openwrt/package/libs/mbedtls/patches/200-config.patch

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--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -658,14 +658,14 @@
*
* Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
+//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
*
* Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
+//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -782,19 +782,19 @@
*
* Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@
*
* Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@
* See dhm.h for more details.
*
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
* MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@
* This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and
* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used.
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1320,14 +1320,14 @@
* Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA.
*
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
*
* Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test).
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
+//#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@
*
* Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256.
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@
* configuration of this extension).
*
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@
*
* Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -1745,7 +1745,7 @@
*
* Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
+//#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2075,7 +2075,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
* MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@
* This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are
* enabled as well.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2153,7 +2153,7 @@
*
* This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server).
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@
*
* Module: library/chacha20.c
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2173,7 +2173,7 @@
*
* This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2232,7 +2232,7 @@
*
* This module provides debugging functions.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_DES_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2261,7 +2261,7 @@
* \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2424,7 +2424,7 @@
* This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code
* (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF).
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2438,7 +2438,7 @@
*
* Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@
*
* This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@
* Module: library/poly1305.c
* Caller: library/chachapoly.c
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2755,7 +2755,7 @@
* Caller: library/md.c
*
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@
*
* This module provides run-time version information.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
mbedtls: update to 2.16.7 Mbed TLS 2.16.7 is a maintenance release of the Mbed TLS 2.16 branch, and provides bug fixes and minor enhancements. This release includes fixes for security issues and the most severe one is described in more detail in a security advisory: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). Due to Mbed TLS moving from ARMmbed to the Trusted Firmware project, some changes to the download URLs are required. For the time being, the ARMmbed/mbedtls Github repository is the canonical source for Mbed TLS. Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com> [Use https://codeload.github.com and new tar.gz file] Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de (cherry picked from commit 201d6776a0b5858b8ce43a2392c9fe48aa1c4dd7)
2020-07-25 14:19:28 +02:00
@@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@
* Module: library/xtea.c
* Caller:
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C
/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */