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haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.19 

- Update haproxy download URL and hash

Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Lachner 2019-02-12 08:56:12 +01:00
parent f9b16dea51
commit b8d3db6fec
16 changed files with 4 additions and 744 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
net/haproxy/Makefile
View File

@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.17
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.19
PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
PKG_HASH:=7b789b177875afdd5ddeff058e7efde73aa895dc2dcf728b464358635ae3948e
PKG_HASH:=64f5fbfd4e09ffeaf26cb6667398ba780704a14e96e60000caa8bf69962ba734
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0

2
net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
CLONEURL=http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-1.8.git
BASE_TAG=v1.8.17
BASE_TAG=v1.8.19
TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo
PATCHESDIR=patches

38
net/haproxy/patches/000-DOC-http-request-cache-use-http-response-cache-store-expects-cache-name.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
commit 6648ff0cccee04a6a0c0e64050151b5d6c5bac51
Author: Jarno Huuskonen <jarno.huuskonen@uef.fi>
Date: Fri Jan 4 14:05:02 2019 +0200
DOC: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store expects cache name
Adds missing cache name option to http-request cache-use and
http-response cache-store documentation.
Also adds optional if/unless condition to
10.2.2. Proxy section: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store
(cherry picked from commit 251a6b72a8b6f0a4b167f6a2960e422d682aed80)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 5376f6af9239fdf8a79b6c912387de12e3c9d6cd)
[wla: no http-request/response section in 1.8]
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index 4f999e25..712e56e2 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -17157,13 +17157,13 @@ max-age <seconds>
10.2.2. Proxy section
---------------------
-http-request cache-use <name>
+http-request cache-use <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
Try to deliver a cached object from the cache <name>. This directive is also
mandatory to store the cache as it calculates the cache hash. If you want to
use a condition for both storage and delivering that's a good idea to put it
after this one.
-http-response cache-store <name>
+http-response cache-store <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
Store an http-response within the cache. The storage of the response headers
is done at this step, which means you can use others http-response actions
to modify headers before or after the storage of the response. This action

0
net/haproxy/patches/013-deprecated-openssl.patch → net/haproxy/patches/000-deprecated-openssl.patch
View File

91
net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MAJOR-cache-fix-confusion-between-zero-and-uninitialized-cache-key.patch
View File

@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
commit a64e5574e40e3e0819c82e35a7e3d2fa65febc73
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Fri Jan 11 19:38:25 2019 +0100
BUG/MAJOR: cache: fix confusion between zero and uninitialized cache key
The cache uses the first 32 bits of the uri's hash as the key to reference
the object in the cache. It makes a special case of the value zero to mean
that the object is not in the cache anymore. The problem is that when an
object hashes as zero, it's still inserted but the eb32_delete() call is
skipped, resulting in the object still being chained in the memory area
while the block has been reclaimed and used for something else. Then when
objects which were chained below it (techically any object since zero is
at the root) are deleted, the walk through the upper object may encounter
corrupted values where valid pointers were expected.
But while this should only happen statically once on 4 billion, the problem
gets worse when the cache-use conditions don't match the cache-store ones,
because cache-store runs with an uninitialized key, which can create objects
that will never be found by the lookup code, or worse, entries with a zero
key preventing eviction of the tree node and resulting in a crash. It's easy
to accidently end up on such a config because the request rules generally
can't be used to decide on the response :
http-request cache-use cache if { path_beg /images }
http-response cache-store cache
In this test, mixing traffic with /images/$RANDOM and /foo/$RANDOM will
result in random keys being inserted, some of them possibly being zero,
and crashes will quickly happen.
The fix consists in 1) always initializing the transaction's cache_hash
to zero, and 2) never storing a response for which the hash has not been
calculated, as indicated by the value zero.
It is worth noting that objects hashing as value zero will never be cached,
but given that there's only one chance among 4 billion that this happens,
this is totally harmless.
This fix must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit c9036c00044a8d81561113886ecec9a9ce71bd3b)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 5a6279fcc16da479304bcabc1705e8653f274337)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
index 667cede3..3d8ed241 100644
--- a/src/cache.c
+++ b/src/cache.c
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
struct cache *cache = (struct cache *)rule->arg.act.p[0];
struct shared_context *shctx = shctx_ptr(cache);
struct cache_entry *object;
-
+ unsigned int key = *(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash;
/* Don't cache if the response came from a cache */
if ((obj_type(s->target) == OBJ_TYPE_APPLET) &&
@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
if (txn->meth != HTTP_METH_GET)
goto out;
+ /* cache key was not computed */
+ if (!key)
+ goto out;
+
/* cache only 200 status code */
if (txn->status != 200)
goto out;
@@ -478,7 +482,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
cache_ctx->first_block = first;
- object->eb.key = (*(unsigned int *)&txn->cache_hash);
+ object->eb.key = key;
memcpy(object->hash, txn->cache_hash, sizeof(object->hash));
/* Insert the node later on caching success */
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 7e4a8351..29a1083a 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -8210,6 +8210,7 @@ void http_init_txn(struct stream *s)
txn->flags = 0;
txn->status = -1;
+ *(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash = 0;
txn->cookie_first_date = 0;
txn->cookie_last_date = 0;

32
net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Disable-anti-replay-protection-and-set-max-data-with-0RTT.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 9f01534cd68de78c74b50d7b8def07a72c2a3b49
Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
Date: Wed Jan 2 18:46:41 2019 +0100
BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Disable anti-replay protection and set max data with 0RTT.
When using early data, disable the OpenSSL anti-replay protection, and set
the max amount of early data we're ready to accept, based on the size of
buffers, or early data won't work with the released OpenSSL 1.1.1.
This should be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 51088ce68fee0bae52118d6823873417046f9efe)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 6703b633078b6bae12395ee3e310427b37965d68)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 24ccc4b1..11655533 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -3821,6 +3821,10 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
+ if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite);
+ }
SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
#else

32
net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-Be-a-bit-more-explicit-about-allow-0rtt-security-implications.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit aca7e5aed7e036489ccc83d925103e94653b8670
Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
Date: Tue Jan 8 15:35:32 2019 +0100
DOC: Be a bit more explicit about allow-0rtt security implications.
Document a bit better than allow-0rtt can trivially be used for replay attacks,
and so should only be used when it's safe to replay a request.
This should probably be backported to 1.8 and 1.9.
(cherry picked from commit 69752964944ef9c8dc03477ee95bc7d149a72089)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit bb0df71201ad5b2d0cec514773d244275e5240df)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index 712e56e2..72b769a4 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -10483,7 +10483,10 @@ accept-proxy
allow-0rtt
Allow receiving early data when using TLSv1.3. This is disabled by default,
- due to security considerations.
+ due to security considerations. Because it is vulnerable to replay attacks,
+ you should only allow if for requests that are safe to replay, ie requests
+ that are idempotent. You can use the "wait-for-handshake" action for any
+ request that wouldn't be safe with early data.
alpn <protocols>
This enables the TLS ALPN extension and advertises the specified protocol

77
net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-missing-allocation-failure-checks-loading-tls-key-file.patch
View File

@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
commit 30cd01cbfd40201f3abe246216a85c69352aa79c
Author: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
Date: Thu Jan 10 10:51:13 2019 +0100
BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: missing allocation failure checks loading tls key file
This patch fixes missing allocation checks loading tls key file
and avoid memory leak in some error cases.
This patch should be backport on branches 1.9 and 1.8
(cherry picked from commit 09852f70e0ed0f23cf9287b1ce55bb6a60112f32)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit a1dc55a63cfbc8f440b72b6def3957bf1fad12b2)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 11655533..7884c411 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -7627,15 +7627,36 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
}
keys_ref = malloc(sizeof(*keys_ref));
+ if (!keys_ref) {
+ if (err)
+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
+ }
+
keys_ref->tlskeys = malloc(TLS_TICKETS_NO * sizeof(struct tls_sess_key));
+ if (!keys_ref->tlskeys) {
+ free(keys_ref);
+ if (err)
+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
+ }
if ((f = fopen(args[cur_arg + 1], "r")) == NULL) {
+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
+ free(keys_ref);
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to load ssl tickets keys file", args[cur_arg+1]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
keys_ref->filename = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
+ if (!keys_ref->filename) {
+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
+ free(keys_ref);
+ if (err)
+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
+ }
while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) {
int len = strlen(thisline);
@@ -7647,6 +7668,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
thisline[--len] = 0;
if (base64dec(thisline, len, (char *) (keys_ref->tlskeys + i % TLS_TICKETS_NO), sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) {
+ free(keys_ref->filename);
+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
+ free(keys_ref);
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to decode base64 key on line %d", args[cur_arg+1], i + 1);
fclose(f);
@@ -7656,6 +7680,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
}
if (i < TLS_TICKETS_NO) {
+ free(keys_ref->filename);
+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
+ free(keys_ref);
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : please supply at least %d keys in the tls-tickets-file", args[cur_arg+1], TLS_TICKETS_NO);
fclose(f);

37
net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MINOR-backend-dont-use-url_param_name-as-a-hint-for-BE_LB_ALGO_PH.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
commit 98f9549fa466e3b73a04f17dbc05fd88427c72f4
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Mon Jan 14 15:17:46 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: backend: don't use url_param_name as a hint for BE_LB_ALGO_PH
At a few places in the code we used to rely on this variable to guess
what LB algo was in place. This is wrong because if the defaults section
presets "balance url_param foo" and a backend uses "balance roundrobin",
these locations will still see this url_param_name set and consider it.
The harm is limited, as this only causes the beginning of the request
body to be buffered. And in general this is a bad practice which prevents
us from cleaning the lbprm stuff. Let's explicitly check the LB algo
instead.
This may be backported to all currently maintained versions.
(cherry picked from commit 089eaa0ba73913187e93d52c3ea34faa01fd8f9c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 70d1744bb41daab4110071e4855504b6dc47bda9)
[wla: no htx in 1.8]
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 29a1083a..5dc562ff 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -3935,7 +3935,8 @@ int http_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
* that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
*/
if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
- s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
+ s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST &&
+ (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_ALGO) == BE_LB_ALGO_PH &&
(msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
channel_dont_connect(req);
req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;

49
net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MINOR-backend-balance-uri-specific-options-were-lost-across-defaults.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
commit a5027f804144536f79829443b33e6c19c32b690a
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Mon Jan 14 16:29:52 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: backend: balance uri specific options were lost across defaults
The "balance uri" options "whole", "len" and "depth" were not properly
inherited from the defaults sections. In addition, "whole" and "len"
were not even reset when parsing "uri", meaning that 2 subsequent
"balance uri" statements would not have the expected effect as the
options from the first one would remain for the second one.
This may be backported to all maintained versions.
(cherry picked from commit 602a499da5e81d6b4cfe8410f0fc6d53c1e06745)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit f00758fde5961e3bebc508852faeee4d9d80b0e0)
[wla: cfg_parse_listen() is still in cfgparse.c in 1.8]
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
index 87327f19..4c4044a6 100644
--- a/src/backend.c
+++ b/src/backend.c
@@ -1516,6 +1516,8 @@ int backend_parse_balance(const char **args, char **err, struct proxy *curproxy)
curproxy->lbprm.algo |= BE_LB_ALGO_UH;
curproxy->uri_whole = 0;
+ curproxy->uri_len_limit = 0;
+ curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = 0;
while (*args[arg]) {
if (!strcmp(args[arg], "len")) {
diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
index 94f29637..91bb802e 100644
--- a/src/cfgparse.c
+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
@@ -2844,7 +2844,10 @@ int cfg_parse_listen(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm)
if (defproxy.url_param_name)
curproxy->url_param_name = strdup(defproxy.url_param_name);
- curproxy->url_param_len = defproxy.url_param_len;
+ curproxy->url_param_len = defproxy.url_param_len;
+ curproxy->uri_whole = defproxy.uri_whole;
+ curproxy->uri_len_limit = defproxy.uri_len_limit;
+ curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = defproxy.uri_dirs_depth1;
if (defproxy.hh_name)
curproxy->hh_name = strdup(defproxy.hh_name);

100
net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MINOR-backend-BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE-is-a-value-not-a-bit.patch
View File

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
commit 7c6a6149a91d2e240a5a63f981c5d07d681df725
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Mon Jan 14 17:07:39 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: backend: BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE is a value, not a bit
There are a few instances where the lookup algo is tested against
BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE using a binary "AND" operation while this macro
is a value among a set, and not a bit. The test happens to work
because the value is exactly 4 and no bit overlaps with the other
possible values but this is a latent bug waiting for a new LB algo
to appear to strike. At the moment the only other algo sharing a bit
with it is the "first" algo which is never supported in the same code
places.
This fix should be backported to maintained versions for safety if it
passes easily, otherwise it's not important as it will not fix any
visible issue.
(cherry picked from commit 6c30be52da3d949a8dd6fb5e2de7319c031e656e)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 48147c424680b7e887fb176662d58d87baa16098)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
index 4c4044a6..0cf14cfd 100644
--- a/src/backend.c
+++ b/src/backend.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_sh(struct proxy *px, const char *addr, int len,
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
h = full_hash(h);
hash_done:
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, h, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, h);
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_uh(struct proxy *px, char *uri, int uri_len, co
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
hash = full_hash(hash);
hash_done:
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph(struct proxy *px, const char *uri, int uri_l
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
hash = full_hash(hash);
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph_post(struct stream *s, const struct server *
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
hash = full_hash(hash);
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_hh(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoid
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
hash = full_hash(hash);
hash_done:
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_rch(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoi
if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
hash = full_hash(hash);
hash_done:
- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
else
return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
case BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE:
case BE_LB_LKUP_MAP:
if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_KIND) == BE_LB_KIND_RR) {
- if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
else
srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
* back to round robin on the map.
*/
if (!srv) {
- if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
else
srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);

66
net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MINOR-stick_table-Prevent-conn_cur-from-underflowing.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
commit 93b3994091b5bd17b43c9d91ecae470d33157e25
Author: Tim Duesterhus <tim@bastelstu.be>
Date: Fri Jan 4 00:11:59 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: stick_table: Prevent conn_cur from underflowing
When using the peers feature a race condition could prevent
a connection from being properly counted. When this connection
exits it is being "uncounted" nonetheless, leading to a possible
underflow (-1) of the conn_curr stick table entry in the following
scenario :
- Connect to peer A (A=1, B=0)
- Peer A sends 1 to B (A=1, B=1)
- Kill connection to A (A=0, B=1)
- Connect to peer B (A=0, B=2)
- Peer A sends 0 to B (A=0, B=0)
- Peer B sends 0/2 to A (A=?, B=0)
- Kill connection to B (A=?, B=-1)
- Peer B sends -1 to A (A=-1, B=-1)
This fix may be backported to all supported branches.
(cherry picked from commit 8b87c01c4d59247d9fb51a38cd12d5d94324b6a4)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 4ceecc8a4ee6f46f20c7729056e14af5a8757121)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/include/proto/session.h b/include/proto/session.h
index f48c0d4f..7265f5a7 100644
--- a/include/proto/session.h
+++ b/include/proto/session.h
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static inline void session_store_counters(struct session *sess)
if (ptr) {
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
diff --git a/include/proto/stream.h b/include/proto/stream.h
index 8521957e..c9bcac37 100644
--- a/include/proto/stream.h
+++ b/include/proto/stream.h
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static inline void stream_store_counters(struct stream *s)
if (ptr) {
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
@@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void stream_stop_content_counters(struct stream *s)
if (ptr) {
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);

67
net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-server-dont-always-trust-srv_check_health-when-loading-a-server-state.patch
View File

@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
commit 1c95076d881b7508a8d0819b1cfd642e364b255c
Author: Jérôme Magnin <jmagnin@haproxy.com>
Date: Sun Jan 20 11:27:40 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: server: don't always trust srv_check_health when loading a server state
When we load health values from a server state file, make sure what we assign
to srv->check.health actually matches the state we restore.
This should be backported as far as 1.6.
(cherry picked from commit f57afa453a685cfd92b7a27ef6e6035cb384ff57)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 75455a0b78ce4ac723698df26c014b38467843b1)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index a86db3db..28414780 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -2843,16 +2843,37 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
HA_SPIN_LOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
/* recover operational state and apply it to this server
* and all servers tracking this one */
+ srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
switch (srv_op_state) {
case SRV_ST_STOPPED:
srv->check.health = 0;
srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
break;
case SRV_ST_STARTING:
+ /* If rise == 1 there is no STARTING state, let's switch to
+ * RUNNING
+ */
+ if (srv->check.rise == 1) {
+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
+ srv_set_running(srv, "", NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (srv->check.health < 1 || srv->check.health >= srv->check.rise)
+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise - 1;
srv->next_state = srv_op_state;
break;
case SRV_ST_STOPPING:
- srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
+ /* If fall == 1 there is no STOPPING state, let's switch to
+ * STOPPED
+ */
+ if (srv->check.fall == 1) {
+ srv->check.health = 0;
+ srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (srv->check.health < srv->check.rise ||
+ srv->check.health > srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 2)
+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise;
srv_set_stopping(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
break;
case SRV_ST_RUNNING:
@@ -2906,7 +2927,6 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
srv->last_change = date.tv_sec - srv_last_time_change;
srv->check.status = srv_check_status;
srv->check.result = srv_check_result;
- srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
/* Only case we want to apply is removing ENABLED flag which could have been
* done by the "disable health" command over the stats socket

43
net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MINOR-check-Wake-the-check-task-if-the-check-is-finished-in-wake_srv_chk.patch
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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
commit 7a74ffef9f356304b46ab862858cead85d451b5f
Author: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon Jan 21 14:15:50 2019 +0100
BUG/MINOR: check: Wake the check task if the check is finished in wake_srv_chk()
With tcp-check, the result of the check is set by the function tcpcheck_main()
from the I/O layer. So it is important to wake up the check task to handle the
result and finish the check. Otherwise, we will wait the task timeout to handle
the result of a tcp-check, delaying the next check by as much.
This patch also fixes a problem about email alerts reported by PiBa-NL (Pieter)
on the ML [1] on all versions since the 1.6. So this patch must be backported
from 1.9 to 1.6.
[1] https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg32190.html
(cherry picked from commit 774c486cece942570b6a9d16afe236a16ee12079)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 3722dfbbfadf8f83f82feb3e67fbe482a5c94840)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
index 74958b2d..e04f1146 100644
--- a/src/checks.c
+++ b/src/checks.c
@@ -1403,12 +1403,13 @@ static int wake_srv_chk(struct conn_stream *cs)
}
if (check->result != CHK_RES_UNKNOWN) {
- /* We're here because nobody wants to handle the error, so we
- * sure want to abort the hard way.
- */
+ /* Check complete or aborted. If connection not yet closed do it
+ * now and wake the check task up to be sure the result is
+ * handled ASAP. */
conn_sock_drain(conn);
cs_close(cs);
ret = -1;
+ task_wakeup(check->task, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
}
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &check->server->lock);

58
net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Fix-handling-of-TLS-1-3-KeyUpdate-messages.patch
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
commit b68a427a236e7b9b0cf8b1c4a5360d960cdf9458
Author: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
Date: Mon Jan 21 09:35:03 2019 -0800
BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Fix handling of TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages
In OpenSSL 1.1.1 TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will trigger the callback
that is used to verify renegotiation is disabled. This means that these
KeyUpdate messages fail. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 a better mechanism is
available with the SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag that disables any TLS
1.2 and earlier negotiation.
So if this SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag is available, instead of having
a manual check, trust OpenSSL and disable the check. This means that TLS
1.3 KeyUpdate messages will work properly.
Reported-By: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
(cherry picked from commit 526894ff3925d272c13e57926aa6b5d9d8ed5ee3)
[wt: gh issue #24; Needs to be backported till 1.8]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 062c5a190d50c4aa9c5bde88c8c5c85c5f15fc7b)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 7884c411..7736c324 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -1406,6 +1406,10 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
BIO *write_bio;
(void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
+#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+ /* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't
+ * change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro!
+ */
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
/* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_CONNECTED | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == CO_FL_CONNECTED) {
@@ -1413,6 +1417,7 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
}
}
+#endif
if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
@@ -3806,6 +3811,11 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH)
options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+ options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+#endif
+
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC)

50
net/haproxy/patches/012-DOC-mention-the-effect-of-nf_conntrack_tcp_loose-on-src-dst.patch
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@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
commit 2e405726a0c6be6617905522bde9038f75e623c4
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Wed Jan 23 10:02:15 2019 +0100
DOC: mention the effect of nf_conntrack_tcp_loose on src/dst
On rare occasions the logs may report inverted src/dst when using
conntrack with this sysctl. Add a mention for it in the doc. More
info here :
https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg544878.html
(cherry picked from commit 64ded3db2c686bad582cf9bb9fcabf21cb4becb7)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 037f9ac4a2cc4b344859af1cff7b30d5ecabe9e0)
Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index 72b769a4..bc8ae4f8 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -13822,7 +13822,12 @@ dst : ip
which is the address the client connected to. It can be useful when running
in transparent mode. It is of type IP and works on both IPv4 and IPv6 tables.
On IPv6 tables, IPv4 address is mapped to its IPv6 equivalent, according to
- RFC 4291.
+ RFC 4291. When the incoming connection passed through address translation or
+ redirection involving connection tracking, the original destination address
+ before the redirection will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and
+ destination may seldom appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl
+ is set, because a late response may reopen a timed out connection and switch
+ what is believed to be the source and the destination.
dst_conn : integer
Returns an integer value corresponding to the number of currently established
@@ -14127,7 +14132,13 @@ src : ip
behind a proxy. However if the "accept-proxy" or "accept-netscaler-cip" bind
directive is used, it can be the address of a client behind another
PROXY-protocol compatible component for all rule sets except
- "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address.
+ "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address. When the incoming
+ connection passed through address translation or redirection involving
+ connection tracking, the original destination address before the redirection
+ will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and destination may seldom
+ appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl is set, because a late
+ response may reopen a timed out connection and switch what is believed to be
+ the source and the destination.
Example:
# add an HTTP header in requests with the originating address' country