x( 2); \
+ x( 3); \
+ x( 4); \
+ x( 5); \
+ x( 6); \
+ x( 7); \
+ x( 8); \
+ x( 9); \
+ x(10); \
+ x(11); \
+ x(12); \
+ x(13); \
+ x(14); \
+ x(15);
+
+#define FOR_EACH_WORD_REV(x) \
+ x(15); \
+ x(14); \
+ x(13); \
+ x(12); \
+ x(11); \
+ x(10); \
+ x( 9); \
+ x( 8); \
+ x( 7); \
+ x( 6); \
+ x( 5); \
+ x( 4); \
+ x( 3); \
+ x( 2); \
+ x( 1); \
+ x( 0);
+
+#define PLUS_ONE_0 1
+#define PLUS_ONE_1 2
+#define PLUS_ONE_2 3
+#define PLUS_ONE_3 4
+#define PLUS_ONE_4 5
+#define PLUS_ONE_5 6
+#define PLUS_ONE_6 7
+#define PLUS_ONE_7 8
+#define PLUS_ONE_8 9
+#define PLUS_ONE_9 10
+#define PLUS_ONE_10 11
+#define PLUS_ONE_11 12
+#define PLUS_ONE_12 13
+#define PLUS_ONE_13 14
+#define PLUS_ONE_14 15
+#define PLUS_ONE_15 16
+#define PLUS_ONE(x) PLUS_ONE_ ## x
+#define _CONCAT3(a,b,c) a ## b ## c
+#define CONCAT3(a,b,c) _CONCAT3(a,b,c)
+
+#define STORE_UNALIGNED(x) \
+CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
+ .if (x != 12); \
+ lw T0, (x*4)(STATE); \
+ .endif; \
+ lwl T1, (x*4)+MSB ## (IN); \
+ lwr T1, (x*4)+LSB ## (IN); \
+ .if (x == 12); \
+ addu X ## x, NONCE_0; \
+ .else; \
+ addu X ## x, T0; \
+ .endif; \
+ CPU_TO_LE32(X ## x); \
+ xor X ## x, T1; \
+ swl X ## x, (x*4)+MSB ## (OUT); \
+ swr X ## x, (x*4)+LSB ## (OUT);
+
+#define STORE_ALIGNED(x) \
+CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
+ .if (x != 12); \
+ lw T0, (x*4)(STATE); \
+ .endif; \
+ lw T1, (x*4) ## (IN); \
+ .if (x == 12); \
+ addu X ## x, NONCE_0; \
+ .else; \
+ addu X ## x, T0; \
+ .endif; \
+ CPU_TO_LE32(X ## x); \
+ xor X ## x, T1; \
+ sw X ## x, (x*4) ## (OUT);
+
+/* Jump table macro.
+ * Used for setup and handling the last bytes, which are not multiple of 4.
+ * X15 is free to store Xn
+ * Every jumptable entry must be equal in size.
+ */
+#define JMPTBL_ALIGNED(x) \
+.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_ ## x: ; \
+ .set noreorder; \
+ b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_ ## x ## _b; \
+ .if (x == 12); \
+ addu SAVED_X, X ## x, NONCE_0; \
+ .else; \
+ addu SAVED_X, X ## x, SAVED_CA; \
+ .endif; \
+ .set reorder
+
+#define JMPTBL_UNALIGNED(x) \
+.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_ ## x: ; \
+ .set noreorder; \
+ b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_ ## x ## _b; \
+ .if (x == 12); \
+ addu SAVED_X, X ## x, NONCE_0; \
+ .else; \
+ addu SAVED_X, X ## x, SAVED_CA; \
+ .endif; \
+ .set reorder
+
+#define AXR(A, B, C, D, K, L, M, N, V, W, Y, Z, S) \
+ addu X(A), X(K); \
+ addu X(B), X(L); \
+ addu X(C), X(M); \
+ addu X(D), X(N); \
+ xor X(V), X(A); \
+ xor X(W), X(B); \
+ xor X(Y), X(C); \
+ xor X(Z), X(D); \
+ rotl X(V), S; \
+ rotl X(W), S; \
+ rotl X(Y), S; \
+ rotl X(Z), S;
+
+.text
+.set reorder
+.set noat
+.globl chacha20_mips
+.ent chacha20_mips
+chacha20_mips:
+ .frame $sp, STACK_SIZE, $ra
+
+ addiu $sp, -STACK_SIZE
+
+ /* Return bytes = 0. */
+ beqz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_end
+
+ lw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
+
+ /* Save s0-s7 */
+ sw $s0, 0($sp)
+ sw $s1, 4($sp)
+ sw $s2, 8($sp)
+ sw $s3, 12($sp)
+ sw $s4, 16($sp)
+ sw $s5, 20($sp)
+ sw $s6, 24($sp)
+ sw $s7, 28($sp)
+
+ /* Test IN or OUT is unaligned.
+ * IS_UNALIGNED = ( IN | OUT ) & 0x00000003
+ */
+ or IS_UNALIGNED, IN, OUT
+ andi IS_UNALIGNED, 0x3
+
+ /* Set number of rounds */
+ li $at, 20
+
+ b .Lchacha20_rounds_start
+
+.align 4
+.Loop_chacha20_rounds:
+ addiu IN, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
+ addiu OUT, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
+ addiu NONCE_0, 1
+
+.Lchacha20_rounds_start:
+ lw X0, 0(STATE)
+ lw X1, 4(STATE)
+ lw X2, 8(STATE)
+ lw X3, 12(STATE)
+
+ lw X4, 16(STATE)
+ lw X5, 20(STATE)
+ lw X6, 24(STATE)
+ lw X7, 28(STATE)
+ lw X8, 32(STATE)
+ lw X9, 36(STATE)
+ lw X10, 40(STATE)
+ lw X11, 44(STATE)
+
+ move X12, NONCE_0
+ lw X13, 52(STATE)
+ lw X14, 56(STATE)
+ lw X15, 60(STATE)
+
+.Loop_chacha20_xor_rounds:
+ addiu $at, -2
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13,14,15, 16);
+ AXR( 8, 9,10,11, 12,13,14,15, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13,14,15, 8);
+ AXR( 8, 9,10,11, 12,13,14,15, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4, 15,12,13,14, 16);
+ AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 12);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4, 15,12,13,14, 8);
+ AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 7);
+ bnez $at, .Loop_chacha20_xor_rounds
+
+ addiu BYTES, -(CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /* Is data src/dst unaligned? Jump */
+ bnez IS_UNALIGNED, .Loop_chacha20_unaligned
+
+ /* Set number rounds here to fill delayslot. */
+ li $at, 20
+
+ /* BYTES < 0, it has no full block. */
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_aligned
+
+ FOR_EACH_WORD_REV(STORE_ALIGNED)
+
+ /* BYTES > 0? Loop again. */
+ bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha20_rounds
+
+ /* Place this here to fill delay slot */
+ addiu NONCE_0, 1
+
+ /* BYTES < 0? Handle last bytes */
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_bytes
+
+.Lchacha20_mips_xor_done:
+ /* Restore used registers */
+ lw $s0, 0($sp)
+ lw $s1, 4($sp)
+ lw $s2, 8($sp)
+ lw $s3, 12($sp)
+ lw $s4, 16($sp)
+ lw $s5, 20($sp)
+ lw $s6, 24($sp)
+ lw $s7, 28($sp)
+
+ /* Write NONCE_0 back to right location in state */
+ sw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
+
+.Lchacha20_mips_end:
+ addiu $sp, STACK_SIZE
+ jr $ra
+
+.Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_aligned:
+ /* Restore the offset on BYTES */
+ addiu BYTES, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+ /* Get number of full WORDS */
+ andi $at, BYTES, MASK_U32
+
+ /* Load upper half of jump table addr */
+ lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
+
+ /* Calculate lower half jump table offset */
+ ins T0, $at, 1, 6
+
+ /* Add offset to STATE */
+ addu T1, STATE, $at
+
+ /* Add lower half jump table addr */
+ addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
+
+ /* Read value from STATE */
+ lw SAVED_CA, 0(T1)
+
+ /* Store remaining bytecounter as negative value */
+ subu BYTES, $at, BYTES
+
+ jr T0
+
+ /* Jump table */
+ FOR_EACH_WORD(JMPTBL_ALIGNED)
+
+
+.Loop_chacha20_unaligned:
+ /* Set number rounds here to fill delayslot. */
+ li $at, 20
+
+ /* BYTES > 0, it has no full block. */
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_unaligned
+
+ FOR_EACH_WORD_REV(STORE_UNALIGNED)
+
+ /* BYTES > 0? Loop again. */
+ bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha20_rounds
+
+ /* Write NONCE_0 back to right location in state */
+ sw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
+
+ .set noreorder
+ /* Fall through to byte handling */
+ bgez BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+.Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_0_b:
+.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_0_b:
+ /* Place this here to fill delay slot */
+ addiu NONCE_0, 1
+ .set reorder
+
+.Lchacha20_mips_xor_bytes:
+ addu IN, $at
+ addu OUT, $at
+ /* First byte */
+ lbu T1, 0(IN)
+ addiu $at, BYTES, 1
+ CPU_TO_LE32(SAVED_X)
+ ROTR(SAVED_X)
+ xor T1, SAVED_X
+ sb T1, 0(OUT)
+ beqz $at, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+ /* Second byte */
+ lbu T1, 1(IN)
+ addiu $at, BYTES, 2
+ ROTx SAVED_X, 8
+ xor T1, SAVED_X
+ sb T1, 1(OUT)
+ beqz $at, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+ /* Third byte */
+ lbu T1, 2(IN)
+ ROTx SAVED_X, 8
+ xor T1, SAVED_X
+ sb T1, 2(OUT)
+ b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+
+.Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_unaligned:
+ /* Restore the offset on BYTES */
+ addiu BYTES, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+ /* Get number of full WORDS */
+ andi $at, BYTES, MASK_U32
+
+ /* Load upper half of jump table addr */
+ lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
+
+ /* Calculate lower half jump table offset */
+ ins T0, $at, 1, 6
+
+ /* Add offset to STATE */
+ addu T1, STATE, $at
+
+ /* Add lower half jump table addr */
+ addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
+
+ /* Read value from STATE */
+ lw SAVED_CA, 0(T1)
+
+ /* Store remaining bytecounter as negative value */
+ subu BYTES, $at, BYTES
+
+ jr T0
+
+ /* Jump table */
+ FOR_EACH_WORD(JMPTBL_UNALIGNED)
+.end chacha20_mips
+.set at

560
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0011-crypto-mips-chacha-wire-up-accelerated-32r2-code-fro.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
From 01c1104f551dae77125bb3d0f461f4084f2a98df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 011/124] crypto: mips/chacha - wire up accelerated 32r2 code
from Zinc
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit 3a2f58f3ba4f6f44e33d1a48240d5eadb882cb59 upstream.
This integrates the accelerated MIPS 32r2 implementation of ChaCha
into both the API and library interfaces of the kernel crypto stack.
The significance of this is that, in addition to becoming available
as an accelerated library implementation, it can also be used by
existing crypto API code such as Adiantum (for block encryption on
ultra low performance cores) or IPsec using chacha20poly1305. These
are use cases that have already opted into using the abstract crypto
API. In order to support Adiantum, the core assembler routine has
been adapted to take the round count as a function argument rather
than hardcoding it to 20.
Co-developed-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/mips/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/mips/crypto/Makefile | 4 +
arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/Kconfig | 6 ++
5 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c
--- a/arch/mips/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/Makefile
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ libs-$(CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT) += arch/m
# See arch/mips/Kbuild for content of core part of the kernel
core-y += arch/mips/
-drivers-$(CONFIG_MIPS_CRC_SUPPORT) += arch/mips/crypto/
+drivers-y += arch/mips/crypto/
drivers-$(CONFIG_OPROFILE) += arch/mips/oprofile/
# suspend and hibernation support
--- a/arch/mips/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/Makefile
@@ -4,3 +4,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_MIPS) += crc32-mips.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_MIPS) += chacha-mips.o
+chacha-mips-y := chacha-core.o chacha-glue.o
+AFLAGS_chacha-core.o += -O2 # needed to fill branch delay slots
--- a/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-core.S
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
#define CONCAT3(a,b,c) _CONCAT3(a,b,c)
#define STORE_UNALIGNED(x) \
-CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
+CONCAT3(.Lchacha_mips_xor_unaligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
.if (x != 12); \
lw T0, (x*4)(STATE); \
.endif; \
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_,
swr X ## x, (x*4)+LSB ## (OUT);
#define STORE_ALIGNED(x) \
-CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
+CONCAT3(.Lchacha_mips_xor_aligned_, PLUS_ONE(x), _b: ;) \
.if (x != 12); \
lw T0, (x*4)(STATE); \
.endif; \
@@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_, PL
* Every jumptable entry must be equal in size.
*/
#define JMPTBL_ALIGNED(x) \
-.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_ ## x: ; \
+.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_aligned_ ## x: ; \
.set noreorder; \
- b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_ ## x ## _b; \
+ b .Lchacha_mips_xor_aligned_ ## x ## _b; \
.if (x == 12); \
addu SAVED_X, X ## x, NONCE_0; \
.else; \
@@ -173,9 +173,9 @@ CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_, PL
.set reorder
#define JMPTBL_UNALIGNED(x) \
-.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_ ## x: ; \
+.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_ ## x: ; \
.set noreorder; \
- b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_ ## x ## _b; \
+ b .Lchacha_mips_xor_unaligned_ ## x ## _b; \
.if (x == 12); \
addu SAVED_X, X ## x, NONCE_0; \
.else; \
@@ -200,15 +200,18 @@ CONCAT3(.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_, PL
.text
.set reorder
.set noat
-.globl chacha20_mips
-.ent chacha20_mips
-chacha20_mips:
+.globl chacha_crypt_arch
+.ent chacha_crypt_arch
+chacha_crypt_arch:
.frame $sp, STACK_SIZE, $ra
+ /* Load number of rounds */
+ lw $at, 16($sp)
+
addiu $sp, -STACK_SIZE
/* Return bytes = 0. */
- beqz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_end
+ beqz BYTES, .Lchacha_mips_end
lw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
@@ -228,18 +231,15 @@ chacha20_mips:
or IS_UNALIGNED, IN, OUT
andi IS_UNALIGNED, 0x3
- /* Set number of rounds */
- li $at, 20
-
- b .Lchacha20_rounds_start
+ b .Lchacha_rounds_start
.align 4
-.Loop_chacha20_rounds:
+.Loop_chacha_rounds:
addiu IN, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
addiu OUT, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
addiu NONCE_0, 1
-.Lchacha20_rounds_start:
+.Lchacha_rounds_start:
lw X0, 0(STATE)
lw X1, 4(STATE)
lw X2, 8(STATE)
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ chacha20_mips:
lw X14, 56(STATE)
lw X15, 60(STATE)
-.Loop_chacha20_xor_rounds:
+.Loop_chacha_xor_rounds:
addiu $at, -2
AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13,14,15, 16);
AXR( 8, 9,10,11, 12,13,14,15, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12);
@@ -269,31 +269,31 @@ chacha20_mips:
AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 12);
AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4, 15,12,13,14, 8);
AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 7);
- bnez $at, .Loop_chacha20_xor_rounds
+ bnez $at, .Loop_chacha_xor_rounds
addiu BYTES, -(CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE)
/* Is data src/dst unaligned? Jump */
- bnez IS_UNALIGNED, .Loop_chacha20_unaligned
+ bnez IS_UNALIGNED, .Loop_chacha_unaligned
/* Set number rounds here to fill delayslot. */
- li $at, 20
+ lw $at, (STACK_SIZE+16)($sp)
/* BYTES < 0, it has no full block. */
- bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_aligned
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha_mips_no_full_block_aligned
FOR_EACH_WORD_REV(STORE_ALIGNED)
/* BYTES > 0? Loop again. */
- bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha20_rounds
+ bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha_rounds
/* Place this here to fill delay slot */
addiu NONCE_0, 1
/* BYTES < 0? Handle last bytes */
- bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_bytes
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha_mips_xor_bytes
-.Lchacha20_mips_xor_done:
+.Lchacha_mips_xor_done:
/* Restore used registers */
lw $s0, 0($sp)
lw $s1, 4($sp)
@@ -307,11 +307,11 @@ chacha20_mips:
/* Write NONCE_0 back to right location in state */
sw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
-.Lchacha20_mips_end:
+.Lchacha_mips_end:
addiu $sp, STACK_SIZE
jr $ra
-.Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_aligned:
+.Lchacha_mips_no_full_block_aligned:
/* Restore the offset on BYTES */
addiu BYTES, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ chacha20_mips:
andi $at, BYTES, MASK_U32
/* Load upper half of jump table addr */
- lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
+ lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
/* Calculate lower half jump table offset */
ins T0, $at, 1, 6
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ chacha20_mips:
addu T1, STATE, $at
/* Add lower half jump table addr */
- addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
+ addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_aligned_0)
/* Read value from STATE */
lw SAVED_CA, 0(T1)
@@ -342,31 +342,31 @@ chacha20_mips:
FOR_EACH_WORD(JMPTBL_ALIGNED)
-.Loop_chacha20_unaligned:
+.Loop_chacha_unaligned:
/* Set number rounds here to fill delayslot. */
- li $at, 20
+ lw $at, (STACK_SIZE+16)($sp)
/* BYTES > 0, it has no full block. */
- bltz BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_unaligned
+ bltz BYTES, .Lchacha_mips_no_full_block_unaligned
FOR_EACH_WORD_REV(STORE_UNALIGNED)
/* BYTES > 0? Loop again. */
- bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha20_rounds
+ bgtz BYTES, .Loop_chacha_rounds
/* Write NONCE_0 back to right location in state */
sw NONCE_0, 48(STATE)
.set noreorder
/* Fall through to byte handling */
- bgez BYTES, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
-.Lchacha20_mips_xor_unaligned_0_b:
-.Lchacha20_mips_xor_aligned_0_b:
+ bgez BYTES, .Lchacha_mips_xor_done
+.Lchacha_mips_xor_unaligned_0_b:
+.Lchacha_mips_xor_aligned_0_b:
/* Place this here to fill delay slot */
addiu NONCE_0, 1
.set reorder
-.Lchacha20_mips_xor_bytes:
+.Lchacha_mips_xor_bytes:
addu IN, $at
addu OUT, $at
/* First byte */
@@ -376,22 +376,22 @@ chacha20_mips:
ROTR(SAVED_X)
xor T1, SAVED_X
sb T1, 0(OUT)
- beqz $at, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+ beqz $at, .Lchacha_mips_xor_done
/* Second byte */
lbu T1, 1(IN)
addiu $at, BYTES, 2
ROTx SAVED_X, 8
xor T1, SAVED_X
sb T1, 1(OUT)
- beqz $at, .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+ beqz $at, .Lchacha_mips_xor_done
/* Third byte */
lbu T1, 2(IN)
ROTx SAVED_X, 8
xor T1, SAVED_X
sb T1, 2(OUT)
- b .Lchacha20_mips_xor_done
+ b .Lchacha_mips_xor_done
-.Lchacha20_mips_no_full_block_unaligned:
+.Lchacha_mips_no_full_block_unaligned:
/* Restore the offset on BYTES */
addiu BYTES, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ chacha20_mips:
andi $at, BYTES, MASK_U32
/* Load upper half of jump table addr */
- lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
+ lui T0, %hi(.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
/* Calculate lower half jump table offset */
ins T0, $at, 1, 6
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ chacha20_mips:
addu T1, STATE, $at
/* Add lower half jump table addr */
- addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha20_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
+ addiu T0, %lo(.Lchacha_mips_jmptbl_unaligned_0)
/* Read value from STATE */
lw SAVED_CA, 0(T1)
@@ -420,5 +420,78 @@ chacha20_mips:
/* Jump table */
FOR_EACH_WORD(JMPTBL_UNALIGNED)
-.end chacha20_mips
+.end chacha_crypt_arch
+.set at
+
+/* Input arguments
+ * STATE $a0
+ * OUT $a1
+ * NROUND $a2
+ */
+
+#undef X12
+#undef X13
+#undef X14
+#undef X15
+
+#define X12 $a3
+#define X13 $at
+#define X14 $v0
+#define X15 STATE
+
+.set noat
+.globl hchacha_block_arch
+.ent hchacha_block_arch
+hchacha_block_arch:
+ .frame $sp, STACK_SIZE, $ra
+
+ addiu $sp, -STACK_SIZE
+
+ /* Save X11(s6) */
+ sw X11, 0($sp)
+
+ lw X0, 0(STATE)
+ lw X1, 4(STATE)
+ lw X2, 8(STATE)
+ lw X3, 12(STATE)
+ lw X4, 16(STATE)
+ lw X5, 20(STATE)
+ lw X6, 24(STATE)
+ lw X7, 28(STATE)
+ lw X8, 32(STATE)
+ lw X9, 36(STATE)
+ lw X10, 40(STATE)
+ lw X11, 44(STATE)
+ lw X12, 48(STATE)
+ lw X13, 52(STATE)
+ lw X14, 56(STATE)
+ lw X15, 60(STATE)
+
+.Loop_hchacha_xor_rounds:
+ addiu $a2, -2
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13,14,15, 16);
+ AXR( 8, 9,10,11, 12,13,14,15, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13,14,15, 8);
+ AXR( 8, 9,10,11, 12,13,14,15, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4, 15,12,13,14, 16);
+ AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 12);
+ AXR( 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4, 15,12,13,14, 8);
+ AXR(10,11, 8, 9, 15,12,13,14, 5, 6, 7, 4, 7);
+ bnez $a2, .Loop_hchacha_xor_rounds
+
+ /* Restore used register */
+ lw X11, 0($sp)
+
+ sw X0, 0(OUT)
+ sw X1, 4(OUT)
+ sw X2, 8(OUT)
+ sw X3, 12(OUT)
+ sw X12, 16(OUT)
+ sw X13, 20(OUT)
+ sw X14, 24(OUT)
+ sw X15, 28(OUT)
+
+ addiu $sp, STACK_SIZE
+ jr $ra
+.end hchacha_block_arch
.set at
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * MIPS accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers,
+ * including ChaCha20 (RFC7539)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+asmlinkage void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
+
+asmlinkage void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
+
+void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
+
+static int chacha_mips_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
+ const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
+{
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ u32 state[16];
+ int err;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
+
+ while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
+ unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
+
+ if (nbytes < walk.total)
+ nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
+
+ chacha_crypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+ nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int chacha_mips(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return chacha_mips_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv);
+}
+
+static int xchacha_mips(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ struct chacha_ctx subctx;
+ u32 state[16];
+ u8 real_iv[16];
+
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
+
+ hchacha_block(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+ subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
+
+ memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8);
+ return chacha_mips_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv);
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
+ {
+ .base.cra_name = "chacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-mips",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = chacha_mips,
+ .decrypt = chacha_mips,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha20",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-mips",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_mips,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_mips,
+ }, {
+ .base.cra_name = "xchacha12",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-mips",
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
+ .encrypt = xchacha_mips,
+ .decrypt = xchacha_mips,
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+}
+
+module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);
+module_exit(chacha_simd_mod_fini);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (MIPS accelerated)");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-mips");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-mips");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-mips");
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1423,6 +1423,12 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64
SSSE3, AVX2, and AVX-512VL optimized implementations of the ChaCha20,
XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers.
+config CRYPTO_CHACHA_MIPS
+ tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms (MIPS 32r2 optimized)"
+ depends on CPU_MIPS32_R2
+ select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
+
config CRYPTO_SEED
tristate "SEED cipher algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI

115
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0012-crypto-chacha-unexport-chacha_generic-routines.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 53b97caa431974880c3ea592be870a62e9ef444a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 012/124] crypto: chacha - unexport chacha_generic routines
commit 22cf705360707ced15f9fe5423938f313c7df536 upstream.
Now that all users of generic ChaCha code have moved to the core library,
there is no longer a need for the generic ChaCha skcpiher driver to
export parts of it implementation for reuse by other drivers. So drop
the exports, and make the symbols static.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/chacha_generic.c | 26 ++++++++------------------
include/crypto/internal/chacha.h | 10 ----------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/chacha_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
@@ -37,36 +37,27 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
return err;
}
-void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
-{
- chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha_init);
-
-int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize)
+static int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize)
{
return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 20);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_setkey);
-int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize)
+static int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize)
{
return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha12_setkey);
-int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
return chacha_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha_crypt);
-int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
@@ -75,7 +66,7 @@ int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher
u8 real_iv[16];
/* Compute the subkey given the original key and first 128 nonce bits */
- crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
+ chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
@@ -86,7 +77,6 @@ int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher
/* Generate the stream and XOR it with the data */
return chacha_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xchacha_crypt);
static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
{
--- a/include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ struct chacha_ctx {
int nrounds;
};
-void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv);
-
static inline int chacha_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize, int nrounds)
{
@@ -42,12 +40,4 @@ static int inline chacha12_setkey(struct
return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12);
}
-int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize);
-int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize);
-
-int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
-int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
-
#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */

650
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0013-crypto-poly1305-move-core-routines-into-a-separate-l.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
From 905432633564215220707ee97f64ffb249a029f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 013/124] crypto: poly1305 - move core routines into a separate
library
commit 48ea8c6ebc96bc0990e12ee1c43d0832c23576bb upstream.
Move the core Poly1305 routines shared between the generic Poly1305
shash driver and the Adiantum and NHPoly1305 drivers into a separate
library so that using just this pieces does not pull in the crypto
API pieces of the generic Poly1305 routine.
In a subsequent patch, we will augment this generic library with
init/update/final routines so that Poyl1305 algorithm can be used
directly without the need for using the crypto API's shash abstraction.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 2 +-
crypto/Kconfig | 5 +-
crypto/adiantum.c | 5 +-
crypto/nhpoly1305.c | 3 +-
crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 195 ++---------------------------
include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h | 67 ++++++++++
include/crypto/poly1305.h | 23 ----
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 3 +
lib/crypto/Makefile | 3 +
lib/crypto/poly1305.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 216 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
create mode 100644 lib/crypto/poly1305.c
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
-#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ config CRYPTO_KEYWRAP
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
tristate
select CRYPTO_HASH
- select CRYPTO_POLY1305
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_SSE2
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function (x86_64 SSE2 implementation)"
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_AVX2
config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
tristate "Adiantum support"
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
- select CRYPTO_POLY1305
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ config CRYPTO_GHASH
config CRYPTO_POLY1305
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
help
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
--- a/crypto/adiantum.c
+++ b/crypto/adiantum.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/nhpoly1305.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
@@ -242,11 +243,11 @@ static void adiantum_hash_header(struct
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(header) % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key,
- &header, sizeof(header) / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ &header, sizeof(header) / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TWEAK_SIZE % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key, req->iv,
- TWEAK_SIZE / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ TWEAK_SIZE / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
poly1305_core_emit(&state, &rctx->header_hash);
}
--- a/crypto/nhpoly1305.c
+++ b/crypto/nhpoly1305.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
#include <crypto/nhpoly1305.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static void process_nh_hash_value(struct
BUILD_BUG_ON(NH_HASH_BYTES % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
poly1305_core_blocks(&state->poly_state, &key->poly_key, state->nh_hash,
- NH_HASH_BYTES / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NH_HASH_BYTES / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
}
/*
--- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
@@ -13,27 +13,12 @@
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-static inline u64 mlt(u64 a, u64 b)
-{
- return a * b;
-}
-
-static inline u32 sr(u64 v, u_char n)
-{
- return v >> n;
-}
-
-static inline u32 and(u32 v, u32 mask)
-{
- return v & mask;
-}
-
int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -47,124 +32,8 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_de
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_init);
-void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key)
-{
- /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
- key->r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff;
- key->r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03;
- key->r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff;
- key->r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff;
- key->r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_setkey);
-
-/*
- * Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that we can't set
- * it on the tfm that gets accessed by multiple users simultaneously. Instead we
- * expect the key as the first 32 bytes in the update() call.
- */
-unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
-{
- if (!dctx->sset) {
- if (!dctx->rset && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- poly1305_core_setkey(&dctx->r, src);
- src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dctx->rset = true;
- }
- if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- dctx->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 0);
- dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 4);
- dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 8);
- dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 12);
- src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dctx->sset = true;
- }
- }
- return srclen;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_setdesckey);
-
-static void poly1305_blocks_internal(struct poly1305_state *state,
- const struct poly1305_key *key,
- const void *src, unsigned int nblocks,
- u32 hibit)
-{
- u32 r0, r1, r2, r3, r4;
- u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
- u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
- u64 d0, d1, d2, d3, d4;
-
- if (!nblocks)
- return;
-
- r0 = key->r[0];
- r1 = key->r[1];
- r2 = key->r[2];
- r3 = key->r[3];
- r4 = key->r[4];
-
- s1 = r1 * 5;
- s2 = r2 * 5;
- s3 = r3 * 5;
- s4 = r4 * 5;
-
- h0 = state->h[0];
- h1 = state->h[1];
- h2 = state->h[2];
- h3 = state->h[3];
- h4 = state->h[4];
-
- do {
- /* h += m[i] */
- h0 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff;
- h1 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff;
- h2 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff;
- h3 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 9) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff;
- h4 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 12) >> 8) | hibit;
-
- /* h *= r */
- d0 = mlt(h0, r0) + mlt(h1, s4) + mlt(h2, s3) +
- mlt(h3, s2) + mlt(h4, s1);
- d1 = mlt(h0, r1) + mlt(h1, r0) + mlt(h2, s4) +
- mlt(h3, s3) + mlt(h4, s2);
- d2 = mlt(h0, r2) + mlt(h1, r1) + mlt(h2, r0) +
- mlt(h3, s4) + mlt(h4, s3);
- d3 = mlt(h0, r3) + mlt(h1, r2) + mlt(h2, r1) +
- mlt(h3, r0) + mlt(h4, s4);
- d4 = mlt(h0, r4) + mlt(h1, r3) + mlt(h2, r2) +
- mlt(h3, r1) + mlt(h4, r0);
-
- /* (partial) h %= p */
- d1 += sr(d0, 26); h0 = and(d0, 0x3ffffff);
- d2 += sr(d1, 26); h1 = and(d1, 0x3ffffff);
- d3 += sr(d2, 26); h2 = and(d2, 0x3ffffff);
- d4 += sr(d3, 26); h3 = and(d3, 0x3ffffff);
- h0 += sr(d4, 26) * 5; h4 = and(d4, 0x3ffffff);
- h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
-
- src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- } while (--nblocks);
-
- state->h[0] = h0;
- state->h[1] = h1;
- state->h[2] = h2;
- state->h[3] = h3;
- state->h[4] = h4;
-}
-
-void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state,
- const struct poly1305_key *key,
- const void *src, unsigned int nblocks)
-{
- poly1305_blocks_internal(state, key, src, nblocks, 1 << 24);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_blocks);
-
-static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, u32 hibit)
+static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int srclen)
{
unsigned int datalen;
@@ -174,8 +43,8 @@ static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1
srclen = datalen;
}
- poly1305_blocks_internal(&dctx->h, &dctx->r,
- src, srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, hibit);
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, &dctx->r, src,
+ srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
}
int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
@@ -193,13 +62,13 @@ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_
if (dctx->buflen == POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
poly1305_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf,
- POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1 << 24);
+ POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
dctx->buflen = 0;
}
}
if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
- poly1305_blocks(dctx, src, srclen, 1 << 24);
+ poly1305_blocks(dctx, src, srclen);
src += srclen - (srclen % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
srclen %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
@@ -213,54 +82,6 @@ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_update);
-void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst)
-{
- u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
- u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4;
- u32 mask;
-
- /* fully carry h */
- h0 = state->h[0];
- h1 = state->h[1];
- h2 = state->h[2];
- h3 = state->h[3];
- h4 = state->h[4];
-
- h2 += (h1 >> 26); h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff;
- h3 += (h2 >> 26); h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff;
- h4 += (h3 >> 26); h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff;
- h0 += (h4 >> 26) * 5; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff;
- h1 += (h0 >> 26); h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
-
- /* compute h + -p */
- g0 = h0 + 5;
- g1 = h1 + (g0 >> 26); g0 &= 0x3ffffff;
- g2 = h2 + (g1 >> 26); g1 &= 0x3ffffff;
- g3 = h3 + (g2 >> 26); g2 &= 0x3ffffff;
- g4 = h4 + (g3 >> 26) - (1 << 26); g3 &= 0x3ffffff;
-
- /* select h if h < p, or h + -p if h >= p */
- mask = (g4 >> ((sizeof(u32) * 8) - 1)) - 1;
- g0 &= mask;
- g1 &= mask;
- g2 &= mask;
- g3 &= mask;
- g4 &= mask;
- mask = ~mask;
- h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
- h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
- h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2;
- h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3;
- h4 = (h4 & mask) | g4;
-
- /* h = h % (2^128) */
- put_unaligned_le32((h0 >> 0) | (h1 << 26), dst + 0);
- put_unaligned_le32((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20), dst + 4);
- put_unaligned_le32((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14), dst + 8);
- put_unaligned_le32((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8), dst + 12);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_emit);
-
int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -274,7 +95,7 @@ int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_d
dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen);
- poly1305_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, &dctx->r, dctx->buf, 1, 0);
}
poly1305_core_emit(&dctx->h, digest);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common values for the Poly1305 algorithm
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
+
+struct shash_desc;
+
+/*
+ * Poly1305 core functions. These implement the ε-almost-∆-universal hash
+ * function underlying the Poly1305 MAC, i.e. they don't add an encrypted nonce
+ * ("s key") at the end. They also only support block-aligned inputs.
+ */
+void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key);
+static inline void poly1305_core_init(struct poly1305_state *state)
+{
+ *state = (struct poly1305_state){};
+}
+
+void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state,
+ const struct poly1305_key *key, const void *src,
+ unsigned int nblocks, u32 hibit);
+void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst);
+
+/* Crypto API helper functions for the Poly1305 MAC */
+int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
+
+int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen);
+int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst);
+
+/*
+ * Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that we can't set
+ * it on the tfm that gets accessed by multiple users simultaneously. Instead we
+ * expect the key as the first 32 bytes in the update() call.
+ */
+static inline
+unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+ if (!dctx->sset) {
+ if (!dctx->rset && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ poly1305_core_setkey(&dctx->r, src);
+ src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ dctx->rset = true;
+ }
+ if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ dctx->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 0);
+ dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 4);
+ dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 8);
+ dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 12);
+ src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ dctx->sset = true;
+ }
+ }
+ return srclen;
+}
+
+#endif
--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
@@ -38,27 +38,4 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
bool sset;
};
-/*
- * Poly1305 core functions. These implement the ε-almost-∆-universal hash
- * function underlying the Poly1305 MAC, i.e. they don't add an encrypted nonce
- * ("s key") at the end. They also only support block-aligned inputs.
- */
-void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key);
-static inline void poly1305_core_init(struct poly1305_state *state)
-{
- memset(state->h, 0, sizeof(state->h));
-}
-void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state,
- const struct poly1305_key *key,
- const void *src, unsigned int nblocks);
-void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst);
-
-/* Crypto API helper functions for the Poly1305 MAC */
-int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
-unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen);
-int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen);
-int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst);
-
#endif
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -37,5 +37,8 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
tristate
+config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
+ tristate
+
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
tristate
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -13,5 +13,8 @@ libarc4-y := arc4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES) += libdes.o
libdes-y := des.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC) += libpoly1305.o
+libpoly1305-y := poly1305.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o
libsha256-y := sha256.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
+ *
+ * Based on public domain code by Andrew Moon and Daniel J. Bernstein.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+static inline u64 mlt(u64 a, u64 b)
+{
+ return a * b;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sr(u64 v, u_char n)
+{
+ return v >> n;
+}
+
+static inline u32 and(u32 v, u32 mask)
+{
+ return v & mask;
+}
+
+void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key)
+{
+ /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
+ key->r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff;
+ key->r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03;
+ key->r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff;
+ key->r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff;
+ key->r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_setkey);
+
+void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state,
+ const struct poly1305_key *key, const void *src,
+ unsigned int nblocks, u32 hibit)
+{
+ u32 r0, r1, r2, r3, r4;
+ u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
+ u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
+ u64 d0, d1, d2, d3, d4;
+
+ if (!nblocks)
+ return;
+
+ r0 = key->r[0];
+ r1 = key->r[1];
+ r2 = key->r[2];
+ r3 = key->r[3];
+ r4 = key->r[4];
+
+ s1 = r1 * 5;
+ s2 = r2 * 5;
+ s3 = r3 * 5;
+ s4 = r4 * 5;
+
+ h0 = state->h[0];
+ h1 = state->h[1];
+ h2 = state->h[2];
+ h3 = state->h[3];
+ h4 = state->h[4];
+
+ do {
+ /* h += m[i] */
+ h0 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h1 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h2 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h3 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 9) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h4 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 12) >> 8) | (hibit << 24);
+
+ /* h *= r */
+ d0 = mlt(h0, r0) + mlt(h1, s4) + mlt(h2, s3) +
+ mlt(h3, s2) + mlt(h4, s1);
+ d1 = mlt(h0, r1) + mlt(h1, r0) + mlt(h2, s4) +
+ mlt(h3, s3) + mlt(h4, s2);
+ d2 = mlt(h0, r2) + mlt(h1, r1) + mlt(h2, r0) +
+ mlt(h3, s4) + mlt(h4, s3);
+ d3 = mlt(h0, r3) + mlt(h1, r2) + mlt(h2, r1) +
+ mlt(h3, r0) + mlt(h4, s4);
+ d4 = mlt(h0, r4) + mlt(h1, r3) + mlt(h2, r2) +
+ mlt(h3, r1) + mlt(h4, r0);
+
+ /* (partial) h %= p */
+ d1 += sr(d0, 26); h0 = and(d0, 0x3ffffff);
+ d2 += sr(d1, 26); h1 = and(d1, 0x3ffffff);
+ d3 += sr(d2, 26); h2 = and(d2, 0x3ffffff);
+ d4 += sr(d3, 26); h3 = and(d3, 0x3ffffff);
+ h0 += sr(d4, 26) * 5; h4 = and(d4, 0x3ffffff);
+ h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+
+ src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ } while (--nblocks);
+
+ state->h[0] = h0;
+ state->h[1] = h1;
+ state->h[2] = h2;
+ state->h[3] = h3;
+ state->h[4] = h4;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_blocks);
+
+void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst)
+{
+ u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
+ u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4;
+ u32 mask;
+
+ /* fully carry h */
+ h0 = state->h[0];
+ h1 = state->h[1];
+ h2 = state->h[2];
+ h3 = state->h[3];
+ h4 = state->h[4];
+
+ h2 += (h1 >> 26); h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h3 += (h2 >> 26); h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h4 += (h3 >> 26); h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h0 += (h4 >> 26) * 5; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h1 += (h0 >> 26); h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+
+ /* compute h + -p */
+ g0 = h0 + 5;
+ g1 = h1 + (g0 >> 26); g0 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ g2 = h2 + (g1 >> 26); g1 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ g3 = h3 + (g2 >> 26); g2 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ g4 = h4 + (g3 >> 26) - (1 << 26); g3 &= 0x3ffffff;
+
+ /* select h if h < p, or h + -p if h >= p */
+ mask = (g4 >> ((sizeof(u32) * 8) - 1)) - 1;
+ g0 &= mask;
+ g1 &= mask;
+ g2 &= mask;
+ g3 &= mask;
+ g4 &= mask;
+ mask = ~mask;
+ h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
+ h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
+ h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2;
+ h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3;
+ h4 = (h4 & mask) | g4;
+
+ /* h = h % (2^128) */
+ put_unaligned_le32((h0 >> 0) | (h1 << 26), dst + 0);
+ put_unaligned_le32((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20), dst + 4);
+ put_unaligned_le32((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14), dst + 8);
+ put_unaligned_le32((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8), dst + 12);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_emit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>");

251
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0014-crypto-x86-poly1305-unify-Poly1305-state-struct-with.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
From 1017a880df176730e7f8e32f28300eea2a6c27a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 014/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - unify Poly1305 state struct
with generic code
commit ad8f5b88383ea685f2b8df2a12ee3e08089a1287 upstream.
In preparation of exposing a Poly1305 library interface directly from
the accelerated x86 driver, align the state descriptor of the x86 code
with the one used by the generic driver. This is needed to make the
library interface unified between all implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 88 ++++++++++--------------------
crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 6 +-
include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h | 4 +-
include/crypto/poly1305.h | 18 +++---
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -14,40 +14,14 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
-struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx {
- struct poly1305_desc_ctx base;
- /* derived key u set? */
- bool uset;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
- /* derived keys r^3, r^4 set? */
- bool wset;
-#endif
- /* derived Poly1305 key r^2 */
- u32 u[5];
- /* ... silently appended r^3 and r^4 when using AVX2 */
-};
-
asmlinkage void poly1305_block_sse2(u32 *h, const u8 *src,
const u32 *r, unsigned int blocks);
asmlinkage void poly1305_2block_sse2(u32 *h, const u8 *src, const u32 *r,
unsigned int blocks, const u32 *u);
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
asmlinkage void poly1305_4block_avx2(u32 *h, const u8 *src, const u32 *r,
unsigned int blocks, const u32 *u);
-static bool poly1305_use_avx2;
-#endif
-static int poly1305_simd_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
-{
- struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- sctx->uset = false;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
- sctx->wset = false;
-#endif
-
- return crypto_poly1305_init(desc);
-}
+static bool poly1305_use_avx2 __ro_after_init;
static void poly1305_simd_mult(u32 *a, const u32 *b)
{
@@ -63,53 +37,49 @@ static void poly1305_simd_mult(u32 *a, c
static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
{
- struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx *sctx;
unsigned int blocks, datalen;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx, base));
- sctx = container_of(dctx, struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx, base);
-
if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) {
datalen = crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(dctx, src, srclen);
src += srclen - datalen;
srclen = datalen;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
- if (poly1305_use_avx2 && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
- if (unlikely(!sctx->wset)) {
- if (!sctx->uset) {
- memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u));
- poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r);
- sctx->uset = true;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
+ poly1305_use_avx2 &&
+ srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
+ if (unlikely(dctx->rset < 4)) {
+ if (dctx->rset < 2) {
+ dctx->r[1] = dctx->r[0];
+ poly1305_simd_mult(dctx->r[1].r, dctx->r[0].r);
}
- memcpy(sctx->u + 5, sctx->u, sizeof(sctx->u));
- poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 5, dctx->r.r);
- memcpy(sctx->u + 10, sctx->u + 5, sizeof(sctx->u));
- poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 10, dctx->r.r);
- sctx->wset = true;
+ dctx->r[2] = dctx->r[1];
+ poly1305_simd_mult(dctx->r[2].r, dctx->r[0].r);
+ dctx->r[3] = dctx->r[2];
+ poly1305_simd_mult(dctx->r[3].r, dctx->r[0].r);
+ dctx->rset = 4;
}
blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4);
- poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks,
- sctx->u);
+ poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r[0].r, blocks,
+ dctx->r[1].r);
src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks;
srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks;
}
-#endif
+
if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)) {
- if (unlikely(!sctx->uset)) {
- memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u));
- poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r);
- sctx->uset = true;
+ if (unlikely(dctx->rset < 2)) {
+ dctx->r[1] = dctx->r[0];
+ poly1305_simd_mult(dctx->r[1].r, dctx->r[0].r);
+ dctx->rset = 2;
}
blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2);
- poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks,
- sctx->u);
+ poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r[0].r,
+ blocks, dctx->r[1].r);
src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks;
srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks;
}
if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, 1);
+ poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r[0].r, 1);
srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
return srclen;
@@ -159,10 +129,10 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
static struct shash_alg alg = {
.digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .init = poly1305_simd_init,
+ .init = crypto_poly1305_init,
.update = poly1305_simd_update,
.final = crypto_poly1305_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx),
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_desc_ctx),
.base = {
.cra_name = "poly1305",
.cra_driver_name = "poly1305-simd",
@@ -177,14 +147,14 @@ static int __init poly1305_simd_mod_init
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
return -ENODEV;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
- poly1305_use_avx2 = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
+ poly1305_use_avx2 = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL);
- alg.descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx);
+ alg.descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_desc_ctx) + 5 * sizeof(u32);
if (poly1305_use_avx2)
alg.descsize += 10 * sizeof(u32);
-#endif
+
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
--- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_de
poly1305_core_init(&dctx->h);
dctx->buflen = 0;
- dctx->rset = false;
+ dctx->rset = 0;
dctx->sset = false;
return 0;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1
srclen = datalen;
}
- poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, &dctx->r, src,
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, dctx->r, src,
srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
}
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_d
dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen);
- poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, &dctx->r, dctx->buf, 1, 0);
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, dctx->r, dctx->buf, 1, 0);
}
poly1305_core_emit(&dctx->h, digest);
--- a/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(
{
if (!dctx->sset) {
if (!dctx->rset && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- poly1305_core_setkey(&dctx->r, src);
+ poly1305_core_setkey(dctx->r, src);
src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dctx->rset = true;
+ dctx->rset = 1;
}
if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
dctx->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 0);
--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
@@ -22,20 +22,20 @@ struct poly1305_state {
};
struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
- /* key */
- struct poly1305_key r;
- /* finalize key */
- u32 s[4];
- /* accumulator */
- struct poly1305_state h;
/* partial buffer */
u8 buf[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* bytes used in partial buffer */
unsigned int buflen;
- /* r key has been set */
- bool rset;
- /* s key has been set */
+ /* how many keys have been set in r[] */
+ unsigned short rset;
+ /* whether s[] has been set */
bool sset;
+ /* finalize key */
+ u32 s[4];
+ /* accumulator */
+ struct poly1305_state h;
+ /* key */
+ struct poly1305_key r[1];
};
#endif

225
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@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
From fd966ddf025b8b62aab20d2e4eb242fe51ad5137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 015/124] crypto: poly1305 - expose init/update/final library
interface
commit a1d93064094cc5e24d64e35cf093e7191d0c9344 upstream.
Expose the existing generic Poly1305 code via a init/update/final
library interface so that callers are not required to go through
the crypto API's shash abstraction to access it. At the same time,
make some preparations so that the library implementation can be
superseded by an accelerated arch-specific version in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 22 +-----------
include/crypto/poly1305.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 26 ++++++++++++++
lib/crypto/poly1305.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
@@ -85,31 +85,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_update
int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- __le32 digest[4];
- u64 f = 0;
if (unlikely(!dctx->sset))
return -ENOKEY;
- if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
- dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
- memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
- POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen);
- poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, dctx->r, dctx->buf, 1, 0);
- }
-
- poly1305_core_emit(&dctx->h, digest);
-
- /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]) + dctx->s[0];
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 0);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]) + dctx->s[1];
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]) + dctx->s[2];
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]) + dctx->s[3];
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
-
+ poly1305_final_generic(dctx, dst);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_final);
--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
@@ -35,7 +35,43 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
/* accumulator */
struct poly1305_state h;
/* key */
- struct poly1305_key r[1];
+ struct poly1305_key r[CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE];
};
+void poly1305_init_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *key);
+void poly1305_init_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *key);
+
+static inline void poly1305_init(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *key)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305))
+ poly1305_init_arch(desc, key);
+ else
+ poly1305_init_generic(desc, key);
+}
+
+void poly1305_update_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes);
+void poly1305_update_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes);
+
+static inline void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305))
+ poly1305_update_arch(desc, src, nbytes);
+ else
+ poly1305_update_generic(desc, src, nbytes);
+}
+
+void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest);
+void poly1305_final_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest);
+
+static inline void poly1305_final(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305))
+ poly1305_final_arch(desc, digest);
+ else
+ poly1305_final_generic(desc, digest);
+}
+
#endif
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -37,8 +37,34 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
tristate
+config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE
+ int
+ default 1
+
+config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+ tristate
+ help
+ Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
+ accelerated implementation of the Poly1305 library interface,
+ either builtin or as a module.
+
config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
tristate
+ help
+ This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
+ Poly1305 library interface that require the generic code as a
+ fallback, e.g., for SIMD implementations. If no arch specific
+ implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
+ of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
+
+config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
+ tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
+ depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
+ help
+ Enable the Poly1305 library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
+ by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
+ is available and enabled.
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
tristate
--- a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
@@ -154,5 +154,79 @@ void poly1305_core_emit(const struct pol
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_emit);
+void poly1305_init_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *key)
+{
+ poly1305_core_setkey(desc->r, key);
+ desc->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 16);
+ desc->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 20);
+ desc->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 24);
+ desc->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 28);
+ poly1305_core_init(&desc->h);
+ desc->buflen = 0;
+ desc->sset = true;
+ desc->rset = 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_init_generic);
+
+void poly1305_update_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int bytes;
+
+ if (unlikely(desc->buflen)) {
+ bytes = min(nbytes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen);
+ memcpy(desc->buf + desc->buflen, src, bytes);
+ src += bytes;
+ nbytes -= bytes;
+ desc->buflen += bytes;
+
+ if (desc->buflen == POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&desc->h, desc->r, desc->buf, 1, 1);
+ desc->buflen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (likely(nbytes >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&desc->h, desc->r, src,
+ nbytes / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
+ src += nbytes - (nbytes % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ nbytes %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(nbytes)) {
+ desc->buflen = nbytes;
+ memcpy(desc->buf, src, nbytes);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_update_generic);
+
+void poly1305_final_generic(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+ __le32 digest[4];
+ u64 f = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(desc->buflen)) {
+ desc->buf[desc->buflen++] = 1;
+ memset(desc->buf + desc->buflen, 0,
+ POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen);
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&desc->h, desc->r, desc->buf, 1, 0);
+ }
+
+ poly1305_core_emit(&desc->h, digest);
+
+ /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */
+ f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]) + desc->s[0];
+ put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 0);
+ f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]) + desc->s[1];
+ put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
+ f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]) + desc->s[2];
+ put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
+ f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]) + desc->s[3];
+ put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
+
+ *desc = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){};
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_final_generic);
+
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>");

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@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
From 0e610172b19b8f7c1ce829247ce5f302b25ad100 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 016/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - depend on generic library not
generic shash
commit 1b2c6a5120489d41c8ea3b8dacd0b4586289b158 upstream.
Remove the dependency on the generic Poly1305 driver. Instead, depend
on the generic library so that we only reuse code without pulling in
the generic skcipher implementation as well.
While at it, remove the logic that prefers the non-SIMD path for short
inputs - this is no longer necessary after recent FPU handling changes
on x86.
Since this removes the last remaining user of the routines exported
by the generic shash driver, unexport them and make them static.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 11 ++---
include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h | 9 ----
4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -34,6 +34,24 @@ static void poly1305_simd_mult(u32 *a, c
poly1305_block_sse2(a, m, b, 1);
}
+static unsigned int poly1305_scalar_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+ unsigned int datalen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) {
+ datalen = crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(dctx, src, srclen);
+ src += srclen - datalen;
+ srclen = datalen;
+ }
+ if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&dctx->h, dctx->r, src,
+ srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
+ srclen %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ return srclen;
+}
+
static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
{
@@ -91,12 +109,6 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int bytes;
- /* kernel_fpu_begin/end is costly, use fallback for small updates */
- if (srclen <= 288 || !crypto_simd_usable())
- return crypto_poly1305_update(desc, src, srclen);
-
- kernel_fpu_begin();
-
if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
bytes = min(srclen, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen);
memcpy(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, src, bytes);
@@ -105,25 +117,57 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
dctx->buflen += bytes;
if (dctx->buflen == POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf,
- POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf,
+ POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+ } else {
+ poly1305_scalar_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf,
+ POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
dctx->buflen = 0;
}
}
if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
- bytes = poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, src, srclen);
+ if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ bytes = poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, src, srclen);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+ } else {
+ bytes = poly1305_scalar_blocks(dctx, src, srclen);
+ }
src += srclen - bytes;
srclen = bytes;
}
- kernel_fpu_end();
-
if (unlikely(srclen)) {
dctx->buflen = srclen;
memcpy(dctx->buf, src, srclen);
}
+}
+
+static int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ poly1305_core_init(&dctx->h);
+ dctx->buflen = 0;
+ dctx->rset = 0;
+ dctx->sset = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+ struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ if (unlikely(!dctx->sset))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ poly1305_final_generic(dctx, dst);
return 0;
}
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ config CRYPTO_POLY1305
config CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm (x86_64/SSE2/AVX2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
- select CRYPTO_POLY1305
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
help
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
--- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+static int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_de
return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_init);
static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src,
unsigned int srclen)
@@ -47,8 +46,8 @@ static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1
srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
}
-int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+static int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int bytes;
@@ -80,9 +79,8 @@ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_
return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_update);
-int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
+static int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
{
struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -92,7 +90,6 @@ int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_d
poly1305_final_generic(dctx, dst);
return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_final);
static struct shash_alg poly1305_alg = {
.digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE,
--- a/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
-struct shash_desc;
-
/*
* Poly1305 core functions. These implement the ε-almost-∆-universal hash
* function underlying the Poly1305 MAC, i.e. they don't add an encrypted nonce
@@ -28,13 +26,6 @@ void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly130
unsigned int nblocks, u32 hibit);
void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst);
-/* Crypto API helper functions for the Poly1305 MAC */
-int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
-
-int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen);
-int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst);
-
/*
* Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that we can't set
* it on the tfm that gets accessed by multiple users simultaneously. Instead we

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From 2ceb2e26de65cce974875e0487dde20bc5f1826c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 017/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - expose existing driver as
poly1305 library
commit f0e89bcfbb894e5844cd1bbf6b3cf7c63cb0f5ac upstream.
Implement the arch init/update/final Poly1305 library routines in the
accelerated SIMD driver for x86 so they are accessible to users of
the Poly1305 library interface as well.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
@@ -21,7 +22,8 @@ asmlinkage void poly1305_2block_sse2(u32
asmlinkage void poly1305_4block_avx2(u32 *h, const u8 *src, const u32 *r,
unsigned int blocks, const u32 *u);
-static bool poly1305_use_avx2 __ro_after_init;
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(poly1305_use_simd);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(poly1305_use_avx2);
static void poly1305_simd_mult(u32 *a, const u32 *b)
{
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
- poly1305_use_avx2 &&
+ static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx2) &&
srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
if (unlikely(dctx->rset < 4)) {
if (dctx->rset < 2) {
@@ -103,10 +105,15 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks
return srclen;
}
-static int poly1305_simd_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+void poly1305_init_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, const u8 *key)
+{
+ poly1305_init_generic(desc, key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_init_arch);
+
+void poly1305_update_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int srclen)
{
- struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int bytes;
if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
@@ -117,7 +124,8 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
dctx->buflen += bytes;
if (dctx->buflen == POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
+ if (static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_simd) &&
+ likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
kernel_fpu_begin();
poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf,
POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
@@ -131,7 +139,8 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
}
if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
- if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
+ if (static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_simd) &&
+ likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
kernel_fpu_begin();
bytes = poly1305_simd_blocks(dctx, src, srclen);
kernel_fpu_end();
@@ -147,6 +156,13 @@ static int poly1305_simd_update(struct s
memcpy(dctx->buf, src, srclen);
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_update_arch);
+
+void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest)
+{
+ poly1305_final_generic(desc, digest);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final_arch);
static int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
@@ -171,6 +187,15 @@ static int crypto_poly1305_final(struct
return 0;
}
+static int poly1305_simd_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+ struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ poly1305_update_arch(dctx, src, srclen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct shash_alg alg = {
.digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = crypto_poly1305_init,
@@ -189,15 +214,15 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
static int __init poly1305_simd_mod_init(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
- return -ENODEV;
+ return 0;
- poly1305_use_avx2 = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
- cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL);
- alg.descsize = sizeof(struct poly1305_desc_ctx) + 5 * sizeof(u32);
- if (poly1305_use_avx2)
- alg.descsize += 10 * sizeof(u32);
+ static_branch_enable(&poly1305_use_simd);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX2) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
+ cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL))
+ static_branch_enable(&poly1305_use_avx2);
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -698,6 +698,7 @@ config CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm (x86_64/SSE2/AVX2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
help
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_DES
config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE
int
+ default 4 if X86_64
default 1
config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305

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From 4852555d88528a86fc20ac63da7aca29f9071193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 022/124] crypto: testmgr - add test cases for Blake2s
commit 17e1df67023a5c9ccaeb5de8bf5b88f63127ecf7 upstream.
As suggested by Eric for the Blake2b implementation contributed by
David, introduce a set of test vectors for Blake2s covering different
digest and key sizes.
blake2s-128 blake2s-160 blake2s-224 blake2s-256
---------------------------------------------------
len=0 | klen=0 klen=1 klen=16 klen=32
len=1 | klen=16 klen=32 klen=0 klen=1
len=7 | klen=32 klen=0 klen=1 klen=16
len=15 | klen=1 klen=16 klen=32 klen=0
len=64 | klen=0 klen=1 klen=16 klen=32
len=247 | klen=16 klen=32 klen=0 klen=1
len=256 | klen=32 klen=0 klen=1 klen=16
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/testmgr.c | 24 +++++
crypto/testmgr.h | 251 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 275 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4035,6 +4035,30 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_te
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
+ .alg = "blake2s-128",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_128_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2s-160",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_160_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2s-224",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_224_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "blake2s-256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "cbc(aes)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.fips_allowed = 1,
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -31567,4 +31567,255 @@ static const struct aead_testvec essiv_h
},
};
+static const char blake2_ordered_sequence[] =
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+ "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+ "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+ "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+ "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47"
+ "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f"
+ "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57"
+ "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f"
+ "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67"
+ "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f"
+ "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77"
+ "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f"
+ "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87"
+ "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f"
+ "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97"
+ "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f"
+ "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+ "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+ "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+ "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+ "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+ "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+ "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+ "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf"
+ "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7"
+ "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef"
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7"
+ "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff";
+
+static const struct hash_testvec blakes2s_128_tv_template[] = {{
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x64, 0x55, 0x0d, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0x0a, 0x01,
+ 0xa1, 0x4a, 0xba, 0x1e, 0xad, 0xe0, 0x20, 0x0c, },
+}, {
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 64,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xdc, 0x66, 0xca, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x86, 0x58, 0x01,
+ 0xb0, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xd8, 0xa1, 0xa9, 0x0e, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 1,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x88, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0x35, 0x80, 0x82,
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0x0f, 0xd7, 0xec, 0x6c, 0x2f, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 7,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xcf, 0x9e, 0x07, 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x22, 0xf2, 0xcd,
+ 0xa2, 0xd8, 0x25, 0x21, 0x80, 0x86, 0x73, 0x1c, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 15,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xf6, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x2c, 0x22, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xb2,
+ 0xb6, 0x3f, 0xeb, 0xbc, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 247,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x72, 0x66, 0x49, 0x60, 0xf9, 0x4a, 0xea, 0xbe,
+ 0x1f, 0xf4, 0x60, 0xce, 0xb7, 0x81, 0xcb, 0x09, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 256,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xd5, 0xa4, 0x0e, 0xc3, 0x16, 0xc7, 0x51, 0xa6,
+ 0x3c, 0xd0, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x57, 0xfa, 0x1e, 0xbb, },
+}};
+
+static const struct hash_testvec blakes2s_160_tv_template[] = {{
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 7,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xb4, 0xf2, 0x03, 0x49, 0x37, 0xed, 0xb1, 0x3e,
+ 0x5b, 0x2a, 0xca, 0x64, 0x82, 0x74, 0xf6, 0x62,
+ 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x84, 0xff, },
+}, {
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 256,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xaa, 0x56, 0x9b, 0xdc, 0x98, 0x17, 0x75, 0xf2,
+ 0xb3, 0x68, 0x83, 0xb7, 0x9b, 0x8d, 0x48, 0xb1,
+ 0x9b, 0x2d, 0x35, 0x05, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x50, 0x16, 0xe7, 0x0c, 0x01, 0xd0, 0xd3, 0xc3,
+ 0xf4, 0x3e, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x97, 0xa9, 0x4e, 0xd1,
+ 0x79, 0x65, 0x32, 0x93, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 1,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x1c, 0x2b, 0xcd, 0x9a, 0x68, 0xca, 0x8c, 0x71,
+ 0x90, 0x29, 0x6c, 0x54, 0xfa, 0x56, 0x4a, 0xef,
+ 0xa2, 0x3a, 0x56, 0x9c, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 15,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x36, 0xc3, 0x5f, 0x9a, 0xdc, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0x19,
+ 0x68, 0xaa, 0xca, 0xd8, 0x81, 0xbf, 0x09, 0x34,
+ 0x83, 0x39, 0x0f, 0x30, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 64,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x86, 0x80, 0x78, 0xa4, 0x14, 0xec, 0x03, 0xe5,
+ 0xb6, 0x9a, 0x52, 0x0e, 0x42, 0xee, 0x39, 0x9d,
+ 0xac, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x63, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 247,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x2d, 0xd8, 0xd2, 0x53, 0x66, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0x01,
+ 0x1c, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x9d, 0x9b, 0x10,
+ 0x0a, 0xf6, 0x73, 0xe8, },
+}};
+
+static const struct hash_testvec blakes2s_224_tv_template[] = {{
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 1,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x61, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0xc9, 0x46, 0x22, 0xa3, 0x91,
+ 0xd2, 0xae, 0x42, 0xe6, 0x45, 0x6c, 0x90, 0x12,
+ 0xd5, 0x80, 0x07, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xfc,
+ 0x48, 0x21, 0x97, 0xbb, },
+}, {
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 247,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x9e, 0xda, 0xc7, 0x20, 0x2c, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x2e,
+ 0x31, 0x94, 0xab, 0x46, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xd8, 0xb4,
+ 0x69, 0xcd, 0xae, 0x19, 0x6d, 0x9e, 0x41, 0xcc,
+ 0x2b, 0xa4, 0xd5, 0xf6, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x32, 0xc0, 0xac, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x9f,
+ 0xbe, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0x4d, 0x6b, 0x4e, 0x56, 0xb3,
+ 0xaa, 0xd3, 0x27, 0xf6, 0x14, 0xbf, 0xb9, 0x32,
+ 0xa7, 0x19, 0xfc, 0xb8, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 7,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x73, 0xad, 0x5e, 0x6d, 0xb9, 0x02, 0x8e, 0x76,
+ 0xf2, 0x66, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0xfa, 0x1f, 0xe6,
+ 0x2e, 0x56, 0x40, 0xe5, 0xa2, 0xb0, 0x3c, 0xe8,
+ 0x7b, 0x45, 0xfe, 0x05, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 15,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x16, 0x60, 0xfb, 0x92, 0x54, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x36,
+ 0x81, 0xf4, 0x16, 0x41, 0xc3, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x43,
+ 0x84, 0xed, 0x10, 0x6f, 0x65, 0x80, 0x7a, 0x3e,
+ 0x25, 0xab, 0xc5, 0x02, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 64,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xca, 0xaa, 0x39, 0x67, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x6b, 0xc7,
+ 0xb6, 0x82, 0xca, 0x0e, 0x65, 0x36, 0x5b, 0x7c,
+ 0x24, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x5f, 0xda, 0x06, 0x91, 0x93,
+ 0x6a, 0x31, 0x83, 0xb5, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 256,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x90, 0x02, 0x26, 0xb5, 0x06, 0x9c, 0x36, 0x86,
+ 0x94, 0x91, 0x90, 0x1e, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x71, 0xb2,
+ 0x48, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x16, 0xfd, 0x64, 0x33, 0x45,
+ 0xb3, 0xd7, 0xec, 0xcc, },
+}};
+
+static const struct hash_testvec blakes2s_256_tv_template[] = {{
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 15,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xd9, 0x7c, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x82, 0xa7, 0x21,
+ 0x80, 0xa0, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x26, 0x83, 0x30, 0x67,
+ 0x3f, 0x7c, 0x4e, 0x06, 0x35, 0x94, 0x7c, 0x04,
+ 0xc0, 0x23, 0x23, 0xfd, 0x45, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0x2d, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x48, 0xa8, 0x99, 0x7d, 0xa4, 0x07, 0x87, 0x6b,
+ 0x3d, 0x79, 0xc0, 0xd9, 0x23, 0x25, 0xad, 0x3b,
+ 0x89, 0xcb, 0xb7, 0x54, 0xd8, 0x6a, 0xb7, 0x1a,
+ 0xee, 0x04, 0x7a, 0xd3, 0x45, 0xfd, 0x2c, 0x49, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 1,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x22, 0x27, 0xae, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0x81, 0x56, 0x03,
+ 0xa7, 0xe3, 0xa1, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0x18,
+ 0xf4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0x16, 0x70, 0xf1, 0xe7, 0x4b,
+ 0x00, 0x6d, 0x66, 0x16, 0xae, 0x9e, 0x74, 0x4e, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 7,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x58, 0x5d, 0xa8, 0x60, 0x1c, 0xa4, 0xd8, 0x03,
+ 0x86, 0x86, 0x84, 0x64, 0xd7, 0xa0, 0x8e, 0x15,
+ 0x2f, 0x05, 0xa2, 0x1b, 0xbc, 0xef, 0x7a, 0x34,
+ 0xb3, 0xc5, 0xbc, 0x4b, 0xf0, 0x32, 0xeb, 0x12, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 32,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 64,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x89, 0x75, 0xb0, 0x57, 0x7f, 0xd3, 0x55, 0x66,
+ 0xd7, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x62, 0xb0, 0x89, 0x7a, 0x26,
+ 0xc3, 0x99, 0x13, 0x6d, 0xf0, 0x7b, 0xab, 0xab,
+ 0xbd, 0xe6, 0x20, 0x3f, 0xf2, 0x95, 0x4e, 0xd4, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 1,
+ .key = "B",
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 247,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0x2e, 0x74, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x03, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0x84,
+ 0x6f, 0xfc, 0x86, 0x32, 0x92, 0x49, 0x7e, 0x66,
+ 0xd7, 0xc3, 0x10, 0x88, 0xfe, 0x28, 0xb3, 0xe0,
+ 0xbf, 0x50, 0x75, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xa4, 0xe6, 0xb2, },
+}, {
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .key = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .plaintext = blake2_ordered_sequence,
+ .psize = 256,
+ .digest = (u8[]){ 0xb9, 0xd2, 0x81, 0x0e, 0x3a, 0xb1, 0x62, 0x9b,
+ 0xad, 0x44, 0x05, 0xf4, 0x92, 0x2e, 0x99, 0xc1,
+ 0x4a, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x5b, 0x6f, 0xb2, 0x96, 0xed,
+ 0xd5, 0x06, 0xb5, 0x3a, 0x7c, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x1d, },
+}};
+
#endif /* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */

245
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0023-crypto-blake2s-implement-generic-shash-driver.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
From af5b936f5e17306da571f703bdef1f011a602b57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 023/124] crypto: blake2s - implement generic shash driver
commit 7f9b0880925f1f9d7d59504ea0892d2ae9cfc233 upstream.
Wire up our newly added Blake2s implementation via the shash API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 18 ++++
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/blake2s_generic.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 5 +
4 files changed, 195 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/blake2s_generic.c
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -639,6 +639,24 @@ config CRYPTO_XXHASH
xxHash non-cryptographic hash algorithm. Extremely fast, working at
speeds close to RAM limits.
+config CRYPTO_BLAKE2S
+ tristate "BLAKE2s digest algorithm"
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_HASH
+ help
+ Implementation of cryptographic hash function BLAKE2s
+ optimized for 8-32bit platforms and can produce digests of any size
+ between 1 to 32. The keyed hash is also implemented.
+
+ This module provides the following algorithms:
+
+ - blake2s-128
+ - blake2s-160
+ - blake2s-224
+ - blake2s-256
+
+ See https://blake2.net for further information.
+
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF
tristate "CRCT10DIF algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_STREEBOG) += streebo
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512) += wp512.o
CFLAGS_wp512.o := $(call cc-option,-fno-schedule-insns) # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TGR192) += tgr192.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S) += blake2s_generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GF128MUL) += gf128mul.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB) += ecb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC) += cbc.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
+ tctx->keylen = keylen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
+ if (tctx->keylen)
+ blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init(state, outlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
+ unsigned int inlen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inlen))
+ return 0;
+ if (inlen > fill) {
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ in += fill;
+ inlen -= fill;
+ }
+ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ }
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+ state->buflen += inlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-128",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-128-generic",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-160",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-160-generic",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-224",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-224-generic",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-256",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-256-generic",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}};
+
+static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(blake2s_mod_init);
+module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-generic");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-generic");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-generic");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-generic");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
--- a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+struct blake2s_tfm_ctx {
+ u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned int keylen;
+};
+
void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);

557
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0024-crypto-blake2s-x86_64-SIMD-implementation.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
From 7960239adcaf7b56b081426ea3aa0ebf17398375 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 024/124] crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation
commit ed0356eda153f6a95649e11feb7b07083caf9e20 upstream.
These implementations from Samuel Neves support AVX and AVX-512VL.
Originally this used AVX-512F, but Skylake thermal throttling made
AVX-512VL more attractive and possible to do with negligable difference.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
[ardb: move to arch/x86/crypto, wire into lib/crypto framework]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/Kconfig | 6 +
4 files changed, 499 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S
create mode 100644 arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ ifeq ($(avx_supported),yes)
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64) += cast6-avx-x86_64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_AVX_X86_64) += twofish-avx-x86_64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64) += serpent-avx-x86_64.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86) += blake2s-x86_64.o
endif
# These modules require assembler to support AVX2.
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ serpent-sse2-x86_64-y := serpent-sse2-x8
aegis128-aesni-y := aegis128-aesni-asm.o aegis128-aesni-glue.o
nhpoly1305-sse2-y := nh-sse2-x86_64.o nhpoly1305-sse2-glue.o
+blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
ifeq ($(avx_supported),yes)
camellia-aesni-avx-x86_64-y := camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.o \
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+.section .rodata.cst32.BLAKE2S_IV, "aM", @progbits, 32
+.align 32
+IV: .octa 0xA54FF53A3C6EF372BB67AE856A09E667
+ .octa 0x5BE0CD191F83D9AB9B05688C510E527F
+.section .rodata.cst16.ROT16, "aM", @progbits, 16
+.align 16
+ROT16: .octa 0x0D0C0F0E09080B0A0504070601000302
+.section .rodata.cst16.ROR328, "aM", @progbits, 16
+.align 16
+ROR328: .octa 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A090407060500030201
+.section .rodata.cst64.BLAKE2S_SIGMA, "aM", @progbits, 160
+.align 64
+SIGMA:
+.byte 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 8, 10, 12, 15, 9, 11, 13
+.byte 14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6, 5, 1, 0, 11, 3, 12, 2, 7
+.byte 11, 12, 5, 15, 8, 0, 2, 13, 9, 10, 3, 7, 4, 14, 6, 1
+.byte 7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14, 15, 2, 5, 4, 8, 6, 10, 0
+.byte 9, 5, 2, 10, 0, 7, 4, 15, 3, 14, 11, 6, 13, 1, 12, 8
+.byte 2, 6, 0, 8, 12, 10, 11, 3, 1, 4, 7, 15, 9, 13, 5, 14
+.byte 12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10, 8, 0, 6, 9, 11, 7, 3, 2
+.byte 13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9, 2, 5, 15, 8, 10, 0, 4, 6
+.byte 6, 14, 11, 0, 15, 9, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13, 1, 5, 2, 7, 4
+.byte 10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5, 13, 15, 9, 3, 0, 11, 14, 12
+#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512
+.section .rodata.cst64.BLAKE2S_SIGMA2, "aM", @progbits, 640
+.align 64
+SIGMA2:
+.long 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 8, 10, 12, 15, 9, 11, 13
+.long 8, 2, 13, 15, 10, 9, 12, 3, 6, 4, 0, 14, 5, 11, 1, 7
+.long 11, 13, 8, 6, 5, 10, 14, 3, 2, 4, 12, 15, 1, 0, 7, 9
+.long 11, 10, 7, 0, 8, 15, 1, 13, 3, 6, 2, 12, 4, 14, 9, 5
+.long 4, 10, 9, 14, 15, 0, 11, 8, 1, 7, 3, 13, 2, 5, 6, 12
+.long 2, 11, 4, 15, 14, 3, 10, 8, 13, 6, 5, 7, 0, 12, 1, 9
+.long 4, 8, 15, 9, 14, 11, 13, 5, 3, 2, 1, 12, 6, 10, 7, 0
+.long 6, 13, 0, 14, 12, 2, 1, 11, 15, 4, 5, 8, 7, 9, 3, 10
+.long 15, 5, 4, 13, 10, 7, 3, 11, 12, 2, 0, 6, 9, 8, 1, 14
+.long 8, 7, 14, 11, 13, 15, 0, 12, 10, 4, 5, 6, 3, 2, 1, 9
+#endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX512 */
+
+.text
+#ifdef CONFIG_AS_SSSE3
+ENTRY(blake2s_compress_ssse3)
+ testq %rdx,%rdx
+ je .Lendofloop
+ movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqa ROT16(%rip),%xmm12
+ movdqa ROR328(%rip),%xmm13
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm14
+ movq %rcx,%xmm15
+ leaq SIGMA+0xa0(%rip),%r8
+ jmp .Lbeginofloop
+ .align 32
+.Lbeginofloop:
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm10
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm11
+ paddq %xmm15,%xmm14
+ movdqa IV(%rip),%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm14,%xmm3
+ pxor IV+0x10(%rip),%xmm3
+ leaq SIGMA(%rip),%rcx
+.Lroundloop:
+ movzbl (%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm4
+ movzbl 0x1(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm5
+ movzbl 0x2(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm6
+ movzbl 0x3(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm7
+ punpckldq %xmm5,%xmm4
+ punpckldq %xmm7,%xmm6
+ punpcklqdq %xmm6,%xmm4
+ paddd %xmm4,%xmm0
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pshufb %xmm12,%xmm3
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm8
+ psrld $0xc,%xmm1
+ pslld $0x14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm8,%xmm1
+ movzbl 0x4(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm5
+ movzbl 0x5(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm6
+ movzbl 0x6(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm7
+ movzbl 0x7(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm4
+ punpckldq %xmm6,%xmm5
+ punpckldq %xmm4,%xmm7
+ punpcklqdq %xmm7,%xmm5
+ paddd %xmm5,%xmm0
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pshufb %xmm13,%xmm3
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm8
+ psrld $0x7,%xmm1
+ pslld $0x19,%xmm8
+ por %xmm8,%xmm1
+ pshufd $0x93,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ pshufd $0x4e,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ pshufd $0x39,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ movzbl 0x8(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm6
+ movzbl 0x9(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm7
+ movzbl 0xa(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm4
+ movzbl 0xb(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm5
+ punpckldq %xmm7,%xmm6
+ punpckldq %xmm5,%xmm4
+ punpcklqdq %xmm4,%xmm6
+ paddd %xmm6,%xmm0
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pshufb %xmm12,%xmm3
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm8
+ psrld $0xc,%xmm1
+ pslld $0x14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm8,%xmm1
+ movzbl 0xc(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm7
+ movzbl 0xd(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm4
+ movzbl 0xe(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm5
+ movzbl 0xf(%rcx),%eax
+ movd (%rsi,%rax,4),%xmm6
+ punpckldq %xmm4,%xmm7
+ punpckldq %xmm6,%xmm5
+ punpcklqdq %xmm5,%xmm7
+ paddd %xmm7,%xmm0
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pshufb %xmm13,%xmm3
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm8
+ psrld $0x7,%xmm1
+ pslld $0x19,%xmm8
+ por %xmm8,%xmm1
+ pshufd $0x39,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ pshufd $0x4e,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ pshufd $0x93,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ addq $0x10,%rcx
+ cmpq %r8,%rcx
+ jnz .Lroundloop
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm10,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm11,%xmm1
+ addq $0x40,%rsi
+ decq %rdx
+ jnz .Lbeginofloop
+ movdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
+ movdqu %xmm1,0x10(%rdi)
+ movdqu %xmm14,0x20(%rdi)
+.Lendofloop:
+ ret
+ENDPROC(blake2s_compress_ssse3)
+#endif /* CONFIG_AS_SSSE3 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512
+ENTRY(blake2s_compress_avx512)
+ vmovdqu (%rdi),%xmm0
+ vmovdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ vmovdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm4
+ vmovq %rcx,%xmm5
+ vmovdqa IV(%rip),%xmm14
+ vmovdqa IV+16(%rip),%xmm15
+ jmp .Lblake2s_compress_avx512_mainloop
+.align 32
+.Lblake2s_compress_avx512_mainloop:
+ vmovdqa %xmm0,%xmm10
+ vmovdqa %xmm1,%xmm11
+ vpaddq %xmm5,%xmm4,%xmm4
+ vmovdqa %xmm14,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm15,%xmm4,%xmm3
+ vmovdqu (%rsi),%ymm6
+ vmovdqu 0x20(%rsi),%ymm7
+ addq $0x40,%rsi
+ leaq SIGMA2(%rip),%rax
+ movb $0xa,%cl
+.Lblake2s_compress_avx512_roundloop:
+ addq $0x40,%rax
+ vmovdqa -0x40(%rax),%ymm8
+ vmovdqa -0x20(%rax),%ymm9
+ vpermi2d %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm8
+ vpermi2d %ymm7,%ymm6,%ymm9
+ vmovdqa %ymm8,%ymm6
+ vmovdqa %ymm9,%ymm7
+ vpaddd %xmm8,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpaddd %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vprord $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpaddd %xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vprord $0xc,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vextracti128 $0x1,%ymm8,%xmm8
+ vpaddd %xmm8,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpaddd %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vprord $0x8,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpaddd %xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vprord $0x7,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpshufd $0x93,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpshufd $0x4e,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpshufd $0x39,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpaddd %xmm9,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpaddd %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vprord $0x10,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpaddd %xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vprord $0xc,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vextracti128 $0x1,%ymm9,%xmm9
+ vpaddd %xmm9,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpaddd %xmm1,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm0,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vprord $0x8,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpaddd %xmm3,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vprord $0x7,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpshufd $0x39,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpshufd $0x4e,%xmm3,%xmm3
+ vpshufd $0x93,%xmm2,%xmm2
+ decb %cl
+ jne .Lblake2s_compress_avx512_roundloop
+ vpxor %xmm10,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm11,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ vpxor %xmm2,%xmm0,%xmm0
+ vpxor %xmm3,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ decq %rdx
+ jne .Lblake2s_compress_avx512_mainloop
+ vmovdqu %xmm0,(%rdi)
+ vmovdqu %xmm1,0x10(%rdi)
+ vmovdqu %xmm4,0x20(%rdi)
+ vzeroupper
+ retq
+ENDPROC(blake2s_compress_avx512)
+#endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX512 */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/simd.h>
+
+asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_ssse3(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u8 *block, const size_t nblocks,
+ const u32 inc);
+asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u8 *block, const size_t nblocks,
+ const u32 inc);
+
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
+
+void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
+ const u32 inc)
+{
+ /* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&blake2s_use_ssse3) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, block, nblocks, inc);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ const size_t blocks = min_t(size_t, nblocks,
+ PAGE_SIZE / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
+ static_branch_likely(&blake2s_use_avx512))
+ blake2s_compress_avx512(state, block, blocks, inc);
+ else
+ blake2s_compress_ssse3(state, block, blocks, inc);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+
+ nblocks -= blocks;
+ if (!nblocks)
+ break;
+ block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
+ tctx->keylen = keylen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
+ if (tctx->keylen)
+ blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init(state, outlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
+ unsigned int inlen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inlen))
+ return 0;
+ if (inlen > fill) {
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+ blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ in += fill;
+ inlen -= fill;
+ }
+ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+ blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ }
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+ state->buflen += inlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+ blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-128",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-128-x86",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-160",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-160-x86",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-224",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-224-x86",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}, {
+ .base.cra_name = "blake2s-256",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-256-x86",
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
+ .base.cra_priority = 200,
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+
+ .digestsize = BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
+}};
+
+static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ return 0;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512F) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) &&
+ cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM |
+ XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
+ static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
+
+ return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
+module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -657,6 +657,12 @@ config CRYPTO_BLAKE2S
See https://blake2.net for further information.
+config CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86
+ tristate "BLAKE2s digest algorithm (x86 accelerated version)"
+ depends on X86 && 64BIT
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
+ select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
+
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF
tristate "CRCT10DIF algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH

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From 54bdc995d525de6ae20f74af36d079f8b79e52fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 027/124] crypto: curve25519 - implement generic KPP driver
commit ee772cb641135739c1530647391d5a04c39db192 upstream.
Expose the generic Curve25519 library via the crypto API KPP interface.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 5 +++
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/curve25519-generic.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/curve25519-generic.c
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -264,6 +264,11 @@ config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification
is implemented.
+config CRYPTO_CURVE25519
+ tristate "Curve25519 algorithm"
+ select CRYPTO_KPP
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
+
comment "Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data"
config CRYPTO_CCM
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519) += curve25519-generic.o
ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+#include <crypto/curve25519.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+
+static int curve25519_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ u8 *secret = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (!len)
+ curve25519_generate_secret(secret);
+ else if (len == CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE &&
+ crypto_memneq(buf, curve25519_null_point, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE))
+ memcpy(secret, buf, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int curve25519_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
+ const u8 *secret = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ u8 public_key[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 buf[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE];
+ int copied, nbytes;
+ u8 const *bp;
+
+ if (req->src) {
+ copied = sg_copy_to_buffer(req->src,
+ sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
+ CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE),
+ public_key, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (copied != CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ bp = public_key;
+ } else {
+ bp = curve25519_base_point;
+ }
+
+ curve25519_generic(buf, secret, bp);
+
+ /* might want less than we've got */
+ nbytes = min_t(size_t, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE, req->dst_len);
+ copied = sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst,
+ nbytes),
+ buf, nbytes);
+ if (copied != nbytes)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int curve25519_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
+{
+ return CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE;
+}
+
+static struct kpp_alg curve25519_alg = {
+ .base.cra_name = "curve25519",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "curve25519-generic",
+ .base.cra_priority = 100,
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE,
+
+ .set_secret = curve25519_set_secret,
+ .generate_public_key = curve25519_compute_value,
+ .compute_shared_secret = curve25519_compute_value,
+ .max_size = curve25519_max_size,
+};
+
+static int curve25519_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
+}
+
+static void curve25519_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(curve25519_init);
+module_exit(curve25519_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("curve25519-generic");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

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From 3c710fa0cdbf9362df4e3b36be338779662b30a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 028/124] crypto: lib/curve25519 - work around Clang stack
spilling issue
commit 660bb8e1f833ea63185fe80fde847e3e42f18e3b upstream.
Arnd reports that the 32-bit generic library code for Curve25119 ends
up using an excessive amount of stack space when built with Clang:
lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c:756:6: error: stack frame size
of 1384 bytes in function 'curve25519_generic'
[-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
Let's give some hints to the compiler regarding which routines should
not be inlined, to prevent it from running out of registers and spilling
to the stack. The resulting code performs identically under both GCC
and Clang, and makes the warning go away.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static __always_inline void fe_1(fe *h)
h->v[0] = 1;
}
-static void fe_add_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
+static noinline void fe_add_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
{
{ const u32 x20 = in1[9];
{ const u32 x21 = in1[8];
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static __always_inline void fe_add(fe_lo
fe_add_impl(h->v, f->v, g->v);
}
-static void fe_sub_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
+static noinline void fe_sub_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
{
{ const u32 x20 = in1[9];
{ const u32 x21 = in1[8];
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static __always_inline void fe_sub(fe_lo
fe_sub_impl(h->v, f->v, g->v);
}
-static void fe_mul_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
+static noinline void fe_mul_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
{
{ const u32 x20 = in1[9];
{ const u32 x21 = in1[8];
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ fe_mul_tll(fe *h, const fe_loose *f, con
fe_mul_impl(h->v, f->v, g->v);
}
-static void fe_sqr_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10])
+static noinline void fe_sqr_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10])
{
{ const u32 x17 = in1[9];
{ const u32 x18 = in1[8];
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static __always_inline void fe_invert(fe
*
* Preconditions: b in {0,1}
*/
-static __always_inline void fe_cswap(fe *f, fe *g, unsigned int b)
+static noinline void fe_cswap(fe *f, fe *g, unsigned int b)
{
unsigned i;
b = 0 - b;

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From b7af0c213ba3afe27da21845419756aec63b43b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 13:22:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 033/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement
crypt_from_sg() routine
commit d95312a3ccc0cd544d374be2fc45aeaa803e5fd9 upstream.
Reimplement the library routines to perform chacha20poly1305 en/decryption
on scatterlists, without [ab]using the [deprecated] blkcipher interface,
which is rather heavyweight and does things we don't really need.
Instead, we use the sg_miter API in a novel and clever way, to iterate
over the scatterlist in-place (i.e., source == destination, which is the
only way this library is expected to be used). That way, we don't have to
iterate over two scatterlists in parallel.
Another optimization is that, instead of relying on the blkcipher walker
to present the input in suitable chunks, we recognize that ChaCha is a
streamcipher, and so we can simply deal with partial blocks by keeping a
block of cipherstream on the stack and use crypto_xor() to mix it with
the in/output.
Finally, we omit the scatterwalk_and_copy() call if the last element of
the scatterlist covers the MAC as well (which is the common case),
avoiding the need to walk the scatterlist and kmap() the page twice.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h | 11 ++
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c | 45 ++++++++
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
--- a/include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#define __CHACHA20POLY1305_H
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
enum chacha20poly1305_lengths {
XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE = 24,
@@ -34,4 +35,14 @@ bool __must_check xchacha20poly1305_decr
const size_t ad_len, const u8 nonce[XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE],
const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
+bool chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src, size_t src_len,
+ const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
+ const u64 nonce,
+ const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+bool chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src, size_t src_len,
+ const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
+ const u64 nonce,
+ const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
+
#endif /* __CHACHA20POLY1305_H */
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c
@@ -7250,6 +7250,7 @@ bool __init chacha20poly1305_selftest(vo
enum { MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN = 1UL << 12 };
size_t i;
u8 *computed_output = NULL, *heap_src = NULL;
+ struct scatterlist sg_src;
bool success = true, ret;
heap_src = kmalloc(MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -7280,6 +7281,29 @@ bool __init chacha20poly1305_selftest(vo
}
}
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors); ++i) {
+ if (chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].nlen != 8)
+ continue;
+ memcpy(heap_src, chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].input,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_src, heap_src,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].ilen + POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(&sg_src,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].ilen,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].assoc,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].alen,
+ get_unaligned_le64(chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].nonce),
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].key);
+ if (memcmp(heap_src,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].output,
+ chacha20poly1305_enc_vectors[i].ilen +
+ POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ pr_err("chacha20poly1305 sg encryption self-test %zu: FAIL\n",
+ i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors); ++i) {
memset(computed_output, 0, MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN);
ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(computed_output,
@@ -7301,6 +7325,27 @@ bool __init chacha20poly1305_selftest(vo
}
}
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors); ++i) {
+ memcpy(heap_src, chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].input,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_src, heap_src,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].ilen);
+ ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(&sg_src,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].ilen,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].assoc,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].alen,
+ get_unaligned_le64(chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].nonce),
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].key);
+ if (!decryption_success(ret,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].failure,
+ memcmp(heap_src, chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].output,
+ chacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].ilen -
+ POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))) {
+ pr_err("chacha20poly1305 sg decryption self-test %zu: FAIL\n",
+ i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xchacha20poly1305_enc_vectors); ++i) {
memset(computed_output, 0, MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN);
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -205,6 +206,155 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);
+static
+bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src,
+ const size_t src_len,
+ const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
+ const u64 nonce,
+ const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE],
+ int encrypt)
+{
+ const u8 *pad0 = page_address(ZERO_PAGE(0));
+ struct poly1305_desc_ctx poly1305_state;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+ struct sg_mapping_iter miter;
+ size_t partial = 0;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ bool ret = true;
+ int sl;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ u32 k[CHACHA_KEY_WORDS];
+ __le64 iv[2];
+ };
+ u8 block0[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 chacha_stream[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct {
+ u8 mac[2][POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ };
+ __le64 lens[2];
+ } b __aligned(16);
+
+ chacha_load_key(b.k, key);
+
+ b.iv[0] = 0;
+ b.iv[1] = cpu_to_le64(nonce);
+
+ chacha_init(chacha_state, b.k, (u8 *)b.iv);
+ chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
+ poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
+
+ if (unlikely(ad_len)) {
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, ad, ad_len);
+ if (ad_len & 0xf)
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, pad0, 0x10 - (ad_len & 0xf));
+ }
+
+ flags = SG_MITER_TO_SG;
+ if (!preemptible())
+ flags |= SG_MITER_ATOMIC;
+
+ sg_miter_start(&miter, src, sg_nents(src), flags);
+
+ for (sl = src_len; sl > 0 && sg_miter_next(&miter); sl -= miter.length) {
+ u8 *addr = miter.addr;
+ size_t length = min_t(size_t, sl, miter.length);
+
+ if (!encrypt)
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, addr, length);
+
+ if (unlikely(partial)) {
+ size_t l = min(length, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE - partial);
+
+ crypto_xor(addr, b.chacha_stream + partial, l);
+ partial = (partial + l) & (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+
+ addr += l;
+ length -= l;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(length >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || length == sl)) {
+ size_t l = length;
+
+ if (unlikely(length < sl))
+ l &= ~(CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ chacha_crypt(chacha_state, addr, addr, l, 20);
+ addr += l;
+ length -= l;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(length > 0)) {
+ chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.chacha_stream, pad0,
+ CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, 20);
+ crypto_xor(addr, b.chacha_stream, length);
+ partial = length;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, miter.addr,
+ min_t(size_t, sl, miter.length));
+ }
+
+ if (src_len & 0xf)
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, pad0, 0x10 - (src_len & 0xf));
+
+ b.lens[0] = cpu_to_le64(ad_len);
+ b.lens[1] = cpu_to_le64(src_len);
+ poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, (u8 *)b.lens, sizeof(b.lens));
+
+ if (likely(sl <= -POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ if (encrypt) {
+ poly1305_final(&poly1305_state,
+ miter.addr + miter.length + sl);
+ ret = true;
+ } else {
+ poly1305_final(&poly1305_state, b.mac[0]);
+ ret = !crypto_memneq(b.mac[0],
+ miter.addr + miter.length + sl,
+ POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ sg_miter_stop(&miter);
+
+ if (unlikely(sl > -POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ poly1305_final(&poly1305_state, b.mac[1]);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b.mac[encrypt], src, src_len,
+ sizeof(b.mac[1]), encrypt);
+ ret = encrypt ||
+ !crypto_memneq(b.mac[0], b.mac[1], POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+ memzero_explicit(&b, sizeof(b));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src, size_t src_len,
+ const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
+ const u64 nonce,
+ const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ return chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(src, src_len, ad, ad_len,
+ nonce, key, 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg_inplace);
+
+bool chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src, size_t src_len,
+ const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
+ const u64 nonce,
+ const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ return false;
+
+ return chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(src,
+ src_len - POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ ad, ad_len, nonce, key, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace);
+
static int __init mod_init(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&

68
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0034-crypto-chacha_generic-remove-unnecessary-setkey-func.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From d59a7ffb8aa6735586929c5a2d90e142c6d6952d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:21:29 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 034/124] crypto: chacha_generic - remove unnecessary setkey()
functions
commit 2043323a799a660bc84bbee404cf7a2617ec6157 upstream.
Use chacha20_setkey() and chacha12_setkey() from
<crypto/internal/chacha.h> instead of defining them again in
chacha_generic.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/chacha_generic.c | 18 +++---------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/chacha_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c
@@ -37,18 +37,6 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
return err;
}
-static int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize)
-{
- return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 20);
-}
-
-static int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keysize)
-{
- return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12);
-}
-
static int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -91,7 +79,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = crypto_chacha_crypt,
.decrypt = crypto_chacha_crypt,
}, {
@@ -106,7 +94,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha20_setkey,
.encrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt,
.decrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt,
}, {
@@ -121,7 +109,7 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE,
.chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey,
+ .setkey = chacha12_setkey,
.encrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt,
.decrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt,
}

32
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0035-crypto-x86-chacha-only-unregister-algorithms-if-regi.patch Normal file
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From 4fa6b436d97e44deef404676d150ed4c13d63bba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:21:58 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 035/124] crypto: x86/chacha - only unregister algorithms if
registered
commit b62755aed3a3f5ca9edd2718339ccea3b6bbbe57 upstream.
It's not valid to call crypto_unregister_skciphers() without a prior
call to crypto_register_skciphers().
Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(v
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);

83
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0036-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-use-chacha20_crypt.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From 41d7b5227dcad70f5bd6471e9620fe3c8b3db300 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:22:16 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 036/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - use chacha20_crypt()
commit 413808b71e6204b0cc1eeaa77960f7c3cd381d33 upstream.
Use chacha20_crypt() instead of chacha_crypt(), since it's not really
appropriate for users of the ChaCha library API to be passing the number
of rounds as an argument.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@ __chacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 *dst, cons
__le64 lens[2];
} b;
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, ad, ad_len);
if (ad_len & 0xf)
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, pad0, 0x10 - (ad_len & 0xf));
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, src_len, 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, src_len);
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, dst, src_len);
if (src_len & 0xf)
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, cons
if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
return false;
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, ad, ad_len);
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, cons
ret = crypto_memneq(b.mac, src + dst_len, POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (likely(!ret))
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, dst_len, 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, dst_len);
memzero_explicit(&b, sizeof(b));
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
b.iv[1] = cpu_to_le64(nonce);
chacha_init(chacha_state, b.k, (u8 *)b.iv);
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
if (unlikely(ad_len)) {
@@ -278,14 +278,14 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
if (unlikely(length < sl))
l &= ~(CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, addr, addr, l, 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, addr, addr, l);
addr += l;
length -= l;
}
if (unlikely(length > 0)) {
- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.chacha_stream, pad0,
- CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, 20);
+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.chacha_stream, pad0,
+ CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_xor(addr, b.chacha_stream, length);
partial = length;
}

275
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@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
From f23fdc58a0a08afada84fe4910279ec3d8d085e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 11:31:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 037/124] crypto: arch - conditionalize crypto api in arch glue
for lib code
commit 8394bfec51e0e565556101bcc4e2fe7551104cd8 upstream.
For glue code that's used by Zinc, the actual Crypto API functions might
not necessarily exist, and don't need to exist either. Before this
patch, there are valid build configurations that lead to a unbuildable
kernel. This fixes it to conditionalize those symbols on the existence
of the proper config entry.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c | 5 +++--
arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 9 ++++++---
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 5 +++--
arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 5 +++--
arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 6 ++++--
arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 5 +++--
arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 5 +++--
11 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -286,11 +286,13 @@ static struct skcipher_alg neon_algs[] =
static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
{
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
- err = crypto_register_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
- if (err)
- return err;
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER)) {
+ err = crypto_register_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) {
int i;
@@ -310,18 +312,22 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(v
static_branch_enable(&use_neon);
}
- err = crypto_register_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
- if (err)
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER)) {
+ err = crypto_register_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
+ if (err)
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ }
}
return err;
}
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON))
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER)) {
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(arm_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arm_algs));
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON))
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(neon_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(neon_algs));
+ }
}
module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
@@ -108,14 +108,15 @@ static int __init mod_init(void)
{
if (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON) {
static_branch_enable(&have_neon);
- return crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP) ?
+ crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg) : 0;
}
return 0;
}
static void __exit mod_exit(void)
{
- if (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP) && elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)
crypto_unregister_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
}
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -249,16 +249,19 @@ static int __init arm_poly1305_mod_init(
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) &&
(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON))
static_branch_enable(&have_neon);
- else
+ else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
/* register only the first entry */
return crypto_register_shash(&arm_poly1305_algs[0]);
- return crypto_register_shashes(arm_poly1305_algs,
- ARRAY_SIZE(arm_poly1305_algs));
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+ crypto_register_shashes(arm_poly1305_algs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(arm_poly1305_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit arm_poly1305_mod_exit(void)
{
+ if (!IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
+ return;
if (!static_branch_likely(&have_neon)) {
crypto_unregister_shash(&arm_poly1305_algs[0]);
return;
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -211,12 +211,13 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(v
static_branch_enable(&have_neon);
- return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) ?
+ crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- if (cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) && cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -220,12 +220,13 @@ static int __init neon_poly1305_mod_init
static_branch_enable(&have_neon);
- return crypto_register_shash(&neon_poly1305_alg);
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+ crypto_register_shash(&neon_poly1305_alg) : 0;
}
static void __exit neon_poly1305_mod_exit(void)
{
- if (cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
crypto_unregister_shash(&neon_poly1305_alg);
}
--- a/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -128,12 +128,14 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = {
static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) ?
+ crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER))
+ crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init);
--- a/arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -187,12 +187,14 @@ static struct shash_alg mips_poly1305_al
static int __init mips_poly1305_mod_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_shash(&mips_poly1305_alg);
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+ crypto_register_shash(&mips_poly1305_alg) : 0;
}
static void __exit mips_poly1305_mod_exit(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_shash(&mips_poly1305_alg);
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&mips_poly1305_alg);
}
module_init(mips_poly1305_mod_init);
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
@@ -210,12 +210,14 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
- return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+ crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
}
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -299,12 +299,13 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(v
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW)) /* kmovq */
static_branch_enable(&chacha_use_avx512vl);
}
- return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) ?
+ crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
@@ -2457,13 +2457,14 @@ static int __init curve25519_mod_init(vo
static_branch_enable(&curve25519_use_adx);
else
return 0;
- return crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP) ?
+ crypto_register_kpp(&curve25519_alg) : 0;
}
static void __exit curve25519_mod_exit(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2) ||
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ADX))
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP) &&
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ADX)))
crypto_unregister_kpp(&curve25519_alg);
}
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -224,12 +224,13 @@ static int __init poly1305_simd_mod_init
cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL))
static_branch_enable(&poly1305_use_avx2);
- return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
+ return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ? crypto_register_shash(&alg) : 0;
}
static void __exit poly1305_simd_mod_exit(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
module_init(poly1305_simd_mod_init);

35
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 61ad3d7b564718b9810b8112a6d2e9ad6405b167 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Valdis=20Kl=C4=93tnieks?= <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 20:58:36 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 038/124] crypto: chacha - fix warning message in header file
commit 579d705cd64e44f3fcda1a6cfd5f37468a5ddf63 upstream.
Building with W=1 causes a warning:
CC [M] arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o
In file included from arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c:10:
./include/crypto/internal/chacha.h:37:1: warning: 'inline' is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
37 | static int inline chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
| ^~~~~~
Straighten out the order to match the rest of the header file.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/crypto/internal/chacha.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/chacha.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline int chacha20_setkey(struct
return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 20);
}
-static int inline chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+static inline int chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize)
{
return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12);

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From 610442255536492764547dddde0289d46a9566db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 10:26:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 039/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - add arch-specific key
generation function
commit 84faa307249b341f6ad8de3e1869d77a65e26669 upstream.
Somehow this was forgotten when Zinc was being split into oddly shaped
pieces, resulting in linker errors. The x86_64 glue has a specific key
generation implementation, but the Arm one does not. However, it can
still receive the NEON speedups by calling the ordinary DH function
using the base point.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ void curve25519_arch(u8 out[CURVE25519_K
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_arch);
+void curve25519_base_arch(u8 pub[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ return curve25519_arch(pub, secret, curve25519_base_point);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_base_arch);
+
static int curve25519_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
unsigned int len)
{

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From 3b1cffd5e47b394b8c0a92583e26acf599022364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2020 22:40:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 044/124] crypto: {arm,arm64,mips}/poly1305 - remove redundant
non-reduction from emit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit 31899908a0d248b030b4464425b86c717e0007d4 upstream.
This appears to be some kind of copy and paste error, and is actually
dead code.
Pre: f = 0 ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
Therefore this sequence is redundant. And Andy's code appears to handle
misalignment acceptably.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 18 ++----------------
arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 18 ++----------------
arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 18 ++----------------
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
void poly1305_init_arm(void *state, const u8 *key);
void poly1305_blocks_arm(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
-void poly1305_emit_arm(void *state, __le32 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
+void poly1305_emit_arm(void *state, u8 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
void __weak poly1305_blocks_neon(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit)
{
@@ -179,9 +179,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_update_arch);
void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, u8 *dst)
{
- __le32 digest[4];
- u64 f = 0;
-
if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
@@ -189,18 +186,7 @@ void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305
poly1305_blocks_arm(&dctx->h, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
}
- poly1305_emit_arm(&dctx->h, digest, dctx->s);
-
- /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
-
+ poly1305_emit_arm(&dctx->h, dst, dctx->s);
*dctx = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){};
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final_arch);
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
asmlinkage void poly1305_init_arm64(void *state, const u8 *key);
asmlinkage void poly1305_blocks(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
asmlinkage void poly1305_blocks_neon(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
-asmlinkage void poly1305_emit(void *state, __le32 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
+asmlinkage void poly1305_emit(void *state, u8 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_neon);
@@ -162,9 +162,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_update_arch);
void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, u8 *dst)
{
- __le32 digest[4];
- u64 f = 0;
-
if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
@@ -172,18 +169,7 @@ void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305
poly1305_blocks(&dctx->h, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
}
- poly1305_emit(&dctx->h, digest, dctx->s);
-
- /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
-
+ poly1305_emit(&dctx->h, dst, dctx->s);
*dctx = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){};
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final_arch);
--- a/arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/mips/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
asmlinkage void poly1305_init_mips(void *state, const u8 *key);
asmlinkage void poly1305_blocks_mips(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
-asmlinkage void poly1305_emit_mips(void *state, __le32 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
+asmlinkage void poly1305_emit_mips(void *state, u8 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
void poly1305_init_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key)
{
@@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_update_arch);
void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, u8 *dst)
{
- __le32 digest[4];
- u64 f = 0;
-
if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) {
dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1;
memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0,
@@ -144,18 +141,7 @@ void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305
poly1305_blocks_mips(&dctx->h, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
}
- poly1305_emit_mips(&dctx->h, digest, dctx->s);
-
- /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
- f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]);
- put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
-
+ poly1305_emit_mips(&dctx->h, dst, dctx->s);
*dctx = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){};
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final_arch);

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From a7e800af9c95490f8b42934eccc88d02d0af6d2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 12:37:35 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 045/124] crypto: curve25519 - Fix selftest build error
commit a8bdf2c42ee4d1ee42af1f3601f85de94e70a421 upstream.
If CRYPTO_CURVE25519 is y, CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC will be
y, but CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519 may be set to m, this causes build
errors:
lib/crypto/curve25519-selftest.o: In function `curve25519':
curve25519-selftest.c:(.text.unlikely+0xc): undefined reference to `curve25519_arch'
lib/crypto/curve25519-selftest.o: In function `curve25519_selftest':
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x17e): undefined reference to `curve25519_base_arch'
This is because the curve25519 self-test code is being controlled
by the GENERIC option rather than the overall CURVE25519 option,
as is the case with blake2s. To recap, the GENERIC and ARCH options
for CURVE25519 are internal only and selected by users such as
the Crypto API, or the externally visible CURVE25519 option which
in turn is selected by wireguard. The self-test is specific to the
the external CURVE25519 option and should not be enabled by the
Crypto API.
This patch fixes this by splitting the GENERIC module from the
CURVE25519 module with the latter now containing just the self-test.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: aa127963f1ca ("crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
lib/crypto/Makefile | 9 ++++++---
lib/crypto/curve25519-generic.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/crypto/curve25519.c | 7 -------
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 lib/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -19,9 +19,12 @@ libblake2s-y += blake2s.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305) += libchacha20poly1305.o
libchacha20poly1305-y += chacha20poly1305.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC) += libcurve25519.o
-libcurve25519-y := curve25519-fiat32.o
-libcurve25519-$(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128) := curve25519-hacl64.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC) += libcurve25519-generic.o
+libcurve25519-generic-y := curve25519-fiat32.o
+libcurve25519-generic-$(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128) := curve25519-hacl64.o
+libcurve25519-generic-y += curve25519-generic.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519) += libcurve25519.o
libcurve25519-y += curve25519.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES) += libdes.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/curve25519-generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the Curve25519 ECDH algorithm, using either
+ * a 32-bit implementation or a 64-bit implementation with 128-bit integers,
+ * depending on what is supported by the target compiler.
+ *
+ * Information: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/curve25519.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+const u8 curve25519_null_point[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(32) = { 0 };
+const u8 curve25519_base_point[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(32) = { 9 };
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_null_point);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_base_point);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_generic);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Curve25519 scalar multiplication");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
--- a/lib/crypto/curve25519.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/curve25519.c
@@ -15,13 +15,6 @@
bool curve25519_selftest(void);
-const u8 curve25519_null_point[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(32) = { 0 };
-const u8 curve25519_base_point[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(32) = { 9 };
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_null_point);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_base_point);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(curve25519_generic);
-
static int __init mod_init(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&

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From cd86f0664c2e42b6406cb56ac8d5182a65764e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 18:23:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 046/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix .gitignore typo
commit 1f6868995326cc82102049e349d8dbd116bdb656 upstream.
Admist the kbuild robot induced changes, the .gitignore file for the
generated file wasn't updated with the non-clashing filename. This
commit adjusts that.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/.gitignore | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/.gitignore
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/.gitignore
@@ -1 +1 @@
-poly1305-x86_64.S
+poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.S

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From 722ccb5da4bab4e142e4dc1eea10406a08547c7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 11:42:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 048/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - emit does base conversion
itself
commit f9e7fe32a792726186301423ff63a465d63386e1 upstream.
The emit code does optional base conversion itself in assembly, so we
don't need to do that here. Also, neither one of these functions uses
simd instructions, so checking for that doesn't make sense either.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -123,13 +123,9 @@ static void poly1305_simd_blocks(void *c
static void poly1305_simd_emit(void *ctx, u8 mac[POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE],
const u32 nonce[4])
{
- struct poly1305_arch_internal *state = ctx;
-
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX) || !static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx) ||
- !state->is_base2_26 || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
- convert_to_base2_64(ctx);
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX) || !static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx))
poly1305_emit_x86_64(ctx, mac, nonce);
- } else
+ else
poly1305_emit_avx(ctx, mac, nonce);
}

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From 627e2c8313065e627fe5c8c9f82cebd765f5a65e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 17:43:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 049/124] crypto: arm/chacha - fix build failured when kernel
mode NEON is disabled
commit 0bc81767c5bd9d005fae1099fb39eb3688370cb1 upstream.
When the ARM accelerated ChaCha driver is built as part of a configuration
that has kernel mode NEON disabled, we expect the compiler to propagate
the build time constant expression IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) in
a way that eliminates all the cross-object references to the actual NEON
routines, which allows the chacha-neon-core.o object to be omitted from
the build entirely.
Unfortunately, this fails to work as expected in some cases, and we may
end up with a build error such as
chacha-glue.c:(.text+0xc0): undefined reference to `chacha_4block_xor_neon'
caused by the fact that chacha_doneon() has not been eliminated from the
object code, even though it will never be called in practice.
Let's fix this by adding some IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) tests
that are not strictly needed from a logical point of view, but should
help the compiler infer that the NEON code paths are unreachable in
those cases.
Fixes: b36d8c09e710c71f ("crypto: arm/chacha - remove dependency on generic ...")
Reported-by: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
if (nbytes < walk.total)
nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
- if (!neon) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) || !neon) {
chacha_doarm(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes, state, ctx->nrounds);
state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int do_xchacha(struct skcipher_re
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
- if (!neon) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) || !neon) {
hchacha_block_arm(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
} else {
kernel_neon_begin();

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From 5e8381a3dc454813605aef01de31985f0f6bf130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 12:01:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 050/124] crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when
manager is disabled
commit 2343d1529aff8b552589f622c23932035ed7a05d upstream.
The library code uses CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS to conditionalize its
tests, but the library code can also exist without CRYPTO_MANAGER. That
means on minimal configs, the test code winds up being built with no way
to disable it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -136,8 +136,6 @@ config CRYPTO_USER
Userspace configuration for cryptographic instantiations such as
cbc(aes).
-if CRYPTO_MANAGER2
-
config CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
bool "Disable run-time self tests"
default y
@@ -155,8 +153,6 @@ config CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
This is intended for developer use only, as these tests take much
longer to run than the normal self tests.
-endif # if CRYPTO_MANAGER2
-
config CRYPTO_GF128MUL
tristate

40
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0051-crypto-chacha20poly1305-prevent-integer-overflow-on-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From dceaaf068879fc228e85c482f65ebb707587f696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2020 12:42:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 051/124] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow
on large input
commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream.
This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems
when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be
passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I
don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types
or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and
print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look
into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're
accidently passing -1 or similar.
Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
__le64 lens[2];
} b __aligned(16);
+ if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX))
+ return false;
+
chacha_load_key(b.k, key);
b.iv[0] = 0;

84
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0052-crypto-x86-curve25519-support-assemblers-with-no-adx.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From 50af997532492b0f55bd9928743ac1f99dc1cd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2020 22:52:35 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 052/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - support assemblers with no
adx support
commit 1579f1bc3b753d17a44de3457d5c6f4a5b14c752 upstream.
Some older version of GAS do not support the ADX instructions, similarly
to how they also don't support AVX and such. This commit adds the same
build-time detection mechanisms we use for AVX and others for ADX, and
then makes sure that the curve25519 library dispatcher calls the right
functions.
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/Makefile | 5 +++--
arch/x86/crypto/Makefile | 7 ++++++-
include/crypto/curve25519.h | 6 ++++--
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ avx2_instr :=$(call as-instr,vpbroadcast
avx512_instr :=$(call as-instr,vpmovm2b %k1$(comma)%zmm5,-DCONFIG_AS_AVX512=1)
sha1_ni_instr :=$(call as-instr,sha1msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,-DCONFIG_AS_SHA1_NI=1)
sha256_ni_instr :=$(call as-instr,sha256msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,-DCONFIG_AS_SHA256_NI=1)
+adx_instr := $(call as-instr,adox %r10$(comma)%r10,-DCONFIG_AS_ADX=1)
-KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(cfi) $(cfi-sigframe) $(cfi-sections) $(asinstr) $(avx_instr) $(avx2_instr) $(avx512_instr) $(sha1_ni_instr) $(sha256_ni_instr)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cfi) $(cfi-sigframe) $(cfi-sections) $(asinstr) $(avx_instr) $(avx2_instr) $(avx512_instr) $(sha1_ni_instr) $(sha256_ni_instr)
+KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(cfi) $(cfi-sigframe) $(cfi-sections) $(asinstr) $(avx_instr) $(avx2_instr) $(avx512_instr) $(sha1_ni_instr) $(sha256_ni_instr) $(adx_instr)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cfi) $(cfi-sigframe) $(cfi-sections) $(asinstr) $(avx_instr) $(avx2_instr) $(avx512_instr) $(sha1_ni_instr) $(sha256_ni_instr) $(adx_instr)
KBUILD_LDFLAGS := -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ avx2_supported := $(call as-instr,vpgath
avx512_supported :=$(call as-instr,vpmovm2b %k1$(comma)%zmm5,yes,no)
sha1_ni_supported :=$(call as-instr,sha1msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,yes,no)
sha256_ni_supported :=$(call as-instr,sha256msg1 %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1,yes,no)
+adx_supported := $(call as-instr,adox %r10$(comma)%r10,yes,no)
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86) += glue_helper.o
@@ -39,7 +40,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEGIS128_AESNI_SSE2)
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_SSE2) += nhpoly1305-sse2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_AVX2) += nhpoly1305-avx2.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86) += curve25519-x86_64.o
+
+# These modules require the assembler to support ADX.
+ifeq ($(adx_supported),yes)
+ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86) += curve25519-x86_64.o
+endif
# These modules require assembler to support AVX.
ifeq ($(avx_supported),yes)
--- a/include/crypto/curve25519.h
+++ b/include/crypto/curve25519.h
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ bool __must_check curve25519(u8 mypublic
const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
const u8 basepoint[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519) &&
+ (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_ADX)))
curve25519_arch(mypublic, secret, basepoint);
else
curve25519_generic(mypublic, secret, basepoint);
@@ -49,7 +50,8 @@ __must_check curve25519_generate_public(
CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE)))
return false;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519) &&
+ (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_ADX)))
curve25519_base_arch(pub, secret);
else
curve25519_generic(pub, secret, curve25519_base_point);

68
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0053-crypto-arm64-chacha-correctly-walk-through-blocks.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From ed61666f3b3fae43e872dc36a2c01794d7119165 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 20:27:32 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 053/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - correctly walk through blocks
commit c8cfcb78c65877313cda7bcbace624d3dbd1f3b3 upstream.
Prior, passing in chunks of 2, 3, or 4, followed by any additional
chunks would result in the chacha state counter getting out of sync,
resulting in incorrect encryption/decryption, which is a pretty nasty
crypto vuln: "why do images look weird on webpages?" WireGuard users
never experienced this prior, because we have always, out of tree, used
a different crypto library, until the recent Frankenzinc addition. This
commit fixes the issue by advancing the pointers and state counter by
the actual size processed. It also fixes up a bug in the (optional,
costly) stride test that prevented it from running on arm64.
Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function")
Reported-and-tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 8 ++++----
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c | 11 ++++++++---
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
break;
}
chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds, l);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 5;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 5;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 5;
- state[12] += 5;
+ bytes -= l;
+ src += l;
+ dst += l;
+ state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(l, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
}
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305-selftest.c
@@ -9028,10 +9028,15 @@ bool __init chacha20poly1305_selftest(vo
&& total_len <= 1 << 10; ++total_len) {
for (i = 0; i <= total_len; ++i) {
for (j = i; j <= total_len; ++j) {
+ k = 0;
sg_init_table(sg_src, 3);
- sg_set_buf(&sg_src[0], input, i);
- sg_set_buf(&sg_src[1], input + i, j - i);
- sg_set_buf(&sg_src[2], input + j, total_len - j);
+ if (i)
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_src[k++], input, i);
+ if (j - i)
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_src[k++], input + i, j - i);
+ if (total_len - j)
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_src[k++], input + j, total_len - j);
+ sg_init_marker(sg_src, k);
memset(computed_output, 0, total_len);
memset(input, 0, total_len);

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376
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0055-crypto-x86-curve25519-leave-r12-as-spare-register.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
From 481c5ed9ac2acec32d93847636707bda02208ec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2020 16:06:56 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 055/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - leave r12 as spare register
commit dc7fc3a53ae158263196b1892b672aedf67796c5 upstream.
This updates to the newer register selection proved by HACL*, which
leads to a more compact instruction encoding, and saves around 100
cycles.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c | 110 ++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
@@ -167,28 +167,28 @@ static inline void fmul(u64 *out, const
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 8(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 48(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;" " movq %%rax, 56(%0);"
/* Line up pointers */
@@ -202,11 +202,11 @@ static inline void fmul(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %3, %3;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 8(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 16(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 56(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static inline void fmul(u64 *out, const
" movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
: "+&r" (tmp), "+&r" (f1), "+&r" (out), "+&r" (f2)
:
- : "%rax", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "memory", "cc"
+ : "%rax", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%rbx", "%r13", "%r14", "memory", "cc"
);
}
@@ -248,28 +248,28 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 8(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
- " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
- " mulxq 16(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
+ " mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 48(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;" " movq %%rax, 56(%0);"
@@ -279,28 +279,28 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
" movq 32(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 64(%0);"
" mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 72(%0);"
- " mulxq 48(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 40(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 72(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 72(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 80(%0);"
- " mulxq 48(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 80(%0);"
+ " mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 48(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 80(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 80(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 88(%0);"
- " mulxq 48(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 88(%0);"
+ " mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 56(%1), %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 88(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 88(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r12, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 96(%0);"
- " mulxq 48(%3), %%r12, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%r14, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 104(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 96(%0);"
+ " mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 104(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 112(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;" " movq %%rax, 120(%0);"
/* Line up pointers */
@@ -314,11 +314,11 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %3, %3;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 8(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 16(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 56(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -347,11 +347,11 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 96(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %3, %3;"
" adoxq 64(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 72(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 112(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 80(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 120(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
" movq %%r8, 32(%0);"
: "+&r" (tmp), "+&r" (f1), "+&r" (out), "+&r" (f2)
:
- : "%rax", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "memory", "cc"
+ : "%rax", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%rbx", "%r13", "%r14", "memory", "cc"
);
}
@@ -388,11 +388,11 @@ static inline void fmul_scalar(u64 *out,
asm volatile(
/* Compute the raw multiplication of f1*f2 */
" mulxq 0(%2), %%r8, %%rcx;" /* f1[0]*f2 */
- " mulxq 8(%2), %%r9, %%r12;" /* f1[1]*f2 */
+ " mulxq 8(%2), %%r9, %%rbx;" /* f1[1]*f2 */
" add %%rcx, %%r9;"
" mov $0, %%rcx;"
" mulxq 16(%2), %%r10, %%r13;" /* f1[2]*f2 */
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" mulxq 24(%2), %%r11, %%rax;" /* f1[3]*f2 */
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
" adcx %%rcx, %%rax;"
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static inline void fmul_scalar(u64 *out,
" movq %%r8, 0(%1);"
: "+&r" (f2_r)
: "r" (out), "r" (f1)
- : "%rax", "%rcx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "memory", "cc"
+ : "%rax", "%rcx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%rbx", "%r13", "memory", "cc"
);
}
@@ -520,8 +520,8 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 16(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 24(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
- " mulxq 8(%1), %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
- " mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%r12;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 8(%1), %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%rbx;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;" " adcx %%r15, %%r13;" /* f1 */
" mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
@@ -531,12 +531,12 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
" adcx %%r9, %%r9;"
- " adox %%r15, %%r12;"
+ " adox %%r15, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r10, %%r10;"
" adox %%r15, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r11, %%r11;"
" adox %%r15, %%r14;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r12;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r14, %%r14;"
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%rcx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[2]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r11;" " movq %%r11, 32(%0);"
- " adcx %%rcx, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 40(%0);"
+ " adcx %%rcx, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);"
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[3]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r13;" " movq %%r13, 48(%0);"
" adcx %%rcx, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 56(%0);"
@@ -565,11 +565,11 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 8(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 16(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 56(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
: "+&r" (tmp), "+&r" (f), "+&r" (out)
:
- : "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "memory", "cc"
+ : "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%rbx", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "memory", "cc"
);
}
@@ -611,8 +611,8 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 16(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 24(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
- " mulxq 8(%1), %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
- " mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%r12;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 8(%1), %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%rbx;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;" " adcx %%r15, %%r13;" /* f1 */
" mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
@@ -622,12 +622,12 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
" adcx %%r9, %%r9;"
- " adox %%r15, %%r12;"
+ " adox %%r15, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r10, %%r10;"
" adox %%r15, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r11, %%r11;"
" adox %%r15, %%r14;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r12;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r14, %%r14;"
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%rcx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[2]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r11;" " movq %%r11, 32(%0);"
- " adcx %%rcx, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 40(%0);"
+ " adcx %%rcx, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);"
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[3]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r13;" " movq %%r13, 48(%0);"
" adcx %%rcx, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 56(%0);"
@@ -651,8 +651,8 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 56(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 56(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r11, %%r12;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
- " mulxq 48(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%r12;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%rcx, %%r11;" /* f[1]*f[3] */
+ " mulxq 48(%1), %%rax, %%r13;" " adcx %%rax, %%rbx;" /* f[2]*f[3] */
" movq 40(%1), %%rdx;" " adcx %%r15, %%r13;" /* f1 */
" mulxq 48(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
@@ -662,12 +662,12 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
" adcx %%r9, %%r9;"
- " adox %%r15, %%r12;"
+ " adox %%r15, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r10, %%r10;"
" adox %%r15, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r11, %%r11;"
" adox %%r15, %%r14;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r12;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r13;"
" adcx %%r14, %%r14;"
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" adcx %%rcx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 88(%0);"
" movq 48(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[2]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r11;" " movq %%r11, 96(%0);"
- " adcx %%rcx, %%r12;" " movq %%r12, 104(%0);"
+ " adcx %%rcx, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 104(%0);"
" movq 56(%1), %%rdx;" " mulx %%rdx, %%rax, %%rcx;" /* f[3]^2 */
" adcx %%rax, %%r13;" " movq %%r13, 112(%0);"
" adcx %%rcx, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 120(%0);"
@@ -694,11 +694,11 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 8(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 16(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 56(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -727,11 +727,11 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 96(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
" xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
" adoxq 64(%1), %%r8;"
- " mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%r12;"
+ " mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
" adoxq 72(%1), %%r9;"
" mulxq 112(%1), %%r10, %%r13;"
- " adcx %%r12, %%r10;"
+ " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;"
" adoxq 80(%1), %%r10;"
" mulxq 120(%1), %%r11, %%rax;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r11;"
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" movq %%r8, 32(%0);"
: "+&r" (tmp), "+&r" (f), "+&r" (out)
:
- : "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "memory", "cc"
+ : "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%rbx", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "memory", "cc"
);
}

36
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0056-crypto-arm-64-poly1305-add-artifact-to-.gitignore-fi.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 216f24cb4aba8385025c38da0f79c4aa8e637484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 11:56:17 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 056/124] crypto: arm[64]/poly1305 - add artifact to .gitignore
files
commit 6e4e00d8b68ca7eb30d08afb740033e0d36abe55 upstream.
The .S_shipped yields a .S, and the pattern in these directories is to
add that to .gitignore so that git-status doesn't raise a fuss.
Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation")
Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation")
Reported-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/.gitignore | 1 +
arch/arm64/crypto/.gitignore | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/.gitignore
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
aesbs-core.S
sha256-core.S
sha512-core.S
+poly1305-core.S
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/.gitignore
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
sha256-core.S
sha512-core.S
+poly1305-core.S

243
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0057-crypto-arch-lib-limit-simd-usage-to-4k-chunks.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
From af386d2b1f9207290a12aa97ecec8b428f3bebb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 15:54:04 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 057/124] crypto: arch/lib - limit simd usage to 4k chunks
commit 706024a52c614b478b63f7728d202532ce6591a9 upstream.
The initial Zinc patchset, after some mailing list discussion, contained
code to ensure that kernel_fpu_enable would not be kept on for more than
a 4k chunk, since it disables preemption. The choice of 4k isn't totally
scientific, but it's not a bad guess either, and it's what's used in
both the x86 poly1305, blake2s, and nhpoly1305 code already (in the form
of PAGE_SIZE, which this commit corrects to be explicitly 4k for the
former two).
Ard did some back of the envelope calculations and found that
at 5 cycles/byte (overestimate) on a 1ghz processor (pretty slow), 4k
means we have a maximum preemption disabling of 20us, which Sebastian
confirmed was probably a good limit.
Unfortunately the chunking appears to have been left out of the final
patchset that added the glue code. So, this commit adds it back in.
Fixes: 84e03fa39fbe ("crypto: x86/chacha - expose SIMD ChaCha routine as library function")
Fixes: b3aad5bad26a ("crypto: arm64/chacha - expose arm64 ChaCha routine as library function")
Fixes: a44a3430d71b ("crypto: arm/chacha - expose ARM ChaCha routine as library function")
Fixes: d7d7b8535662 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernel")
Fixes: f569ca164751 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation")
Fixes: a6b803b3ddc7 ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - incorporate OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS NEON implementation")
Fixes: ed0356eda153 ("crypto: blake2s - x86_64 SIMD implementation")
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 14 +++++++++++---
arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 15 +++++++++++----
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 14 +++++++++++---
arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 15 +++++++++++----
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c | 10 ++++------
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 14 +++++++++++---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 13 ++++++-------
7 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -91,9 +91,17 @@ void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *d
return;
}
- kernel_neon_begin();
- chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ do {
+ unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, bytes, SZ_4K);
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, todo, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+
+ bytes -= todo;
+ src += todo;
+ dst += todo;
+ } while (bytes);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -160,13 +160,20 @@ void poly1305_update_arch(struct poly130
unsigned int len = round_down(nbytes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (static_branch_likely(&have_neon) && do_neon) {
- kernel_neon_begin();
- poly1305_blocks_neon(&dctx->h, src, len, 1);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ do {
+ unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, len, SZ_4K);
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ poly1305_blocks_neon(&dctx->h, src, todo, 1);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+
+ len -= todo;
+ src += todo;
+ } while (len);
} else {
poly1305_blocks_arm(&dctx->h, src, len, 1);
+ src += len;
}
- src += len;
nbytes %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c
@@ -87,9 +87,17 @@ void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *d
!crypto_simd_usable())
return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
- kernel_neon_begin();
- chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ do {
+ unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, bytes, SZ_4K);
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ chacha_doneon(state, dst, src, todo, nrounds);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+
+ bytes -= todo;
+ src += todo;
+ dst += todo;
+ } while (bytes);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -143,13 +143,20 @@ void poly1305_update_arch(struct poly130
unsigned int len = round_down(nbytes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (static_branch_likely(&have_neon) && crypto_simd_usable()) {
- kernel_neon_begin();
- poly1305_blocks_neon(&dctx->h, src, len, 1);
- kernel_neon_end();
+ do {
+ unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, len, SZ_4K);
+
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ poly1305_blocks_neon(&dctx->h, src, todo, 1);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+
+ len -= todo;
+ src += todo;
+ } while (len);
} else {
poly1305_blocks(&dctx->h, src, len, 1);
+ src += len;
}
- src += len;
nbytes %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2
const u32 inc)
{
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
if (!static_branch_likely(&blake2s_use_ssse3) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
blake2s_compress_generic(state, block, nblocks, inc);
return;
}
- for (;;) {
+ do {
const size_t blocks = min_t(size_t, nblocks,
- PAGE_SIZE / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
kernel_fpu_begin();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
@@ -52,10 +52,8 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2
kernel_fpu_end();
nblocks -= blocks;
- if (!nblocks)
- break;
block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
+ } while (nblocks);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -154,9 +154,17 @@ void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *d
bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- chacha_dosimd(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
- kernel_fpu_end();
+ do {
+ unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, bytes, SZ_4K);
+
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ chacha_dosimd(state, dst, src, todo, nrounds);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+
+ bytes -= todo;
+ src += todo;
+ dst += todo;
+ } while (bytes);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ static void poly1305_simd_blocks(void *c
struct poly1305_arch_internal *state = ctx;
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE ||
- PAGE_SIZE % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE ||
+ SZ_4K % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX) || !static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx) ||
(len < (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 18) && !state->is_base2_26) ||
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ static void poly1305_simd_blocks(void *c
return;
}
- for (;;) {
- const size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE);
+ do {
+ const size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, len, SZ_4K);
kernel_fpu_begin();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) && static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx512))
@@ -113,11 +113,10 @@ static void poly1305_simd_blocks(void *c
else
poly1305_blocks_avx(ctx, inp, bytes, padbit);
kernel_fpu_end();
+
len -= bytes;
- if (!len)
- break;
inp += bytes;
- }
+ } while (len);
}
static void poly1305_simd_emit(void *ctx, u8 mac[POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE],

38
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 58c2229461f888087fc3175650bc2e6aa70fd862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:41:13 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 058/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - Add missing function
declaration
commit 06cc2afbbdf9a9e8df3e2f8db724997dd6e1b4ac upstream.
This patch adds a declaration for chacha20poly1305_selftest to
silence a sparse warning.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h | 2 ++
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 2 --
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h
@@ -45,4 +45,6 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace
const u64 nonce,
const u8 key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
+bool chacha20poly1305_selftest(void);
+
#endif /* __CHACHA20POLY1305_H */
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
#define CHACHA_KEY_WORDS (CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
-bool __init chacha20poly1305_selftest(void);
-
static void chacha_load_key(u32 *k, const u8 *in)
{
k[0] = get_unaligned_le32(in);

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From 833ca409e17c10f4affb5879e22a03fdf1933439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:11:18 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 059/124] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for
state array
commit e79a31715193686e92dadb4caedfbb1f5de3659c upstream.
Due to the fact that the x86 port does not support allocating objects
on the stack with an alignment that exceeds 8 bytes, we have a rather
ugly hack in the x86 code for ChaCha to ensure that the state array is
aligned to 16 bytes, allowing the SSE3 implementation of the algorithm
to use aligned loads.
Given that the performance benefit of using of aligned loads appears to
be limited (~0.25% for 1k blocks using tcrypt on a Corei7-8650U), and
the fact that this hack has leaked into generic ChaCha code, let's just
remove it.
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 17 ++---------------
include/crypto/chacha.h | 4 ----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ ENTRY(chacha_block_xor_ssse3)
FRAME_BEGIN
# x0..3 = s0..3
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm10
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@ ENTRY(hchacha_block_ssse3)
# %edx: nrounds
FRAME_BEGIN
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
mov %edx,%r8d
call chacha_permute
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
-#define CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN 16
-
asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
@@ -125,8 +123,6 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
} else {
@@ -139,8 +135,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
@@ -148,8 +142,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable() ||
bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
@@ -171,15 +163,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
@@ -218,12 +207,10 @@ static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct chacha_ctx subctx;
u8 real_iv[16];
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
if (req->cryptlen > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE && crypto_simd_usable()) {
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -25,11 +25,7 @@
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS ((CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE + 12) / sizeof(u32))
-#else
#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
-#endif
/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32

47
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 9cfd2787b0b37940c656c6ea5fede6b3c360f0e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 17:50:48 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 060/124] crypto: x86/curve25519 - Remove unused carry
variables
commit 054a5540fb8f7268e2c79e9deab4242db15c8cba upstream.
The carry variables are assigned but never used, which upsets
the compiler. This patch removes them.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Karthikeyan Bhargavan <karthik.bhargavan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
@@ -948,10 +948,8 @@ static void store_felem(u64 *b, u64 *f)
{
u64 f30 = f[3U];
u64 top_bit0 = f30 >> (u32)63U;
- u64 carry0;
u64 f31;
u64 top_bit;
- u64 carry;
u64 f0;
u64 f1;
u64 f2;
@@ -970,11 +968,11 @@ static void store_felem(u64 *b, u64 *f)
u64 o2;
u64 o3;
f[3U] = f30 & (u64)0x7fffffffffffffffU;
- carry0 = add_scalar(f, f, (u64)19U * top_bit0);
+ add_scalar(f, f, (u64)19U * top_bit0);
f31 = f[3U];
top_bit = f31 >> (u32)63U;
f[3U] = f31 & (u64)0x7fffffffffffffffU;
- carry = add_scalar(f, f, (u64)19U * top_bit);
+ add_scalar(f, f, (u64)19U * top_bit);
f0 = f[0U];
f1 = f[1U];
f2 = f[2U];

37
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 6ae9f0d421af5145d457c51abe2b704ebb297a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 11:09:53 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 061/124] crypto: arm/curve25519 - include
<linux/scatterlist.h>
commit 6779d0e6b0fe193ab3010ea201782ca6f75a3862 upstream.
Building ARM allmodconfig leads to the following warnings:
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c:73:12: error: implicit declaration of function 'sg_copy_to_buffer' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c:74:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'sg_nents_for_len' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c:88:11: error: implicit declaration of function 'sg_copy_from_buffer' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
Include <linux/scatterlist.h> to fix such warnings
Reported-by: Olof's autobuilder <build@lixom.net>
Fixes: 0c3dc787a62a ("crypto: algapi - Remove skbuff.h inclusion")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-glue.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/curve25519.h>
asmlinkage void curve25519_neon(u8 mypublic[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],

34
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0062-crypto-arm-poly1305-Add-prototype-for-poly1305_block.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 55a3d2044f411ecf291777f31053b8d8ee81c051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 11:23:00 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 062/124] crypto: arm/poly1305 - Add prototype for
poly1305_blocks_neon
commit 51982ea02aef972132eb35c583d3e4c5b83166e5 upstream.
This patch adds a prototype for poly1305_blocks_neon to slience
a compiler warning:
CC [M] arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.o
../arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c:25:13: warning: no previous prototype for `poly1305_blocks_neon' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __weak poly1305_blocks_neon(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
void poly1305_init_arm(void *state, const u8 *key);
void poly1305_blocks_arm(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
+void poly1305_blocks_neon(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit);
void poly1305_emit_arm(void *state, u8 *digest, const u32 *nonce);
void __weak poly1305_blocks_neon(void *state, const u8 *src, u32 len, u32 hibit)

261
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0063-crypto-curve25519-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
From 4c4ab112443b42603d57b698111b55bfec278001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:30:58 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 063/124] crypto: curve25519-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32
commit db719539fd3889836900bf912755aa30a5985e9a upstream.
x86_64 zero extends 32bit operations, so for 64bit operands,
XORL r32,r32 is functionally equal to XORL r64,r64, but avoids
a REX prefix byte when legacy registers are used.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c | 68 ++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/curve25519-x86_64.c
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ static inline u64 add_scalar(u64 *out, c
asm volatile(
/* Clear registers to propagate the carry bit */
- " xor %%r8, %%r8;"
- " xor %%r9, %%r9;"
- " xor %%r10, %%r10;"
- " xor %%r11, %%r11;"
- " xor %1, %1;"
+ " xor %%r8d, %%r8d;"
+ " xor %%r9d, %%r9d;"
+ " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;"
+ " xor %%r11d, %%r11d;"
+ " xor %k1, %k1;"
/* Begin addition chain */
" addq 0(%3), %0;"
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static inline void fadd(u64 *out, const
" cmovc %0, %%rax;"
/* Step 2: Add carry*38 to the original sum */
- " xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
+ " xor %%ecx, %%ecx;"
" add %%rax, %%r8;"
" adcx %%rcx, %%r9;"
" movq %%r9, 8(%1);"
@@ -165,28 +165,28 @@ static inline void fmul(u64 *out, const
/* Compute src1[0] * src2 */
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 8(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 48(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline void fmul(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %3, %3;"
+ " xor %k3, %k3;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
@@ -246,28 +246,28 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
/* Compute src1[0] * src2 */
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " movq %%r8, 0(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 8(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 8(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 8(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 8(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 16(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 16(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 16(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 16(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 24(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
+ " mulxq 0(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 24(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 24(%0);"
" mulxq 8(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 32(%0);"
" mulxq 16(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 40(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 24(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 48(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
@@ -277,29 +277,29 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
/* Compute src1[0] * src2 */
" movq 32(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " movq %%r8, 64(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 72(%0);"
+ " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " movq %%r8, 64(%0);"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 72(%0);"
" mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[1] * src2 */
" movq 40(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 72(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 72(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 80(%0);"
+ " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 72(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 72(%0);"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 80(%0);"
" mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[2] * src2 */
" movq 48(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 80(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 80(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 88(%0);"
+ " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 80(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 80(%0);"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 88(%0);"
" mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;"
/* Compute src1[3] * src2 */
" movq 56(%1), %%rdx;"
- " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10, %%r10;" " adcxq 88(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 88(%0);"
- " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 96(%0);"
+ " mulxq 32(%3), %%r8, %%r9;" " xor %%r10d, %%r10d;" " adcxq 88(%0), %%r8;" " movq %%r8, 88(%0);"
+ " mulxq 40(%3), %%r10, %%r11;" " adox %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%rbx, %%r10;" " movq %%r10, 96(%0);"
" mulxq 48(%3), %%rbx, %%r13;" " adox %%r11, %%rbx;" " adcx %%r14, %%rbx;" " movq %%rbx, 104(%0);" " mov $0, %%r8;"
" mulxq 56(%3), %%r14, %%rdx;" " adox %%r13, %%r14;" " adcx %%rax, %%r14;" " movq %%r14, 112(%0);" " mov $0, %%rax;"
" adox %%rdx, %%rax;" " adcx %%r8, %%rax;" " movq %%rax, 120(%0);"
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %3, %3;"
+ " xor %k3, %k3;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static inline void fmul2(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 96(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %3, %3;"
+ " xor %k3, %k3;"
" adoxq 64(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute all partial products */
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[0] */
- " mulxq 8(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15, %%r15;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
+ " mulxq 8(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
" mulxq 16(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 24(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
/* Step 2: Compute two parallel carry chains */
- " xor %%r15, %%r15;"
+ " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;"
" adox %%rax, %%r10;"
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void fsqr(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
+ " xor %%ecx, %%ecx;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
asm volatile(
/* Step 1: Compute all partial products */
" movq 0(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[0] */
- " mulxq 8(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15, %%r15;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
+ " mulxq 8(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
" mulxq 16(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 24(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 24(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 16(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
/* Step 2: Compute two parallel carry chains */
- " xor %%r15, %%r15;"
+ " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;"
" adox %%rax, %%r10;"
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute all partial products */
" movq 32(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[0] */
- " mulxq 40(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15, %%r15;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
+ " mulxq 40(%1), %%r8, %%r14;" " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;" /* f[1]*f[0] */
" mulxq 48(%1), %%r9, %%r10;" " adcx %%r14, %%r9;" /* f[2]*f[0] */
" mulxq 56(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " adcx %%rax, %%r10;" /* f[3]*f[0] */
" movq 56(%1), %%rdx;" /* f[3] */
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
" mulxq 48(%1), %%rax, %%rcx;" " mov $0, %%r14;" /* f[2]*f[1] */
/* Step 2: Compute two parallel carry chains */
- " xor %%r15, %%r15;"
+ " xor %%r15d, %%r15d;"
" adox %%rax, %%r10;"
" adcx %%r8, %%r8;"
" adox %%rcx, %%r11;"
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 32(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
+ " xor %%ecx, %%ecx;"
" adoxq 0(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 40(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static inline void fsqr2(u64 *out, const
/* Step 1: Compute dst + carry == tmp_hi * 38 + tmp_lo */
" mov $38, %%rdx;"
" mulxq 96(%1), %%r8, %%r13;"
- " xor %%rcx, %%rcx;"
+ " xor %%ecx, %%ecx;"
" adoxq 64(%1), %%r8;"
" mulxq 104(%1), %%r9, %%rbx;"
" adcx %%r13, %%r9;"

59
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0064-crypto-poly1305-x86_64-Use-XORL-r32-32.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From a2c7d387da3b3cdb8b7c16ef91cce45f92ebcf61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:38:31 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 064/124] crypto: poly1305-x86_64 - Use XORL r32,32
commit 7dfd1e01b3dfc13431b1b25720cf2692a7e111ef upstream.
x86_64 zero extends 32bit operations, so for 64bit operands,
XORL r32,r32 is functionally equal to XORQ r64,r64, but avoids
a REX prefix byte when legacy registers are used.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$kernel);
___
&declare_function("poly1305_init_x86_64", 32, 3);
$code.=<<___;
- xor %rax,%rax
+ xor %eax,%eax
mov %rax,0($ctx) # initialize hash value
mov %rax,8($ctx)
mov %rax,16($ctx)
@@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type poly1305_init_base2_44,\@function,3
.align 32
poly1305_init_base2_44:
- xor %rax,%rax
+ xor %eax,%eax
mov %rax,0($ctx) # initialize hash value
mov %rax,8($ctx)
mov %rax,16($ctx)
@@ -3963,7 +3963,7 @@ xor128_decrypt_n_pad:
mov \$16,$len
sub %r10,$len
xor %eax,%eax
- xor %r11,%r11
+ xor %r11d,%r11d
.Loop_dec_byte:
mov ($inp,$otp),%r11b
mov ($otp),%al
@@ -4101,7 +4101,7 @@ avx_handler:
.long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
mov $disp,%rsi
- xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+ xor %ecx,%ecx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase
mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc
mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry

30
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0065-crypto-x86-poly1305-Remove-assignments-with-no-effec.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 5502c4d51b8c27631ed1026ef172bd9ce58303d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:29:04 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 065/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no
effect
commit 4a0c1de64bf9d9027a6f19adfba89fc27893db23 upstream.
This patch removes a few ineffectual assignments from the function
crypto_poly1305_setdctxkey.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ static unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setd
dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[4]);
dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[8]);
dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[12]);
- inp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
- acc += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
dctx->sset = true;
}
}

33
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0066-crypto-x86-poly1305-add-back-a-needed-assignment.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 4849474f7e021d0d2e33a008abf93cacebf812f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 15:27:48 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 066/124] crypto: x86/poly1305 - add back a needed assignment
commit c3a98c3ad5c0dc60a1ac66bf91147a3f39cac96b upstream.
One of the assignments that was removed by commit 4a0c1de64bf9 ("crypto:
x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect") is actually needed,
since it affects the return value.
This fixes the following crypto self-test failure:
alg: shash: poly1305-simd test failed (wrong result) on test vector 2, cfg="init+update+final aligned buffer"
Fixes: 4a0c1de64bf9 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setd
dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[4]);
dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[8]);
dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(&inp[12]);
+ acc += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
dctx->sset = true;
}
}

33
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0067-crypto-Kconfig-CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS-requires-t.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 4517445d7df86d35d348f884a228e6979113d485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 14:48:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 067/124] crypto: Kconfig - CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS requires
the manager
commit 6569e3097f1c4a490bdf2b23d326855e04942dfd upstream.
The extra tests in the manager actually require the manager to be
selected too. Otherwise the linker gives errors like:
ld: arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o: in function `chacha_simd_stream_xor':
chacha_glue.c:(.text+0x422): undefined reference to `crypto_simd_disabled_for_test'
Fixes: 2343d1529aff ("crypto: Kconfig - allow tests to be disabled when manager is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
config CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
bool "Enable extra run-time crypto self tests"
- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+ depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS && CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
Enable extra run-time self tests of registered crypto algorithms,
including randomized fuzz tests.

272
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0068-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
From de69c3a866f93a10d86d25d04af54a722bebc420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 17:28:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 068/124] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size
multiples
commit 86cd97ec4b943af35562a74688bc4e909b32c3d1 upstream.
The current NEON based ChaCha implementation for ARM is optimized for
multiples of 4x the ChaCha block size (64 bytes). This makes sense for
block encryption, but given that ChaCha is also often used in the
context of networking, it makes sense to consider arbitrary length
inputs as well.
For example, WireGuard typically uses 1420 byte packets, and performing
ChaCha encryption involves 5 invocations of chacha_4block_xor_neon()
and 3 invocations of chacha_block_xor_neon(), where the last one also
involves a memcpy() using a buffer on the stack to process the final
chunk of 1420 % 64 == 12 bytes.
Let's optimize for this case as well, by letting chacha_4block_xor_neon()
deal with any input size between 64 and 256 bytes, using NEON permutation
instructions and overlapping loads and stores. This way, the 140 byte
tail of a 1420 byte input buffer can simply be processed in one go.
This results in the following performance improvements for 1420 byte
blocks, without significant impact on power-of-2 input sizes. (Note
that Raspberry Pi is widely used in combination with a 32-bit kernel,
even though the core is 64-bit capable)
Cortex-A8 (BeagleBone) : 7%
Cortex-A15 (Calxeda Midway) : 21%
Cortex-A53 (Raspberry Pi 3) : 3%
Cortex-A72 (Raspberry Pi 4) : 19%
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 34 +++++------
arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
- int nrounds);
+ int nrounds, unsigned int nbytes);
asmlinkage void hchacha_block_arm(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
@@ -42,24 +42,24 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
{
u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
- chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
- state[12] += 4;
- }
- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- state[12]++;
+ while (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ unsigned int l = min(bytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4U);
+
+ chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds, l);
+ bytes -= l;
+ src += l;
+ dst += l;
+ state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(l, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
if (bytes) {
- memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf, nrounds);
- memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
+ const u8 *s = src;
+ u8 *d = dst;
+
+ if (bytes != CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ s = d = memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
+ chacha_block_xor_neon(state, d, s, nrounds);
+ if (d != dst)
+ memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
}
}
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/cache.h>
.text
.fpu neon
@@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ ENDPROC(hchacha_block_neon)
.align 5
ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
- push {r4-r5}
+ push {r4, lr}
mov r4, sp // preserve the stack pointer
sub ip, sp, #0x20 // allocate a 32 byte buffer
bic ip, ip, #0x1f // aligned to 32 bytes
@@ -229,10 +230,10 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0]
vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [ip]
- adr r5, .Lctrinc
+ adr lr, .Lctrinc
vdup.32 q15, d7[1]
vdup.32 q14, d7[0]
- vld1.32 {q4}, [r5, :128]
+ vld1.32 {q4}, [lr, :128]
vdup.32 q13, d6[1]
vdup.32 q12, d6[0]
vdup.32 q11, d5[1]
@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
// Re-interleave the words in the first two rows of each block (x0..7).
// Also add the counter values 0-3 to x12[0-3].
- vld1.32 {q8}, [r5, :128] // load counter values 0-3
+ vld1.32 {q8}, [lr, :128] // load counter values 0-3
vzip.32 q0, q1 // => (0 1 0 1) (0 1 0 1)
vzip.32 q2, q3 // => (2 3 2 3) (2 3 2 3)
vzip.32 q4, q5 // => (4 5 4 5) (4 5 4 5)
@@ -493,6 +494,8 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
// Re-interleave the words in the last two rows of each block (x8..15).
vld1.32 {q8-q9}, [sp, :256]
+ mov sp, r4 // restore original stack pointer
+ ldr r4, [r4, #8] // load number of bytes
vzip.32 q12, q13 // => (12 13 12 13) (12 13 12 13)
vzip.32 q14, q15 // => (14 15 14 15) (14 15 14 15)
vzip.32 q8, q9 // => (8 9 8 9) (8 9 8 9)
@@ -520,41 +523,121 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
// XOR the rest of the data with the keystream
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #96
veor q0, q0, q8
veor q1, q1, q12
+ ble .Lle96
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #32
veor q0, q0, q2
veor q1, q1, q6
+ ble .Lle128
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #32
veor q0, q0, q10
veor q1, q1, q14
+ ble .Lle160
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #32
veor q0, q0, q4
veor q1, q1, q5
+ ble .Lle192
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #32
veor q0, q0, q9
veor q1, q1, q13
+ ble .Lle224
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
+ subs r4, r4, #32
veor q0, q0, q3
veor q1, q1, q7
+ blt .Llt256
+.Lout:
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]
- mov sp, r4 // restore original stack pointer
veor q0, q0, q11
veor q1, q1, q15
vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]
- pop {r4-r5}
- bx lr
+ pop {r4, pc}
+
+.Lle192:
+ vmov q4, q9
+ vmov q5, q13
+
+.Lle160:
+ // nothing to do
+
+.Lfinalblock:
+ // Process the final block if processing less than 4 full blocks.
+ // Entered with 32 bytes of ChaCha cipher stream in q4-q5, and the
+ // previous 32 byte output block that still needs to be written at
+ // [r1] in q0-q1.
+ beq .Lfullblock
+
+.Lpartialblock:
+ adr lr, .Lpermute + 32
+ add r2, r2, r4
+ add lr, lr, r4
+ add r4, r4, r1
+
+ vld1.8 {q2-q3}, [lr]
+ vld1.8 {q6-q7}, [r2]
+
+ add r4, r4, #32
+
+ vtbl.8 d4, {q4-q5}, d4
+ vtbl.8 d5, {q4-q5}, d5
+ vtbl.8 d6, {q4-q5}, d6
+ vtbl.8 d7, {q4-q5}, d7
+
+ veor q6, q6, q2
+ veor q7, q7, q3
+
+ vst1.8 {q6-q7}, [r4] // overlapping stores
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]
+ pop {r4, pc}
+
+.Lfullblock:
+ vmov q11, q4
+ vmov q15, q5
+ b .Lout
+.Lle96:
+ vmov q4, q2
+ vmov q5, q6
+ b .Lfinalblock
+.Lle128:
+ vmov q4, q10
+ vmov q5, q14
+ b .Lfinalblock
+.Lle224:
+ vmov q4, q3
+ vmov q5, q7
+ b .Lfinalblock
+.Llt256:
+ vmov q4, q11
+ vmov q5, q15
+ b .Lpartialblock
ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+
+ .align L1_CACHE_SHIFT
+.Lpermute:
+ .byte 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
+ .byte 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ .byte 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17
+ .byte 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
+ .byte 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
+ .byte 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+ .byte 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17
+ .byte 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f

324
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0069-crypto-arm64-chacha-simplify-tail-block-handling.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
From af8c75e27b20e01464aa6ad43ca3095534c81a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 17:39:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 069/124] crypto: arm64/chacha - simplify tail block handling
commit c4fc6328d6c67690a7e6e03f43a5a976a13120ef upstream.
Based on lessons learnt from optimizing the 32-bit version of this driver,
we can simplify the arm64 version considerably, by reordering the final
two stores when the last block is not a multiple of 64 bytes. This removes
the need to use permutation instructions to calculate the elements that are
clobbered by the final overlapping store, given that the store of the
penultimate block now follows it, and that one carries the correct values
for those elements already.
While at it, simplify the overlapping loads as well, by calculating the
address of the final overlapping load upfront, and switching to this
address for every load that would otherwise extend past the end of the
source buffer.
There is no impact on performance, but the resulting code is substantially
smaller and easier to follow.
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S | 193 ++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
adr_l x10, .Lpermute
and x5, x4, #63
add x10, x10, x5
- add x11, x10, #64
//
// This function encrypts four consecutive ChaCha blocks by loading
@@ -645,11 +644,11 @@ CPU_BE( rev a15, a15 )
zip2 v31.4s, v14.4s, v15.4s
eor a15, a15, w9
- mov x3, #64
+ add x3, x2, x4
+ sub x3, x3, #128 // start of last block
+
subs x5, x4, #128
- add x6, x5, x2
- csel x3, x3, xzr, ge
- csel x2, x2, x6, ge
+ csel x2, x2, x3, ge
// interleave 64-bit words in state n, n+2
zip1 v0.2d, v16.2d, v18.2d
@@ -658,13 +657,10 @@ CPU_BE( rev a15, a15 )
zip1 v8.2d, v17.2d, v19.2d
zip2 v12.2d, v17.2d, v19.2d
stp a2, a3, [x1, #-56]
- ld1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x2], x3
subs x6, x4, #192
- ccmp x3, xzr, #4, lt
- add x7, x6, x2
- csel x3, x3, xzr, eq
- csel x2, x2, x7, eq
+ ld1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x2], #64
+ csel x2, x2, x3, ge
zip1 v1.2d, v20.2d, v22.2d
zip2 v5.2d, v20.2d, v22.2d
@@ -672,13 +668,10 @@ CPU_BE( rev a15, a15 )
zip1 v9.2d, v21.2d, v23.2d
zip2 v13.2d, v21.2d, v23.2d
stp a6, a7, [x1, #-40]
- ld1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x2], x3
subs x7, x4, #256
- ccmp x3, xzr, #4, lt
- add x8, x7, x2
- csel x3, x3, xzr, eq
- csel x2, x2, x8, eq
+ ld1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x2], #64
+ csel x2, x2, x3, ge
zip1 v2.2d, v24.2d, v26.2d
zip2 v6.2d, v24.2d, v26.2d
@@ -686,12 +679,10 @@ CPU_BE( rev a15, a15 )
zip1 v10.2d, v25.2d, v27.2d
zip2 v14.2d, v25.2d, v27.2d
stp a10, a11, [x1, #-24]
- ld1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x2], x3
subs x8, x4, #320
- ccmp x3, xzr, #4, lt
- add x9, x8, x2
- csel x2, x2, x9, eq
+ ld1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x2], #64
+ csel x2, x2, x3, ge
zip1 v3.2d, v28.2d, v30.2d
zip2 v7.2d, v28.2d, v30.2d
@@ -699,151 +690,105 @@ CPU_BE( rev a15, a15 )
zip1 v11.2d, v29.2d, v31.2d
zip2 v15.2d, v29.2d, v31.2d
stp a14, a15, [x1, #-8]
+
+ tbnz x5, #63, .Lt128
ld1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x2]
// xor with corresponding input, write to output
- tbnz x5, #63, 0f
eor v16.16b, v16.16b, v0.16b
eor v17.16b, v17.16b, v1.16b
eor v18.16b, v18.16b, v2.16b
eor v19.16b, v19.16b, v3.16b
- st1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x1], #64
- cbz x5, .Lout
- tbnz x6, #63, 1f
+ tbnz x6, #63, .Lt192
+
eor v20.16b, v20.16b, v4.16b
eor v21.16b, v21.16b, v5.16b
eor v22.16b, v22.16b, v6.16b
eor v23.16b, v23.16b, v7.16b
- st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x1], #64
- cbz x6, .Lout
- tbnz x7, #63, 2f
+ st1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x1], #64
+ tbnz x7, #63, .Lt256
+
eor v24.16b, v24.16b, v8.16b
eor v25.16b, v25.16b, v9.16b
eor v26.16b, v26.16b, v10.16b
eor v27.16b, v27.16b, v11.16b
- st1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x1], #64
- cbz x7, .Lout
- tbnz x8, #63, 3f
+ st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x1], #64
+ tbnz x8, #63, .Lt320
+
eor v28.16b, v28.16b, v12.16b
eor v29.16b, v29.16b, v13.16b
eor v30.16b, v30.16b, v14.16b
eor v31.16b, v31.16b, v15.16b
+
+ st1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x1], #64
st1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x1]
.Lout: frame_pop
ret
- // fewer than 128 bytes of in/output
-0: ld1 {v8.16b}, [x10]
- ld1 {v9.16b}, [x11]
- movi v10.16b, #16
- sub x2, x1, #64
- add x1, x1, x5
- ld1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x2]
- tbl v4.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v20.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v5.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v21.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v6.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v22.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v7.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v23.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
-
- eor v20.16b, v20.16b, v4.16b
- eor v21.16b, v21.16b, v5.16b
- eor v22.16b, v22.16b, v6.16b
- eor v23.16b, v23.16b, v7.16b
- st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x1]
- b .Lout
-
// fewer than 192 bytes of in/output
-1: ld1 {v8.16b}, [x10]
- ld1 {v9.16b}, [x11]
- movi v10.16b, #16
- add x1, x1, x6
- tbl v0.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v20.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v1.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v21.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v2.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v22.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
- add v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b
- add v9.16b, v9.16b, v10.16b
- tbl v3.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v8.16b
- tbx v23.16b, {v16.16b-v19.16b}, v9.16b
-
- eor v20.16b, v20.16b, v0.16b
- eor v21.16b, v21.16b, v1.16b
- eor v22.16b, v22.16b, v2.16b
- eor v23.16b, v23.16b, v3.16b
- st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x1]
+.Lt192: cbz x5, 1f // exactly 128 bytes?
+ ld1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x10]
+ add x5, x5, x1
+ tbl v28.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v28.16b
+ tbl v29.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v29.16b
+ tbl v30.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v30.16b
+ tbl v31.16b, {v4.16b-v7.16b}, v31.16b
+
+0: eor v20.16b, v20.16b, v28.16b
+ eor v21.16b, v21.16b, v29.16b
+ eor v22.16b, v22.16b, v30.16b
+ eor v23.16b, v23.16b, v31.16b
+ st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x5] // overlapping stores
+1: st1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x1]
b .Lout
+ // fewer than 128 bytes of in/output
+.Lt128: ld1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x10]
+ add x5, x5, x1
+ sub x1, x1, #64
+ tbl v28.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v28.16b
+ tbl v29.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v29.16b
+ tbl v30.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v30.16b
+ tbl v31.16b, {v0.16b-v3.16b}, v31.16b
+ ld1 {v16.16b-v19.16b}, [x1] // reload first output block
+ b 0b
+
// fewer than 256 bytes of in/output
-2: ld1 {v4.16b}, [x10]
- ld1 {v5.16b}, [x11]
- movi v6.16b, #16
- add x1, x1, x7
+.Lt256: cbz x6, 2f // exactly 192 bytes?
+ ld1 {v4.16b-v7.16b}, [x10]
+ add x6, x6, x1
tbl v0.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v24.16b, {v20.16b-v23.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v1.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v25.16b, {v20.16b-v23.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v2.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v26.16b, {v20.16b-v23.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v3.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v27.16b, {v20.16b-v23.16b}, v5.16b
-
- eor v24.16b, v24.16b, v0.16b
- eor v25.16b, v25.16b, v1.16b
- eor v26.16b, v26.16b, v2.16b
- eor v27.16b, v27.16b, v3.16b
- st1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x1]
+ tbl v1.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v5.16b
+ tbl v2.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v6.16b
+ tbl v3.16b, {v8.16b-v11.16b}, v7.16b
+
+ eor v28.16b, v28.16b, v0.16b
+ eor v29.16b, v29.16b, v1.16b
+ eor v30.16b, v30.16b, v2.16b
+ eor v31.16b, v31.16b, v3.16b
+ st1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x6] // overlapping stores
+2: st1 {v20.16b-v23.16b}, [x1]
b .Lout
// fewer than 320 bytes of in/output
-3: ld1 {v4.16b}, [x10]
- ld1 {v5.16b}, [x11]
- movi v6.16b, #16
- add x1, x1, x8
+.Lt320: cbz x7, 3f // exactly 256 bytes?
+ ld1 {v4.16b-v7.16b}, [x10]
+ add x7, x7, x1
tbl v0.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v28.16b, {v24.16b-v27.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v1.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v29.16b, {v24.16b-v27.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v2.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v30.16b, {v24.16b-v27.16b}, v5.16b
- add v4.16b, v4.16b, v6.16b
- add v5.16b, v5.16b, v6.16b
- tbl v3.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v4.16b
- tbx v31.16b, {v24.16b-v27.16b}, v5.16b
+ tbl v1.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v5.16b
+ tbl v2.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v6.16b
+ tbl v3.16b, {v12.16b-v15.16b}, v7.16b
eor v28.16b, v28.16b, v0.16b
eor v29.16b, v29.16b, v1.16b
eor v30.16b, v30.16b, v2.16b
eor v31.16b, v31.16b, v3.16b
- st1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x1]
+ st1 {v28.16b-v31.16b}, [x7] // overlapping stores
+3: st1 {v24.16b-v27.16b}, [x1]
b .Lout
ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
@@ -851,7 +796,7 @@ ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
.align L1_CACHE_SHIFT
.Lpermute:
.set .Li, 0
- .rept 192
+ .rept 128
.byte (.Li - 64)
.set .Li, .Li + 1
.endr

37
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0070-crypto-lib-chacha20poly1305-define-empty-module-exit.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 06c613a67ec604201f424e8e763f3361264d995e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 20:30:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 070/124] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - define empty module
exit function
commit ac88c322d0f2917d41d13553c69e9d7f043c8b6f upstream.
With no mod_exit function, users are unable to unload the module after
use. I'm not aware of any reason why module unloading should be
prohibited for this one, so this commit simply adds an empty exit
function.
Reported-and-tested-by: John Donnelly <john.p.donnelly@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -364,7 +364,12 @@ static int __init mod_init(void)
return 0;
}
+static void __exit mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
module_init(mod_init);
+module_exit(mod_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD construction");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");

148
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0071-icmp-introduce-helper-for-nat-d-source-address-in-ne.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
From 9793cc7357e8d70fed9cb350d2d39346328cc73b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 071/124] icmp: introduce helper for nat'd source address in
network device context
commit 0b41713b606694257b90d61ba7e2712d8457648b upstream.
This introduces a helper function to be called only by network drivers
that wraps calls to icmp[v6]_send in a conntrack transformation, in case
NAT has been used. We don't want to pollute the non-driver path, though,
so we introduce this as a helper to be called by places that actually
make use of this, as suggested by Florian.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/linux/icmpv6.h | 10 ++++++++++
include/net/icmp.h | 6 ++++++
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 83 insertions(+)
--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h
@@ -22,12 +22,22 @@ extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(
int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type,
unsigned int data_len);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
+#else
+#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send
+#endif
+
#else
static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb,
u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
{
+}
+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
}
#endif
--- a/include/net/icmp.h
+++ b/include/net/icmp.h
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b
__icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt);
}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);
+#else
+#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send
+#endif
+
int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
int icmp_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info);
int icmp_init(void);
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -750,6 +750,39 @@ out:;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
+void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
+ struct nf_conn *ct;
+ __be32 orig_ip;
+
+ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
+ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
+ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (skb_shared(skb_in))
+ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head ||
+ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) >
+ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in,
+ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct iphdr))))
+ goto out;
+
+ orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
+ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;
+ icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
+out:
+ consume_skb(cloned_skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmp_ndo_send);
+#endif
static void icmp_socket_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
@@ -45,4 +45,38 @@ out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
+void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
+ struct in6_addr orig_ip;
+ struct nf_conn *ct;
+
+ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
+ if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
+ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (skb_shared(skb_in))
+ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head ||
+ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) >
+ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in,
+ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))))
+ goto out;
+
+ orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6;
+ icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
+out:
+ consume_skb(cloned_skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_ndo_send);
+#endif
#endif

299
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0072-net-icmp-pass-zeroed-opts-from-icmp-v6-_ndo_send-bef.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
From 4a25324891a32d080589a6e3a4dec2be2d9e3d60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:18:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 072/124] net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send
before sending
commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.
The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:
panic+0x108/0x2ea
__stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
__icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160
In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:
// sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
// dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
dptr = dopt->__data;
// sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
// flowing the stack:
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
}
In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.
This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
__kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
kasan_report+0x32/0x40
check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
__ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
__icmp_send+0x744/0x1700
Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.
This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.
Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Jason: the gtp part didn't apply because it doesn't use icmp_ndo_send on 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/linux/icmpv6.h | 17 ++++++++++++++---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 -
include/net/icmp.h | 6 +++++-
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/icmp.c | 16 ++++++++--------
net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 12 +++++++-----
6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define _LINUX_ICMPV6_H
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <uapi/linux/icmpv6.h>
static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -13,10 +14,16 @@ static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-extern void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
+extern void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm);
+static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ __icmpv6_send(skb, type, code, info, IP6CB(skb));
+}
typedef void ip6_icmp_send_t(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr);
+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm);
extern int inet6_register_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn);
extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn);
int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type,
@@ -25,7 +32,11 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
#else
-#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send
+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 };
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
+}
#endif
#else
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ struct ipv6_params {
__s32 autoconf;
};
extern struct ipv6_params ipv6_defaults;
-#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
--- a/include/net/icmp.h
+++ b/include/net/icmp.h
@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);
#else
-#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send
+static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
+{
+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+}
#endif
int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -755,13 +755,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send);
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct nf_conn *ct;
__be32 orig_ip;
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
return;
}
@@ -776,7 +777,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_i
orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;
- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);
--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -312,10 +312,9 @@ static int icmpv6_getfrag(void *from, ch
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
-static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
- struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb);
struct ipv6_destopt_hao *hao;
struct in6_addr tmp;
int off;
@@ -332,7 +331,7 @@ static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buf
}
}
#else
-static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) {}
+static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) {}
#endif
static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net,
@@ -427,7 +426,8 @@ static int icmp6_iif(const struct sk_buf
* Send an ICMP message in response to a packet in error
*/
static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr)
+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *s
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && !icmpv6_global_allow(net, type))
goto out_bh_enable;
- mip6_addr_swap(skb);
+ mip6_addr_swap(skb, parm);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out_bh_enable:
*/
void icmpv6_param_prob(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 code, int pos)
{
- icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL);
+ icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL, IP6CB(skb));
kfree_skb(skb);
}
@@ -662,10 +662,10 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk
}
if (type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT,
- info, &temp_saddr);
+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2));
else
icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH,
- info, &temp_saddr);
+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2));
if (rt)
ip6_rt_put(rt);
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icm
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_unregister_icmp_sender);
-void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm)
{
ip6_icmp_send_t *send;
@@ -40,16 +41,17 @@ void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8
if (!send)
goto out;
- send(skb, type, code, info, NULL);
+ send(skb, type, code, info, NULL, parm);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmpv6_send);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
{
+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 };
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct in6_addr orig_ip;
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
return;
}
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb
orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6;
- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);

8071
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0073-net-WireGuard-secure-network-tunnel.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1079
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0074-wireguard-selftests-import-harness-makefile-for-test.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

31
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0075-wireguard-Kconfig-select-parent-dependency-for-crypt.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 87e4891e91a381de049a6c70690a295f44ae1f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 075/124] wireguard: Kconfig: select parent dependency for
crypto
commit d7c68a38bb4f9b7c1a2e4a772872c752ee5c44a6 upstream.
This fixes the crypto selection submenu depenencies. Otherwise, we'd
wind up issuing warnings in which certain dependencies we also select
couldn't be satisfied. This condition was triggered by the addition of
the test suite autobuilder in the previous commit.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ config WIREGUARD
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT
+ select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM
+ select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM

66
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0076-wireguard-global-fix-spelling-mistakes-in-comments.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 163383e1867a8eb7026d436627bbcd39ecdbd509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Soref <jsoref@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 076/124] wireguard: global: fix spelling mistakes in comments
commit a2ec8b5706944d228181c8b91d815f41d6dd8e7b upstream.
This fixes two spelling errors in source code comments.
Signed-off-by: Josh Soref <jsoref@gmail.com>
[Jason: rewrote commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h | 8 ++++----
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(
/* We've already verified the Poly1305 auth tag, which means this packet
* was not modified in transit. We can therefore tell the networking
* stack that all checksums of every layer of encapsulation have already
- * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unneccessary to check
+ * been checked "by the hardware" and therefore is unnecessary to check
* again in software.
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
--- a/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/wireguard.h
@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@
* one but not both of:
*
* WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32
- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1
+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1
*
* The kernel will then return several messages (NLM_F_MULTI) containing the
* following tree of nested items:
*
* WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32
- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1
+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1
* WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN
* WGDEVICE_A_PUBLIC_KEY: NLA_EXACT_LEN, len WG_KEY_LEN
* WGDEVICE_A_LISTEN_PORT: NLA_U16
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
* WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX and WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME:
*
* WGDEVICE_A_IFINDEX: NLA_U32
- * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMESIZ - 1
+ * WGDEVICE_A_IFNAME: NLA_NUL_STRING, maxlen IFNAMSIZ - 1
* WGDEVICE_A_FLAGS: NLA_U32, 0 or WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS if all current
* peers should be removed prior to adding the list below.
* WGDEVICE_A_PRIVATE_KEY: len WG_KEY_LEN, all zeros to remove
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
* filling in information not contained in the prior. Note that if
* WGDEVICE_F_REPLACE_PEERS is specified in the first message, it probably
* should not be specified in fragments that come after, so that the list
- * of peers is only cleared the first time but appened after. Likewise for
+ * of peers is only cleared the first time but appended after. Likewise for
* peers, if WGPEER_F_REPLACE_ALLOWEDIPS is specified in the first message
* of a peer, it likely should not be specified in subsequent fragments.
*

29
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0077-wireguard-main-remove-unused-include-linux-version.h.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 27686282c4b34ad6db44cb3dbf58763e5bb8e96b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 077/124] wireguard: main: remove unused include
<linux/version.h>
commit 43967b6ff91e53bcce5ae08c16a0588a475b53a1 upstream.
Remove <linux/version.h> from the includes for main.c, which is unused.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
[Jason: reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/main.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/main.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include <uapi/linux/wireguard.h>
-#include <linux/version.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/genetlink.h>

42
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0078-wireguard-allowedips-use-kfree_rcu-instead-of-call_r.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 17c33753f9b68288a2e8551b6161ca54f1809d37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 22:08:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 078/124] wireguard: allowedips: use kfree_rcu() instead of
call_rcu()
commit d89ee7d5c73af15c1c6f12b016cdf469742b5726 upstream.
The callback function of call_rcu() just calls a kfree(), so we
can use kfree_rcu() instead of call_rcu() + callback function.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 7 +------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c
@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ static void copy_and_assign_cidr(struct
#define CHOOSE_NODE(parent, key) \
parent->bit[(key[parent->bit_at_a] >> parent->bit_at_b) & 1]
-static void node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
- kfree(container_of(rcu, struct allowedips_node, rcu));
-}
-
static void push_rcu(struct allowedips_node **stack,
struct allowedips_node __rcu *p, unsigned int *len)
{
@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ static void walk_remove_by_peer(struct a
if (!node->bit[0] || !node->bit[1]) {
rcu_assign_pointer(*nptr, DEREF(
&node->bit[!REF(node->bit[0])]));
- call_rcu(&node->rcu, node_free_rcu);
+ kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
node = DEREF(nptr);
}
}

373
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0079-wireguard-selftests-remove-ancient-kernel-compatibil.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
From df3289cf81503ef299450a67f5bf11e526fdb2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 079/124] wireguard: selftests: remove ancient kernel
compatibility code
commit 9a69a4c8802adf642bc4a13d471b5a86b44ed434 upstream.
Quite a bit of the test suite was designed to work with ancient kernels.
Thankfully we no longer have to deal with this. This commit updates
things that we can finally update and removes things that we can finally
remove, to avoid the build-up of the last several years as a result of
having to support ancient kernels. We can finally rely on suppress_
prefixlength being available. On the build side of things, the no-PIE
hack is no longer required, and we can bump some of the tools, repair
our m68k and i686-kvm support, and get better coverage of the static
branches used in the crypto lib and in udp_tunnel.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +--
.../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 82 ++++++++++---------
.../selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 +
.../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 2 +
5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ n2() { pretty 2 "$*"; maybe_exec ip netn
ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0 "$@"; }
ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; }
ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; }
-sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 0 || true; }
+sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; }
waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
@@ -294,12 +294,9 @@ ip1 -6 rule add table main suppress_pref
ip1 -4 route add default dev wg0 table 51820
ip1 -4 rule add not fwmark 51820 table 51820
ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_prefixlength 0
-# suppress_prefixlength only got added in 3.12, and we want to support 3.10+.
-if [[ $(ip1 -4 rule show all) == *suppress_prefixlength* ]]; then
- # Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs.
- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7
- n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111
-fi
+# Flood the pings instead of sending just one, to trigger routing table reference counting bugs.
+n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7
+n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111
n0 iptables -t nat -F
ip0 link del vethrc
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
PWD := $(shell pwd)
CHOST := $(shell gcc -dumpmachine)
+HOST_ARCH := $(firstword $(subst -, ,$(CHOST)))
ifneq (,$(ARCH))
CBUILD := $(subst -gcc,,$(lastword $(subst /, ,$(firstword $(wildcard $(foreach bindir,$(subst :, ,$(PATH)),$(bindir)/$(ARCH)-*-gcc))))))
ifeq (,$(CBUILD))
@@ -37,19 +38,19 @@ endef
define file_download =
$(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1):
mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH)
- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -t inf --retry-on-http-error=404 -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp'
+ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp'
if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi
endef
-$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.20,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,44be8771d0e6c6b5f82dd15662eb2957c9a3173a19a8b49966ac0542bbd40d61))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3))
$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.1.7,.tar.gz,http://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,a4ef73406fe92250602b8da2ae89ec53211f805df97a1d1d629db5a14043734f))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c))
$(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.1.0,.tar.gz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,9b43707d6075ecdca14803ca8ce0c8553848c49fa1586d12fd508d66577243f2))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.6.1,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,0fc2d7bd5d7be11311726466789d4c65fb4c8e096c9182b56ce97440864f0cf5))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.60,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,a8796ecc4fa6c38aad6139d9515dc8113023a82e9d787e5a5fb5fa1b05516f21))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20161105,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20161105.tar.gz/#,f813092f03d17294fd23544b129b95cdb87fe19f7970a51908a6b88509acad8a))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,WireGuard,0.0.20191212,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/WireGuard/snapshot/,b0d718380f7a8822b2f12d75e462fa4eafa3a77871002981f367cd4fe2a1b071))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f))
KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug)
rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d))
@@ -59,23 +60,21 @@ export CFLAGS ?= -O3 -pipe
export LDFLAGS ?=
export CPPFLAGS := -I$(BUILD_PATH)/include
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --host=$(CHOST)
-NOPIE_GCC := gcc -fno-PIE
CFLAGS += -march=native
STRIP := strip
else
$(info Cross compilation: building for $(CBUILD) using $(CHOST))
CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG := --build=$(CBUILD) --host=$(CHOST)
export CROSS_COMPILE=$(CBUILD)-
-NOPIE_GCC := $(CBUILD)-gcc -fno-PIE
STRIP := $(CBUILD)-strip
endif
ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
QEMU_ARCH := aarch64
KERNEL_ARCH := arm64
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt
@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64_be)
QEMU_ARCH := aarch64
KERNEL_ARCH := arm64
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm64/boot/Image
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a53 -machine virt
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm)
QEMU_ARCH := arm
KERNEL_ARCH := arm
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),armeb)
QEMU_ARCH := arm
KERNEL_ARCH := arm
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/arm/boot/zImage
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine virt,gic_version=host,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu cortex-a15 -machine virt
@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64)
QEMU_ARCH := x86_64
KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu Skylake-Server -machine q35
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686)
QEMU_ARCH := i386
KERNEL_ARCH := x86
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage
-ifeq ($(subst i686,x86_64,$(CBUILD)),$(CHOST))
+ifeq ($(subst x86_64,i686,$(HOST_ARCH)),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine q35,accel=kvm
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine q35
@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64)
QEMU_ARCH := mips64
KERNEL_ARCH := mips
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm
CFLAGS += -EB
else
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64el)
QEMU_ARCH := mips64el
KERNEL_ARCH := mips
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm
CFLAGS += -EL
else
@@ -158,7 +157,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips)
QEMU_ARCH := mips
KERNEL_ARCH := mips
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm
CFLAGS += -EB
else
@@ -169,7 +168,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),mipsel)
QEMU_ARCH := mipsel
KERNEL_ARCH := mips
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine malta,accel=kvm
CFLAGS += -EL
else
@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc64le)
QEMU_ARCH := ppc64
KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine pseries
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -machine pseries
@@ -190,7 +189,7 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc)
QEMU_ARCH := ppc
KERNEL_ARCH := powerpc
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/powerpc/boot/uImage
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine ppce500
else
QEMU_MACHINE := -machine ppce500
@@ -200,10 +199,11 @@ else ifeq ($(ARCH),m68k)
QEMU_ARCH := m68k
KERNEL_ARCH := m68k
KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/vmlinux
-ifeq ($(CHOST),$(CBUILD))
-QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800
+KERNEL_CMDLINE := $(shell sed -n 's/CONFIG_CMDLINE=\(.*\)/\1/p' arch/m68k.config)
+ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH))
+QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host,accel=kvm -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE)
else
-QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800
+QEMU_MACHINE := -machine q800 -smp 1 -append $(KERNEL_CMDLINE)
endif
else
$(error I only build: x86_64, i686, arm, armeb, aarch64, aarch64_be, mips, mipsel, mips64, mips64el, powerpc64le, powerpc, m68k)
@@ -238,14 +238,14 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt:
echo "nod /dev/console 644 0 0 c 5 1" >> $@
echo "dir /bin 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/iperf3 $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 755 0 0" >> $@
- echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg 755 0 0" >> $@
+ echo "file /bin/wg $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/bash $(BASH_PATH)/bash 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/ip $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/ping $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /bin/ncat $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat 755 0 0" >> $@
- echo "file /bin/xtables-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi 755 0 0" >> $@
- echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-multi 777 0 0" >> $@
+ echo "file /bin/xtables-legacy-multi $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi 755 0 0" >> $@
+ echo "slink /bin/iptables xtables-legacy-multi 777 0 0" >> $@
echo "slink /bin/ping6 ping 777 0 0" >> $@
echo "dir /lib 755 0 0" >> $@
echo "file /lib/libc.so $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so 755 0 0" >> $@
@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config: kernel.con
cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/minimal.config
$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),cp debug.config $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && cd $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) && ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) $(KERNEL_PATH)/scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -n $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config debug.config,)
-$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES)
- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)"
+$(KERNEL_BZIMAGE): $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config $(BUILD_PATH)/init-cpio-spec.txt $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3 $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping $(BASH_PATH)/bash $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip $(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg $(BUILD_PATH)/init ../netns.sh $(WIREGUARD_SOURCES)
+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE)
$(BUILD_PATH)/include/linux/.installed: | $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config
$(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) INSTALL_HDR_PATH=$(BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) headers_install
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ $(BUILD_PATH)/include/.installed: $(MUSL
$(MUSL_CC): $(MUSL_PATH)/lib/libc.so
sh $(MUSL_PATH)/tools/musl-gcc.specs.sh $(BUILD_PATH)/include $(MUSL_PATH)/lib /lib/ld-linux.so.1 > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs
- printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" -fno-stack-protector -no-pie "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc
+ printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "$(REAL_CC)" --specs="$(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc.specs" "$$@"\n' > $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc
chmod +x $(BUILD_PATH)/musl-gcc
$(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR)
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed: $(IPERF_TAR)
touch $@
$(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared
+ cd $(IPERF_PATH) && CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --with-openssl=no
$(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH)
$(STRIP) -s $@
@@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WI
flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $<
touch $@
-$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/tools LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg
+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+ LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg
$(STRIP) -s $@
$(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
@@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed: $(IPUTILS_TA
touch $@
$(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping: | $(IPUTILS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- $(MAKE) -C $(IPUTILS_PATH) USE_CAP=no USE_IDN=no USE_NETTLE=no USE_CRYPTO=no ping
+ sed -i /atexit/d $(IPUTILS_PATH)/ping.c
+ cd $(IPUTILS_PATH) && $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -std=c99 -o $@ ping.c ping_common.c ping6_common.c iputils_common.c -D_GNU_SOURCE -D'IPUTILS_VERSION(f)=f' -lresolv $(LDFLAGS)
$(STRIP) -s $@
$(BASH_PATH)/.installed: $(BASH_TAR)
@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_
sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure
touch $@
-$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include
$(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH)
$(STRIP) -s $@
@@ -368,8 +369,9 @@ $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed: $(NMAP_TAR)
touch $@
$(NMAP_PATH)/ncat/ncat: | $(NMAP_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux
- $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH) build-ncat
+ cd $(NMAP_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --without-ndiff --without-zenmap --without-nping --with-libpcap=included --with-libpcre=included --with-libdnet=included --without-liblua --with-liblinear=included --without-nmap-update --without-openssl --with-pcap=linux --without-libssh
+ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/libpcap
+ $(MAKE) -C $(NMAP_PATH)/ncat
$(STRIP) -s $@
clean:
@@ -379,7 +381,7 @@ distclean: clean
rm -rf $(DISTFILES_PATH)
menuconfig: $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/.config
- $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) CC="$(NOPIE_GCC)" menuconfig
+ $(MAKE) -C $(KERNEL_PATH) O=$(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH) ARCH=$(KERNEL_ARCH) CROSS_COMPILE=$(CROSS_COMPILE) menuconfig
.PHONY: qemu build clean distclean menuconfig
.DELETE_ON_ERROR:
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/m68k.config
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
CONFIG_MMU=y
+CONFIG_M68KCLASSIC=y
CONFIG_M68040=y
CONFIG_MAC=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_TTYS=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_PMACZILOG_CONSOLE=y
-CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y
CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=ttyS0 wg.success=ttyS1"
CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1024
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <sys/reboot.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/version.h>
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ CONFIG_PRINTK=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y
CONFIG_BUG=y
CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y
+CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y
CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n
CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y
CONFIG_FUTEX=y
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n
CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n
CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y
+CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME=y
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y
CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y
CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y

39
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0080-wireguard-queueing-do-not-account-for-pfmemalloc-whe.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 2b7c5a4a57e1f5cc37877f838293173994e028c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 080/124] wireguard: queueing: do not account for pfmemalloc
when clearing skb header
commit 04d2ea92a18417619182cbb79063f154892b0150 upstream.
Before 8b7008620b84 ("net: Don't copy pfmemalloc flag in __copy_skb_
header()"), the pfmemalloc flag used to be between headers_start and
headers_end, which is a region we clear when preparing the packet for
encryption/decryption. This is a parameter we certainly want to
preserve, which is why 8b7008620b84 moved it out of there. The code here
was written in a world before 8b7008620b84, though, where we had to
manually account for it. This commit brings things up to speed.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
@@ -83,13 +83,10 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr
static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- const int pfmemalloc = skb->pfmemalloc;
-
skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
memset(&skb->headers_start, 0,
offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) -
offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start));
- skb->pfmemalloc = pfmemalloc;
skb->queue_mapping = 0;
skb->nohdr = 0;
skb->peeked = 0;

34
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0081-wireguard-socket-mark-skbs-as-not-on-list-when-recei.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 6d8e17ad1b4b019c61403a88377e731491de409c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:47:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 081/124] wireguard: socket: mark skbs as not on list when
receiving via gro
commit 736775d06bac60d7a353e405398b48b2bd8b1e54 upstream.
Certain drivers will pass gro skbs to udp, at which point the udp driver
simply iterates through them and passes them off to encap_rcv, which is
where we pick up. At the moment, we're not attempting to coalesce these
into bundles, but we also don't want to wind up having cascaded lists of
skbs treated separately. The right behavior here, then, is to just mark
each incoming one as not on a list. This can be seen in practice, for
example, with Qualcomm's rmnet_perf driver.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Tested-by: Yaroslav Furman <yaro330@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static int wg_receive(struct sock *sk, s
wg = sk->sk_user_data;
if (unlikely(!wg))
goto err;
+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb);
wg_packet_receive(wg, skb);
return 0;

164
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0082-wireguard-allowedips-fix-use-after-free-in-root_remo.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
From 13696b0d3219c3ca9ff4ce6a580c53fab6284312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 082/124] wireguard: allowedips: fix use-after-free in
root_remove_peer_lists
commit 9981159fc3b677b357f84e069a11de5a5ec8a2a8 upstream.
In the unlikely case a new node could not be allocated, we need to
remove @newnode from @peer->allowedips_list before freeing it.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809881a538 by task syz-executor.4/30133
CPU: 0 PID: 30133 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
__list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
list_del include/linux/list.h:146 [inline]
root_remove_peer_lists+0x24f/0x4b0 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:65
wg_allowedips_free+0x232/0x390 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:300
wg_peer_remove_all+0xd5/0x620 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c:187
wg_set_device+0xd01/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:542
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f99a9bcdc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f99a9bce6d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 00000000000009ba R14: 00000000004cb2b8 R15: 0000000000000009
Allocated by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:527
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x790 mm/slab.c:3551
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:670 [inline]
add+0x70a/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:236
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kfree+0x10a/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3757
add+0x12d2/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:266
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809881a500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff88809881a500, ffff88809881a540)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002620680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400380 index:0x0
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000250b748 ffffea000254bac8 ffff8880aa400380
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809881a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88809881a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88809881a500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88809881a580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ static int add(struct allowedips_node __
} else {
node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ list_del(&newnode->peer_list);
kfree(newnode);
return -ENOMEM;
}

234
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0083-wireguard-noise-reject-peers-with-low-order-public-k.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
From 1da05ad0bbc51cd226a2297e66b3cc8499803306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 083/124] wireguard: noise: reject peers with low order public
keys
commit ec31c2676a10e064878927b243fada8c2fb0c03c upstream.
Our static-static calculation returns a failure if the public key is of
low order. We check for this when peers are added, and don't allow them
to be added if they're low order, except in the case where we haven't
yet been given a private key. In that case, we would defer the removal
of the peer until we're given a private key, since at that point we're
doing new static-static calculations which incur failures we can act on.
This meant, however, that we wound up removing peers rather late in the
configuration flow.
Syzkaller points out that peer_remove calls flush_workqueue, which in
turn might then wait for sending a handshake initiation to complete.
Since handshake initiation needs the static identity lock, holding the
static identity lock while calling peer_remove can result in a rare
deadlock. We have precisely this case in this situation of late-stage
peer removal based on an invalid public key. We can't drop the lock when
removing, because then incoming handshakes might interact with a bogus
static-static calculation.
While the band-aid patch for this would involve breaking up the peer
removal into two steps like wg_peer_remove_all does, in order to solve
the locking issue, there's actually a much more elegant way of fixing
this:
If the static-static calculation succeeds with one private key, it
*must* succeed with all others, because all 32-byte strings map to valid
private keys, thanks to clamping. That means we can get rid of this
silly dance and locking headaches of removing peers late in the
configuration flow, and instead just reject them early on, regardless of
whether the device has yet been assigned a private key. For the case
where the device doesn't yet have a private key, we safely use zeros
just for the purposes of checking for low order points by way of
checking the output of the calculation.
The following PoC will trigger the deadlock:
ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev wg0
ip link set wg0 up
ping -f 10.0.0.2 &
while true; do
wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= allowed-ips 10.0.0.0/24 endpoint 10.0.0.3:1234
wg set wg0 private-key <(echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=)
done
[ 0.949105] ======================================================
[ 0.949550] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 0.950143] 5.5.0-debug+ #18 Not tainted
[ 0.950431] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 0.950959] wg/89 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 0.951252] ffff8880333e2128 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.951865]
[ 0.951865] but task is already holding lock:
[ 0.952280] ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[ 0.953011]
[ 0.953011] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 0.953011]
[ 0.953651]
[ 0.953651] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 0.954292]
[ 0.954292] -> #2 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}:
[ 0.954804] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.955133] down_read+0x83/0x410
[ 0.955428] wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation+0x97/0x700
[ 0.955885] wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x13a/0x280
[ 0.956401] wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x10/0x20
[ 0.956841] process_one_work+0x806/0x1500
[ 0.957167] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[ 0.957549] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[ 0.957792] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 0.958234]
[ 0.958234] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)){+.+.}:
[ 0.958808] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.959075] process_one_work+0x7ab/0x1500
[ 0.959369] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[ 0.959639] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[ 0.959896] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 0.960346]
[ 0.960346] -> #0 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}:
[ 0.960945] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[ 0.961351] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[ 0.961725] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.961990] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[ 0.962280] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.962600] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[ 0.962994] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[ 0.963298] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[ 0.963618] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[ 0.963853] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[ 0.964245] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[ 0.964586] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[ 0.964854] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 0.965141] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[ 0.965408] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 0.965769]
[ 0.965769] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 0.965769]
[ 0.966337] Chain exists of:
[ 0.966337] (wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0 --> (work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work) --> &wg->static_identity.lock
[ 0.966337]
[ 0.967417] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 0.967417]
[ 0.967836] CPU0 CPU1
[ 0.968155] ---- ----
[ 0.968497] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[ 0.968779] lock((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work));
[ 0.969345] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[ 0.969809] lock((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0);
[ 0.970146]
[ 0.970146] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 0.970146]
[ 0.970531] 5 locks held by wg/89:
[ 0.970908] #0: ffffffff827433c8 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x10/0x30
[ 0.971400] #1: ffffffff82743480 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x642/0xe90
[ 0.971924] #2: ffffffff827160c0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0x9f/0xcc0
[ 0.972488] #3: ffff888032819de0 (&wg->device_update_lock){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0xb0/0xcc0
[ 0.973095] #4: ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[ 0.973653]
[ 0.973653] stack backtrace:
[ 0.973932] CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: wg Not tainted 5.5.0-debug+ #18
[ 0.974476] Call Trace:
[ 0.974638] dump_stack+0x97/0xe0
[ 0.974869] check_noncircular+0x312/0x3e0
[ 0.975132] ? print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 0.975410] ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30
[ 0.975727] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x51/0x90
[ 0.976024] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[ 0.976367] ? graph_lock+0x70/0x160
[ 0.976682] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[ 0.976998] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[ 0.977323] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.977627] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.977890] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[ 0.978147] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.978410] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[ 0.978662] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
[ 0.978919] ? queue_rcu_work+0x60/0x60
[ 0.979166] ? netif_napi_del+0x151/0x3b0
[ 0.979501] ? peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.979871] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.980232] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[ 0.980516] ? deref_stack_reg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 0.980801] ? set_peer+0xe10/0xe10
[ 0.981040] ? __ww_mutex_check_waiters+0x150/0x150
[ 0.981430] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x163/0x270
[ 0.981719] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x13f/0x310
[ 0.982078] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[ 0.982348] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[ 0.982690] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[ 0.983049] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[ 0.983298] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[ 0.983645] ? netlink_ack+0x880/0x880
[ 0.983888] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[ 0.984168] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[ 0.984443] ? netlink_detachskb+0x60/0x60
[ 0.984729] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[ 0.984976] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[ 0.985220] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xa60/0xa60
[ 0.985533] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[ 0.985763] ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0
[ 0.986039] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x17/0x160
[ 0.986397] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x8c/0xf0
[ 0.986711] ? __sys_recvmsg_sock+0xd0/0xd0
[ 0.987018] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 0.987283] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39b/0x5a0
[ 0.987666] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[ 0.987903] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 0.988223] RIP: 0033:0x7fe77c12003e
[ 0.988508] Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 4
[ 0.989666] RSP: 002b:00007fffada2ed58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 0.990137] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe77c159d48 RCX: 00007fe77c12003e
[ 0.990583] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055fd1d38e020 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 0.991091] RBP: 000055fd1d38e020 R08: 000055fd1cb63358 R09: 000000000000000c
[ 0.991568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c
[ 0.992014] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 000055fd1d38e020 R15: 0000000000000001
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 6 ++----
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 10 +++++++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c
@@ -575,10 +575,8 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff
private_key);
list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list,
peer_list) {
- if (wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer))
- wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer);
- else
- wg_peer_remove(peer);
+ BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer));
+ wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer);
}
wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker);
up_write(&wg->static_identity.lock);
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -46,17 +46,21 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void)
/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */
bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer)
{
- bool ret = true;
+ bool ret;
down_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity)
+ if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) {
ret = curve25519(
peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static,
peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private,
peer->handshake.remote_static);
- else
+ } else {
+ u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
+
+ ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static);
memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0,
NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+ }
up_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
return ret;
}

34
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0084-wireguard-selftests-ensure-non-addition-of-peers-wit.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From eb6a11e6d69912d8bb0b951b08f6871785cfe0e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 084/124] wireguard: selftests: ensure non-addition of peers
with failed precomputation
commit f9398acba6a4ae9cb98bfe4d56414d376eff8d57 upstream.
Ensure that peers with low order points are ignored, both in the case
where we already have a device private key and in the case where we do
not. This adds points that naturally give a zero output.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -516,6 +516,12 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0
+n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove
+low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= )
+n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
+n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
+[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
ip0 link del wg0
declare -A objects

78
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0085-wireguard-selftests-tie-socket-waiting-to-target-pid.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From d95179eade4bc805455dd5e6617db5e387004d13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 22:17:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 085/124] wireguard: selftests: tie socket waiting to target
pid
commit 88f404a9b1d75388225b1c67b6dd327cb2182777 upstream.
Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the
previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the
listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ ip0() { pretty 0 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns0
ip1() { pretty 1 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns1 "$@"; }
ip2() { pretty 2 "ip $*"; ip -n $netns2 "$@"; }
sleep() { read -t "$1" -N 1 || true; }
-waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 5201') != *iperf3* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
-waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
-waitncattcp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for tcp:1111"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlp 'sport = 1111') != *ncat* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
+waitiperf() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for iperf:5201 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -tlpH 'sport = 5201') != *\"iperf3\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
+waitncatudp() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for udp:1111 pid $2"; while [[ $(ss -N "$1" -ulpH 'sport = 1111') != *\"ncat\",pid=$2,fd=* ]]; do sleep 0.1; done; }
waitiface() { pretty "${1//*-}" "wait for $2 to come up"; ip netns exec "$1" bash -c "while [[ \$(< \"/sys/class/net/$2/operstate\") != up ]]; do read -t .1 -N 0 || true; done;"; }
cleanup() {
@@ -119,22 +118,22 @@ tests() {
# TCP over IPv4
n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.2 &
- waitiperf $netns2
+ waitiperf $netns2 $!
n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c 192.168.241.2
# TCP over IPv6
n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::1 &
- waitiperf $netns1
+ waitiperf $netns1 $!
n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -c fd00::1
# UDP over IPv4
n1 iperf3 -s -1 -B 192.168.241.1 &
- waitiperf $netns1
+ waitiperf $netns1 $!
n2 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c 192.168.241.1
# UDP over IPv6
n2 iperf3 -s -1 -B fd00::2 &
- waitiperf $netns2
+ waitiperf $netns2 $!
n1 iperf3 -Z -t 3 -b 0 -u -c fd00::2
}
@@ -207,7 +206,7 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 192.168.241.0/24
exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111)
ncat_pid=$!
-waitncatudp $netns1
+waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid
n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X"
read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 && [[ $out == "X" ]]
kill $ncat_pid
@@ -216,7 +215,7 @@ n1 wg set wg0 peer "$more_specific_key"
n2 wg set wg0 listen-port 9997
exec 4< <(n1 ncat -l -u -p 1111)
ncat_pid=$!
-waitncatudp $netns1
+waitncatudp $netns1 $ncat_pid
n2 ncat -u 192.168.241.1 1111 <<<"X"
! read -r -N 1 -t 1 out <&4 || false
kill $ncat_pid

64
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0086-wireguard-device-use-icmp_ndo_send-helper.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From a16efc93a9c12bbfbff6d50811332e687cc527a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 20:47:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 086/124] wireguard: device: use icmp_ndo_send helper
commit a12d7f3cbdc72c7625881c8dc2660fc2c979fdf2 upstream.
Because wireguard is calling icmp from network device context, it should
use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. This
commit adds a small test to the wireguard test suite to ensure that the
new functions continue doing the right thing in the context of
wireguard. It does this by setting up a condition that will definately
evoke an icmp error message from the driver, but along a nat'd path.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ err_peer:
err:
++dev->stats.tx_errors;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
- icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
+ icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
- icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0);
+ icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0);
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
set -e
exec 3>&1
+export LANG=C
export WG_HIDE_KEYS=never
netns0="wg-test-$$-0"
netns1="wg-test-$$-1"
@@ -297,7 +298,17 @@ ip1 -4 rule add table main suppress_pref
n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f 192.168.99.7
n1 ping -W 1 -c 100 -f abab::1111
+# Have ns2 NAT into wg0 packets from ns0, but return an icmp error along the right route.
+n2 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d 192.168.241.0/24 -j SNAT --to 192.168.241.2
+n0 iptables -t filter -A INPUT \! -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i vethrs -j DROP # Manual rpfilter just to be explicit.
+n2 bash -c 'printf 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward'
+ip0 -4 route add 192.168.241.1 via 10.0.0.100
+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub1" remove
+[[ $(! n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1 || false) == *"From 10.0.0.100 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable"* ]]
+
n0 iptables -t nat -F
+n0 iptables -t filter -F
+n2 iptables -t nat -F
ip0 link del vethrc
ip0 link del vethrs
ip1 link del wg0

105
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0087-wireguard-selftests-reduce-complexity-and-fix-make-r.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
From 871a6ff0cd8f9edad483b8f467c0abe6cff32390 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 087/124] wireguard: selftests: reduce complexity and fix make
races
commit 04ddf1208f03e1dbc39a4619c40eba640051b950 upstream.
This gives us fewer dependencies and shortens build time, fixes up some
hash checking race conditions, and also fixes missing directory creation
that caused issues on massively parallel builds.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 38 +++++++------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile
@@ -38,19 +38,17 @@ endef
define file_download =
$(DISTFILES_PATH)/$(1):
mkdir -p $(DISTFILES_PATH)
- flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp'
- if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi
+ flock -x $$@.lock -c '[ -f $$@ ] && exit 0; wget -O $$@.tmp $(MIRROR)$(1) || wget -O $$@.tmp $(2)$(1) || rm -f $$@.tmp; [ -f $$@.tmp ] || exit 1; if echo "$(3) $$@.tmp" | sha256sum -c -; then mv $$@.tmp $$@; else rm -f $$@.tmp; exit 71; fi'
endef
$(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.1.24,.tar.gz,https://www.musl-libc.org/releases/,1370c9a812b2cf2a7d92802510cca0058cc37e66a7bedd70051f0a34015022a3))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,LIBMNL,libmnl,1.0.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libmnl/files/,171f89699f286a5854b72b91d06e8f8e3683064c5901fb09d954a9ab6f551f81))
$(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c))
$(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d))
$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae))
$(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c))
$(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa))
$(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20191226,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,aa8af0fdc9872d369d8c890a84dbc2a2466b55795dccd5b47721b2d97644b04f))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,WIREGUARD_TOOLS,wireguard-tools,1.0.20200206,.tar.xz,https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-tools/snapshot/,f5207248c6a3c3e3bfc9ab30b91c1897b00802ed861e1f9faaed873366078c64))
KERNEL_BUILD_PATH := $(BUILD_PATH)/kernel$(if $(findstring yes,$(DEBUG_KERNEL)),-debug)
rwildcard=$(foreach d,$(wildcard $1*),$(call rwildcard,$d/,$2) $(filter $(subst *,%,$2),$d))
@@ -295,21 +293,13 @@ $(IPERF_PATH)/src/iperf3: | $(IPERF_PATH
$(MAKE) -C $(IPERF_PATH)
$(STRIP) -s $@
-$(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed: $(LIBMNL_TAR)
- flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $<
- touch $@
-
-$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a: | $(LIBMNL_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- cd $(LIBMNL_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared
- $(MAKE) -C $(LIBMNL_PATH)
- sed -i 's:prefix=.*:prefix=$(LIBMNL_PATH):' $(LIBMNL_PATH)/libmnl.pc
-
$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed: $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_TAR)
+ mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH)
flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $<
touch $@
-$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src LIBMNL_CFLAGS="-I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include" LIBMNL_LDLIBS="-lmnl" wg
+$(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src/wg: | $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+ $(MAKE) -C $(WIREGUARD_TOOLS_PATH)/src wg
$(STRIP) -s $@
$(BUILD_PATH)/init: init.c | $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
@@ -340,17 +330,17 @@ $(BASH_PATH)/bash: | $(BASH_PATH)/.insta
$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed: $(IPROUTE2_TAR)
mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH)
flock -s $<.lock tar -C $(BUILD_PATH) -xf $<
- printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=y\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS -DHAVE_LIBMNL -I$(LIBMNL_PATH)/include\nLDLIBS+=-lmnl' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk
+ printf 'CC:=$(CC)\nPKG_CONFIG:=pkg-config\nTC_CONFIG_XT:=n\nTC_CONFIG_ATM:=n\nTC_CONFIG_IPSET:=n\nIP_CONFIG_SETNS:=y\nHAVE_ELF:=n\nHAVE_MNL:=n\nHAVE_BERKELEY_DB:=n\nHAVE_LATEX:=n\nHAVE_PDFLATEX:=n\nCFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SETNS\n' > $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/config.mk
printf 'lib: snapshot\n\t$$(MAKE) -C lib\nip/ip: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C ip ip\nmisc/ss: lib\n\t$$(MAKE) -C misc ss\n' >> $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/Makefile
touch $@
-$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip
- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip
-
-$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS) -L$(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs" PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss
- $(STRIP) -s $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss
+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/ip/ip: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ ip/ip
+ $(STRIP) -s $@
+
+$(IPROUTE2_PATH)/misc/ss: | $(IPROUTE2_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+ $(MAKE) -C $(IPROUTE2_PATH) PREFIX=/ misc/ss
+ $(STRIP) -s $@
$(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_TAR)
mkdir -p $(BUILD_PATH)
@@ -358,8 +348,8 @@ $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed: $(IPTABLES_
sed -i -e "/nfnetlink=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" -e "/nfconntrack=[01]/s:=[01]:=0:" $(IPTABLES_PATH)/configure
touch $@
-$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(LIBMNL_PATH)/src/.libs/libmnl.a $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
- cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR="$(LIBMNL_PATH)" ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include
+$(IPTABLES_PATH)/iptables/xtables-legacy-multi: | $(IPTABLES_PATH)/.installed $(USERSPACE_DEPS)
+ cd $(IPTABLES_PATH) && ./configure --prefix=/ $(CROSS_COMPILE_FLAG) --enable-static --disable-shared --disable-nftables --disable-bpf-compiler --disable-nfsynproxy --disable-libipq --disable-connlabel --with-kernel=$(BUILD_PATH)/include
$(MAKE) -C $(IPTABLES_PATH)
$(STRIP) -s $@

38
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0088-wireguard-receive-reset-last_under_load-to-zero.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From b3969f204f6f3e1b712d4892050abf35ad178ccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 088/124] wireguard: receive: reset last_under_load to zero
commit 2a8a4df36462aa85b0db87b7c5ea145ba67e34a8 upstream.
This is a small optimization that prevents more expensive comparisons
from happening when they are no longer necessary, by clearing the
last_under_load variable whenever we wind up in a state where we were
under load but we no longer are.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Matt Dunwoodie <ncon@noconroy.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -118,10 +118,13 @@ static void wg_receive_handshake_packet(
under_load = skb_queue_len(&wg->incoming_handshakes) >=
MAX_QUEUED_INCOMING_HANDSHAKES / 8;
- if (under_load)
+ if (under_load) {
last_under_load = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
- else if (last_under_load)
+ } else if (last_under_load) {
under_load = !wg_birthdate_has_expired(last_under_load, 1);
+ if (!under_load)
+ last_under_load = 0;
+ }
mac_state = wg_cookie_validate_packet(&wg->cookie_checker, skb,
under_load);
if ((under_load && mac_state == VALID_MAC_WITH_COOKIE) ||

95
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0089-wireguard-send-account-for-mtu-0-devices.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
From 6e82ecb98d019209c77c73d0460535f1fcb3d8cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 089/124] wireguard: send: account for mtu=0 devices
commit 175f1ca9a9ed8689d2028da1a7c624bb4fb4ff7e upstream.
It turns out there's an easy way to get packets queued up while still
having an MTU of zero, and that's via persistent keep alive. This commit
makes sure that in whatever condition, we don't wind up dividing by
zero. Note that an MTU of zero for a wireguard interface is something
quasi-valid, so I don't think the correct fix is to limit it via
min_mtu. This can be reproduced easily with:
ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip link add wg1 type wireguard
ip link set wg0 up mtu 0
ip link set wg1 up
wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey)
wg set wg1 listen-port 1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key)
wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1
However, while min_mtu=0 seems fine, it makes sense to restrict the
max_mtu. This commit also restricts the maximum MTU to the greatest
number for which rounding up to the padding multiple won't overflow a
signed integer. Packets this large were always rejected anyway
eventually, due to checks deeper in, but it seems more sound not to even
let the administrator configure something that won't work anyway.
We use this opportunity to clean up this function a bit so that it's
clear which paths we're expecting.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++---
drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device *
enum { WG_NETDEV_FEATURES = NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_GSO |
NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_HIGHDMA };
+ const int overhead = MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH + sizeof(struct udphdr) +
+ max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr));
dev->netdev_ops = &netdev_ops;
dev->hard_header_len = 0;
@@ -271,9 +273,8 @@ static void wg_setup(struct net_device *
dev->features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES;
dev->hw_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES;
dev->hw_enc_features |= WG_NETDEV_FEATURES;
- dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH -
- sizeof(struct udphdr) -
- max(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), sizeof(struct iphdr));
+ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - overhead;
+ dev->max_mtu = round_down(INT_MAX, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - overhead;
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &device_type);
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
@@ -143,16 +143,22 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_pee
static unsigned int calculate_skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ unsigned int padded_size, last_unit = skb->len;
+
+ if (unlikely(!PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu))
+ return ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE) - last_unit;
+
/* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking
* layer gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. In that case, we
* wouldn't want the final subtraction to overflow in the case of the
- * padded_size being clamped.
+ * padded_size being clamped. Fortunately, that's very rarely the case,
+ * so we optimize for that not happening.
*/
- unsigned int last_unit = skb->len % PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu;
- unsigned int padded_size = ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE);
+ if (unlikely(last_unit > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu))
+ last_unit %= PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu;
- if (padded_size > PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu)
- padded_size = PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu;
+ padded_size = min(PACKET_CB(skb)->mtu,
+ ALIGN(last_unit, MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE));
return padded_size - last_unit;
}

33
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0090-wireguard-socket-remove-extra-call-to-synchronize_ne.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From ce6c6fa0d2dd4ca9c500e6240e4f22c48018a0ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 23:57:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 090/124] wireguard: socket: remove extra call to
synchronize_net
commit 1fbc33b0a7feb6ca72bf7dc8a05d81485ee8ee2e upstream.
synchronize_net() is a wrapper around synchronize_rcu(), so there's no
point in having synchronize_net and synchronize_rcu back to back,
despite the documentation comment suggesting maybe it's somewhat useful,
"Wait for packets currently being received to be done." This commit
removes the extra call.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ void wg_socket_reinit(struct wg_device *
wg->incoming_port = ntohs(inet_sk(new4)->inet_sport);
mutex_unlock(&wg->socket_update_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
- synchronize_net();
sock_free(old4);
sock_free(old6);
}

28
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-selftests-remove-duplicated-include-sys-ty.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 4c680d3ca400288018c9b9fff0c5df4dbed96e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:43 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 091/124] wireguard: selftests: remove duplicated include
<sys/types.h>
commit 166391159c5deb84795d2ff46e95f276177fa5fb upstream.
This commit removes a duplicated include.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/init.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/io.h>

100
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0092-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From db7e2e9ced3df1fb9286946914183f6a074a2b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:45 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 092/124] wireguard: queueing: account for skb->protocol==0
commit a5588604af448664e796daf3c1d5a4523c60667b upstream.
We carry out checks to the effect of:
if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb))
goto err;
By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this
means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol
is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET:
struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" };
unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 };
sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0),
buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr));
Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code
base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is
used more liberally.
I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a
32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of
skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov
to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't
seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function
to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol
itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to
the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a
mergable branch.
Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 8 +++++++-
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf
u32 mtu;
int ret;
- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) {
+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb))) {
ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name);
goto err;
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct packet_cb {
#define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer)
/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */
-static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head &&
(skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <=
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr
return 0;
}
+static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
+ return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol;
+}
+
static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_
size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len;
struct udphdr *udp;
- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol ||
+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) ||
skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head ||
(skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) >
skb_tail_pointer(skb)))
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */
- skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb);
+ skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr)))

35
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0093-wireguard-receive-remove-dead-code-from-default-pack.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 827489b9186ac53ed1e162c7d9b0f7b19d1a5995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:46 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 093/124] wireguard: receive: remove dead code from default
packet type case
commit 2b8765c52db24c0fbcc81bac9b5e8390f2c7d3c8 upstream.
The situation in which we wind up hitting the default case here
indicates a major bug in earlier parsing code. It is not a usual thing
that should ever happen, which means a "friendly" message for it doesn't
make sense. Rather, replace this with a WARN_ON, just like we do earlier
in the file for a similar situation, so that somebody sends us a bug
report and we can fix it.
Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -587,8 +587,7 @@ void wg_packet_receive(struct wg_device
wg_packet_consume_data(wg, skb);
break;
default:
- net_dbg_skb_ratelimited("%s: Invalid packet from %pISpfsc\n",
- wg->dev->name, skb);
+ WARN(1, "Non-exhaustive parsing of packet header lead to unknown packet type!\n");
goto err;
}
return;

224
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0094-wireguard-noise-error-out-precomputed-DH-during-hand.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
From 3c5c9d96cea67a8dc381e6ca0f5a894f1ce099ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:47 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 094/124] wireguard: noise: error out precomputed DH during
handshake rather than config
commit 11a7686aa99c7fe4b3f80f6dcccd54129817984d upstream.
We precompute the static-static ECDH during configuration time, in order
to save an expensive computation later when receiving network packets.
However, not all ECDH computations yield a contributory result. Prior,
we were just not letting those peers be added to the interface. However,
this creates a strange inconsistency, since it was still possible to add
other weird points, like a valid public key plus a low-order point, and,
like points that result in zeros, a handshake would not complete. In
order to make the behavior more uniform and less surprising, simply
allow all peers to be added. Then, we'll error out later when doing the
crypto if there's an issue. This also adds more separation between the
crypto layer and the configuration layer.
Discussed-with: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c | 8 +---
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 55 ++++++++++++----------
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h | 12 ++---
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 7 +--
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 15 ++++--
5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c
@@ -417,11 +417,7 @@ static int set_peer(struct wg_device *wg
peer = wg_peer_create(wg, public_key, preshared_key);
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
- /* Similar to the above, if the key is invalid, we skip
- * it without fanfare, so that services don't need to
- * worry about doing key validation themselves.
- */
- ret = PTR_ERR(peer) == -EKEYREJECTED ? 0 : PTR_ERR(peer);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(peer);
peer = NULL;
goto out;
}
@@ -575,7 +571,7 @@ static int wg_set_device(struct sk_buff
private_key);
list_for_each_entry_safe(peer, temp, &wg->peer_list,
peer_list) {
- BUG_ON(!wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer));
+ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer);
wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(peer);
}
wg_cookie_checker_precompute_device_keys(&wg->cookie_checker);
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -44,32 +44,23 @@ void __init wg_noise_init(void)
}
/* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */
-bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer)
+void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer)
{
- bool ret;
-
down_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
- if (peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity) {
- ret = curve25519(
- peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static,
+ if (!peer->handshake.static_identity->has_identity ||
+ !curve25519(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static,
peer->handshake.static_identity->static_private,
- peer->handshake.remote_static);
- } else {
- u8 empty[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
-
- ret = curve25519(empty, empty, peer->handshake.remote_static);
+ peer->handshake.remote_static))
memset(peer->handshake.precomputed_static_static, 0,
NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
- }
up_write(&peer->handshake.lock);
- return ret;
}
-bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
- struct wg_peer *peer)
+void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ struct wg_peer *peer)
{
memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(*handshake));
init_rwsem(&handshake->lock);
@@ -81,7 +72,7 @@ bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct nois
NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
handshake->static_identity = static_identity;
handshake->state = HANDSHAKE_ZEROED;
- return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer);
+ wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer);
}
static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake *handshake)
@@ -403,6 +394,19 @@ static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chain
return true;
}
+static bool __must_check mix_precomputed_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
+ u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 precomputed[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
+{
+ static u8 zero_point[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+ if (unlikely(!crypto_memneq(precomputed, zero_point, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN)))
+ return false;
+ kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, precomputed, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
+ NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
+ chaining_key);
+ return true;
+}
+
static void mix_hash(u8 hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const u8 *src, size_t src_len)
{
struct blake2s_state blake;
@@ -531,10 +535,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(str
NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key, handshake->hash);
/* ss */
- kdf(handshake->chaining_key, key, NULL,
- handshake->precomputed_static_static, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
- NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
- handshake->chaining_key);
+ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(handshake->chaining_key, key,
+ handshake->precomputed_static_static))
+ goto out;
/* {t} */
tai64n_now(timestamp);
@@ -595,9 +598,9 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(st
handshake = &peer->handshake;
/* ss */
- kdf(chaining_key, key, NULL, handshake->precomputed_static_static,
- NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
- chaining_key);
+ if (!mix_precomputed_dh(chaining_key, key,
+ handshake->precomputed_static_static))
+ goto out;
/* {t} */
if (!message_decrypt(t, src->encrypted_timestamp,
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h
@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ struct noise_handshake {
struct wg_device;
void wg_noise_init(void);
-bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
- struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
- const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
- const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
- struct wg_peer *peer);
+void wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
+ struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
+ const u8 peer_public_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
+ const u8 peer_preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
+ struct wg_peer *peer);
void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake *handshake);
static inline void wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(atomic64_t *handshake_ns)
{
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypai
void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
struct noise_static_identity *static_identity,
const u8 private_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
-bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer);
+void wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer *peer);
bool
wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation *dst,
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
@@ -34,11 +34,8 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg
return ERR_PTR(ret);
peer->device = wg;
- if (!wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity,
- public_key, preshared_key, peer)) {
- ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
- goto err_1;
- }
+ wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity,
+ public_key, preshared_key, peer);
if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL))
goto err_1;
if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false,
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -527,11 +527,16 @@ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips 0
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0,1700::/111,5000::/4,e000::/37,9000::/75
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" allowed-ips ::/0
n0 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" remove
-low_order_points=( AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38= )
-n0 wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
-[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
-n0 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") ${low_order_points[@]/#/peer }
-[[ -z $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
+for low_order_point in AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= 4Ot6fDtBuK4WVuP68Z/EatoJjeucMrH9hmIFFl9JuAA= X5yVvKNQjCSx0LFVnIPvWwREXMRYHI6G2CJO3dCfEVc= 7P///////////////////////////////////////38= 7f///////////////////////////////////////38= 7v///////////////////////////////////////38=; do
+ n0 wg set wg0 peer "$low_order_point" persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1111
+done
+[[ -n $(n0 wg show wg0 peers) ]]
+exec 4< <(n0 ncat -l -u -p 1111)
+ncat_pid=$!
+waitncatudp $netns0 $ncat_pid
+ip0 link set wg0 up
+! read -r -n 1 -t 2 <&4 || false
+kill $ncat_pid
ip0 link del wg0
declare -A objects

29
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0095-wireguard-send-remove-errant-newline-from-packet_enc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 271fd6b0c4c81b844b81bbf4dd49d9e1de2827c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:20 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 095/124] wireguard: send: remove errant newline from
packet_encrypt_worker
commit d6833e42786e050e7522d6a91a9361e54085897d upstream.
This commit removes a useless newline at the end of a scope, which
doesn't add anything in the way of organization or readability.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
@@ -304,7 +304,6 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor
}
wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first,
state);
-
}
}

35
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0096-wireguard-queueing-cleanup-ptr_ring-in-error-path-of.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 08d5c8fc96361389fdd982477aaf6d7c9311f5e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:21 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 096/124] wireguard: queueing: cleanup ptr_ring in error path
of packet_queue_init
commit 130c58606171326c81841a49cc913cd354113dd9 upstream.
Prior, if the alloc_percpu of packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc
failed, the previously allocated ptr_ring wouldn't be freed. This commit
adds the missing call to ptr_ring_cleanup in the error case.
Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c
@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu
if (multicore) {
queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(
function, queue);
- if (!queue->worker)
+ if (!queue->worker) {
+ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
} else {
INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function);
}

50
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0097-wireguard-receive-use-tunnel-helpers-for-decapsulati.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 274c356580ec1b077ad10212c59a05b6e0b90d97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Toke=20H=C3=B8iland-J=C3=B8rgensen?= <toke@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:59:22 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 097/124] wireguard: receive: use tunnel helpers for
decapsulating ECN markings
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit eebabcb26ea1e3295704477c6cd4e772c96a9559 upstream.
WireGuard currently only propagates ECN markings on tunnel decap according
to the old RFC3168 specification. However, the spec has since been updated
in RFC6040 to recommend slightly different decapsulation semantics. This
was implemented in the kernel as a set of common helpers for ECN
decapsulation, so let's just switch over WireGuard to using those, so it
can benefit from this enhancement and any future tweaks. We do not drop
packets with invalid ECN marking combinations, because WireGuard is
frequently used to work around broken ISPs, which could be doing that.
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Reported-by: Olivier Tilmans <olivier.tilmans@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Cc: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Cc: Rodney W. Grimes <ietf@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -393,13 +393,11 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(
len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr)))
goto dishonest_packet_size;
- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds))
- IP_ECN_set_ce(ip_hdr(skb));
+ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ip_hdr(skb)->tos);
} else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
- if (INET_ECN_is_ce(PACKET_CB(skb)->ds))
- IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb));
+ INET_ECN_decapsulate(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->ds, ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6_hdr(skb)));
} else {
goto dishonest_packet_type;
}

29
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0098-wireguard-selftests-use-normal-kernel-stack-size-on-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From abf11efb5187c0aaa57c37f36db035c840c9c90d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:02 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 098/124] wireguard: selftests: use normal kernel stack size on
ppc64
commit a0fd7cc87a018df1a17f9d3f0bd994c1f22c6b34 upstream.
While at some point it might have made sense to be running these tests
on ppc64 with 4k stacks, the kernel hasn't actually used 4k stacks on
64-bit powerpc in a long time, and more interesting things that we test
don't really work when we deviate from the default (16k). So, we stop
pushing our luck in this commit, and return to the default instead of
the minimum.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/arch/powerpc64le.config
@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y
CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1"
CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y
CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280
+CONFIG_THREAD_SHIFT=14

162
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0099-wireguard-socket-remove-errant-restriction-on-loopin.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
From 81676eb0adad9931279470559107f75741ba957c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:03 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 099/124] wireguard: socket: remove errant restriction on
looping to self
commit b673e24aad36981f327a6570412ffa7754de8911 upstream.
It's already possible to create two different interfaces and loop
packets between them. This has always been possible with tunnels in the
kernel, and isn't specific to wireguard. Therefore, the networking stack
already needs to deal with that. At the very least, the packet winds up
exceeding the MTU and is discarded at that point. So, since this is
already something that happens, there's no need to forbid the not very
exceptional case of routing a packet back to the same interface; this
loop is no different than others, and we shouldn't special case it, but
rather rely on generic handling of loops in general. This also makes it
easier to do interesting things with wireguard such as onion routing.
At the same time, we add a selftest for this, ensuring that both onion
routing works and infinite routing loops do not crash the kernel. We
also add a test case for wireguard interfaces nesting packets and
sending traffic between each other, as well as the loop in this case
too. We make sure to send some throughput-heavy traffic for this use
case, to stress out any possible recursion issues with the locks around
workqueues.
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c | 12 -----
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c
@@ -76,12 +76,6 @@ static int send4(struct wg_device *wg, s
net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n",
wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret);
goto err;
- } else if (unlikely(rt->dst.dev == skb->dev)) {
- ip_rt_put(rt);
- ret = -ELOOP;
- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n",
- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr);
- goto err;
}
if (cache)
dst_cache_set_ip4(cache, &rt->dst, fl.saddr);
@@ -149,12 +143,6 @@ static int send6(struct wg_device *wg, s
net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No route to %pISpfsc, error %d\n",
wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr, ret);
goto err;
- } else if (unlikely(dst->dev == skb->dev)) {
- dst_release(dst);
- ret = -ELOOP;
- net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Avoiding routing loop to %pISpfsc\n",
- wg->dev->name, &endpoint->addr);
- goto err;
}
if (cache)
dst_cache_set_ip6(cache, dst, &fl.saddr);
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/netns.sh
@@ -48,8 +48,11 @@ cleanup() {
exec 2>/dev/null
printf "$orig_message_cost" > /proc/sys/net/core/message_cost
ip0 link del dev wg0
+ ip0 link del dev wg1
ip1 link del dev wg0
+ ip1 link del dev wg1
ip2 link del dev wg0
+ ip2 link del dev wg1
local to_kill="$(ip netns pids $netns0) $(ip netns pids $netns1) $(ip netns pids $netns2)"
[[ -n $to_kill ]] && kill $to_kill
pp ip netns del $netns1
@@ -77,18 +80,20 @@ ip0 link set wg0 netns $netns2
key1="$(pp wg genkey)"
key2="$(pp wg genkey)"
key3="$(pp wg genkey)"
+key4="$(pp wg genkey)"
pub1="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key1")"
pub2="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key2")"
pub3="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key3")"
+pub4="$(pp wg pubkey <<<"$key4")"
psk="$(pp wg genpsk)"
[[ -n $key1 && -n $key2 && -n $psk ]]
configure_peers() {
ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg0
- ip1 addr add fd00::1/24 dev wg0
+ ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg0
ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg0
- ip2 addr add fd00::2/24 dev wg0
+ ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg0
n1 wg set wg0 \
private-key <(echo "$key1") \
@@ -230,9 +235,38 @@ n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key3")
n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32 peer "$pub1" remove
n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
+n2 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove
-ip1 link del wg0
+# Test that we can route wg through wg
+ip1 addr flush dev wg0
+ip2 addr flush dev wg0
+ip1 addr add fd00::5:1/112 dev wg0
+ip2 addr add fd00::5:2/112 dev wg0
+n1 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key1") peer "$pub2" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:2/128 endpoint 127.0.0.1:2
+n2 wg set wg0 private-key <(echo "$key2") listen-port 2 peer "$pub1" preshared-key <(echo "$psk") allowed-ips fd00::5:1/128 endpoint 127.212.121.99:9998
+ip1 link add wg1 type wireguard
+ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard
+ip1 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1
+ip1 addr add fd00::1/112 dev wg1
+ip2 addr add 192.168.241.2/24 dev wg1
+ip2 addr add fd00::2/112 dev wg1
+ip1 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1
+ip2 link set mtu 1340 up dev wg1
+n1 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key3") peer "$pub4" allowed-ips 192.168.241.2/32,fd00::2/128 endpoint [fd00::5:2]:5
+n2 wg set wg1 listen-port 5 private-key <(echo "$key4") peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.241.1/32,fd00::1/128 endpoint [fd00::5:1]:5
+tests
+# Try to set up a routing loop between the two namespaces
+ip1 link set netns $netns0 dev wg1
+ip0 addr add 192.168.241.1/24 dev wg1
+ip0 link set up dev wg1
+n0 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.2
+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" endpoint 192.168.241.2:7
ip2 link del wg0
+ip2 link del wg1
+! n0 ping -W 1 -c 10 -f 192.168.241.2 || false # Should not crash kernel
+
+ip0 link del wg1
+ip1 link del wg0
# Test using NAT. We now change the topology to this:
# ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
@@ -282,6 +316,20 @@ pp sleep 3
n2 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.241.1
n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub2" persistent-keepalive 0
+# Test that onion routing works, even when it loops
+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" allowed-ips 192.168.242.2/32 endpoint 192.168.241.2:5
+ip1 addr add 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0
+ip2 link add wg1 type wireguard
+ip2 addr add 192.168.242.2/24 dev wg1
+n2 wg set wg1 private-key <(echo "$key3") listen-port 5 peer "$pub1" allowed-ips 192.168.242.1/32
+ip2 link set wg1 up
+n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2
+ip2 link del wg1
+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" endpoint 192.168.242.2:5
+! n1 ping -W 1 -c 1 192.168.242.2 || false # Should not crash kernel
+n1 wg set wg0 peer "$pub3" remove
+ip1 addr del 192.168.242.1/24 dev wg0
+
# Do a wg-quick(8)-style policy routing for the default route, making sure vethc has a v6 address to tease out bugs.
ip1 -6 addr add fc00::9/96 dev vethc
ip1 -6 route add default via fc00::1

58
target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0100-wireguard-send-receive-cond_resched-when-processing-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 3943211e0997b04f1e2ca1a6624391cc72a176bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 15:33:04 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 100/124] wireguard: send/receive: cond_resched() when
processing worker ringbuffers
commit 4005f5c3c9d006157ba716594e0d70c88a235c5e upstream.
Users with pathological hardware reported CPU stalls on CONFIG_
PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y, because the ringbuffers would stay full, meaning
these workers would never terminate. That turned out not to be okay on
systems without forced preemption, which Sultan observed. This commit
adds a cond_resched() to the bottom of each loop iteration, so that
these workers don't hog the core. Note that we don't need this on the
napi poll worker, since that terminates after its budget is expended.
Suggested-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reported-by: Wang Jian <larkwang@gmail.com>
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 2 ++
drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -516,6 +516,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor
&PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ?
PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD;
wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state);
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
}
}
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
@@ -281,6 +281,8 @@ void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_str
wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false);
wg_peer_put(peer);
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
}
}
@@ -304,6 +306,8 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor
}
wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first,
state);
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
}
}

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