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ipmitool: fix CVE-2020-5208 

All patches has been applied upstream.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
This commit is contained in:
Alexander Couzens 2020-06-06 03:30:37 +02:00
parent ec0b891b62
commit b2a9219f73
7 changed files with 488 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
admin/ipmitool/Makefile
View File

@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=ipmitool
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.18
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_RELEASE:=4
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@SF/$(PKG_NAME)
PKG_HASH:=0c1ba3b1555edefb7c32ae8cd6a3e04322056bc087918f07189eeedfc8b81e01
PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-3-clause
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:ipmitool_project:ipmitool
include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk

128
admin/ipmitool/patches/0006-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
From 960dbb956d9f9cb05b719087faed53c88dc80956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:33:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of
requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not
respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the
unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is
larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer.
The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function.
---
lib/ipmi_fru.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
index cf00effc82a2..af99aa99444c 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
@@ -615,7 +615,10 @@ int
read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
{
- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
+ uint32_t off = offset;
+ uint32_t tmp;
+ uint32_t finish;
+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
struct ipmi_rq req;
uint8_t msg_data[4];
@@ -628,10 +631,12 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
finish = offset + length;
if (finish > fru->size) {
+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
finish = fru->size;
lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
"Adjusting to %d",
offset + length, finish - offset);
+ length = finish - offset;
}
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
@@ -667,6 +672,7 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
}
}
+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
do {
tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
msg_data[0] = id;
@@ -707,9 +713,18 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
}
tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
+ {
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
memcpy(frubuf, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
off += tmp;
frubuf += tmp;
+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
/* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
* is too large. return 0 so higher level function
* still attempts to parse what was returned */
@@ -742,7 +757,9 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
{
static uint32_t fru_data_rqst_size = 20;
- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
+ uint32_t off = offset;
+ uint32_t tmp, finish;
+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
struct ipmi_rq req;
uint8_t msg_data[4];
@@ -755,10 +772,12 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
finish = offset + length;
if (finish > fru->size) {
+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
finish = fru->size;
lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
"Adjusting to %d",
offset + length, finish - offset);
+ length = finish - offset;
}
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
@@ -773,6 +792,8 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
if (fru->access && fru_data_rqst_size > 16)
#endif
fru_data_rqst_size = 16;
+
+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
do {
tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
msg_data[0] = id;
@@ -804,8 +825,16 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
}
tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
+ {
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy((frubuf + off)-offset, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
off += tmp;
+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
/* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
* is too large. return 0 so higher level function
--
2.27.0

48
admin/ipmitool/patches/0007-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 910e5782b7d9f222d4e34d3505d0d636ff757103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:44:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_spd_print_fru
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `ipmi_spd_print_fru` function has a similar issue as the one fixed
by the previous commit in `read_fru_area_section`. An initial request is
made to get the `fru.size`, which is used as the size for the allocation
of `spd_data`. Inside a loop, further requests are performed to get the
copy sizes which are not checked before being used as the size for a
copy into the buffer.
---
lib/dimm_spd.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/dimm_spd.c b/lib/dimm_spd.c
index 41e30dbb4bda..68f3b4fa1eff 100644
--- a/lib/dimm_spd.c
+++ b/lib/dimm_spd.c
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id)
struct ipmi_rq req;
struct fru_info fru;
uint8_t *spd_data, msg_data[4];
- int len, offset;
+ uint32_t len, offset;
msg_data[0] = id;
@@ -1697,6 +1697,13 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id)
}
len = rsp->data[0];
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
+ || len > rsp->data_len - 1
+ || len > fru.size - offset)
+ {
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(&spd_data[offset], rsp->data + 1, len);
offset += len;
} while (offset < fru.size);
--
2.27.0

48
admin/ipmitool/patches/0008-CVE-2020-5208-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 4f7778ed232a92bde388f38917b94f458a82c78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:51:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 08/11] session: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_get_session_info
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `ipmi_get_session_info` function does not properly check the
response `data_len`, which is used as a copy size, allowing stack buffer
overflow.
---
lib/ipmi_session.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_session.c b/lib/ipmi_session.c
index 141f0f4ec8dd..b9af1fd75d40 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_session.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_session.c
@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf,
}
else
{
- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
+ print_session_info(&session_info,
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
}
break;
@@ -341,8 +343,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf,
break;
}
- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
+ print_session_info(&session_info,
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
} while (i <= session_info.session_slot_count);
break;
--
2.27.0

37
admin/ipmitool/patches/0009-CVE-2020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 743dd4faa302f22950e4438cf684e1e398eb47eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:56:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 09/11] channel: Fix buffer overflow
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check
the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow
on the final copy.
---
lib/ipmi_channel.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_channel.c b/lib/ipmi_channel.c
index fab2e5483d12..8cd7c59a4273 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_channel.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_channel.c
@@ -413,7 +413,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ipmi_intf *intf, const char *payload_type,
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites");
return -1;
}
- if (rsp->ccode > 0) {
+ if (rsp->ccode
+ || rsp->data_len < 1
+ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + 0x10)
+ {
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s",
val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals));
return -1;
--
2.27.0

88
admin/ipmitool/patches/0010-CVE-2020-5208-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From e048e9c65a52f0879d482531e70735c1d314d43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:06:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] lanp: Fix buffer overflows in get_lan_param_select
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `get_lan_param_select` function is missing a validation check on the
response’s `data_len`, which it then returns to caller functions, where
stack buffer overflow can occur.
---
lib/ipmi_lanp.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
index 65d881bc5890..022c7f1605ed 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
/* set new ipaddr */
memcpy(data+3, temp, 4);
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d IP Address to %d.%d.%d.%d\n", alert,
@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
/* set new macaddr */
memcpy(data+7, temp, 6);
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d MAC Address to "
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "def", 3) == 0 ||
strncasecmp(argv[1], "default", 7) == 0) {
@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "on", 2) == 0 ||
strncasecmp(argv[1], "yes", 3) == 0) {
@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "pet", 3) == 0) {
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d destination to PET Trap\n", alert);
@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[2]) != 0) {
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid time: %s", argv[1]);
@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert,
if (p == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[3]) != 0) {
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid retry: %s", argv[1]);
--
2.27.0

137
admin/ipmitool/patches/0011-CVE-2020-5208-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
From 98b47424cf548f58c4d295fa8235210406ea85ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:13:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] fru, sdr: Fix id_string buffer overflows
Final part of the fixes for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
9 variants of stack buffer overflow when parsing `id_string` field of
SDR records returned from `CMD_GET_SDR` command.
SDR record structs have an `id_code` field, and an `id_string` `char`
array.
The length of `id_string` is calculated as `(id_code & 0x1f) + 1`,
which can be larger than expected 16 characters (if `id_code = 0xff`,
then length will be `(0xff & 0x1f) + 1 = 32`).
In numerous places, this can cause stack buffer overflow when copying
into fixed buffer of size `17` bytes from this calculated length.
---
lib/ipmi_fru.c | 2 +-
lib/ipmi_sdr.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
index af99aa99444c..98bc9840955a 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@ ipmi_fru_print(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct sdr_record_fru_locator * fru)
return 0;
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(desc));
- memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, fru->id_code & 0x01f);
+ memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, __min(fru->id_code & 0x01f, sizeof(desc)));
desc[fru->id_code & 0x01f] = 0;
printf("FRU Device Description : %s (ID %d)\n", desc, fru->device_id);
diff --git a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
index 2a9cbe3087af..62aac08a9002 100644
--- a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
+++ b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
@@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_eventonly(struct ipmi_intf *intf,
return -1;
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
- snprintf(desc, (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", sensor->id_string);
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, sensor->id_string);
if (verbose) {
printf("Sensor ID : %s (0x%x)\n",
@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_mc_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf,
return -1;
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
- snprintf(desc, (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", mc->id_string);
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, mc->id_string);
if (verbose == 0) {
if (csv_output)
@@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_generic_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf,
char desc[17];
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
- snprintf(desc, (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", dev->id_string);
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, dev->id_string);
if (!verbose) {
if (csv_output)
@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_fru_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf,
char desc[17];
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
- snprintf(desc, (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", fru->id_string);
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, fru->id_string);
if (!verbose) {
if (csv_output)
@@ -2489,35 +2489,43 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_name_from_rawentry(struct ipmi_intf *intf, uint16_t id,
int rc =0;
char desc[17];
+ const char *id_string;
+ uint8_t id_code;
memset(desc, ' ', sizeof (desc));
switch ( type) {
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_FULL_SENSOR:
record.full = (struct sdr_record_full_sensor *) raw;
- snprintf(desc, (record.full->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
- (const char *)record.full->id_string);
+ id_code = record.full->id_code;
+ id_string = record.full->id_string;
break;
+
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_COMPACT_SENSOR:
record.compact = (struct sdr_record_compact_sensor *) raw ;
- snprintf(desc, (record.compact->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
- (const char *)record.compact->id_string);
+ id_code = record.compact->id_code;
+ id_string = record.compact->id_string;
break;
+
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_EVENTONLY_SENSOR:
record.eventonly = (struct sdr_record_eventonly_sensor *) raw ;
- snprintf(desc, (record.eventonly->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
- (const char *)record.eventonly->id_string);
- break;
+ id_code = record.eventonly->id_code;
+ id_string = record.eventonly->id_string;
+ break;
+
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_MC_DEVICE_LOCATOR:
record.mcloc = (struct sdr_record_mc_locator *) raw ;
- snprintf(desc, (record.mcloc->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
- (const char *)record.mcloc->id_string);
+ id_code = record.mcloc->id_code;
+ id_string = record.mcloc->id_string;
break;
+
default:
rc = -1;
- break;
- }
+ }
+ if (!rc) {
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (id_code & 0x1f) + 1, id_string);
+ }
- lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
+ lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
return rc;
}
--
2.27.0