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haproxy: update to version 1.9 patch 02
- BUILD: fix "make install" to support spaces in the install dirs - BUG/MEDIUM: checks: fix conflicts between agent checks and ssl healthchecks - BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: fix bad ssl context init can cause segfault in case of OOM. - BUG/MINOR: samples: fix unnecessary memcopy converting binary to string. - BUG/MEDIUM: connection: sanitize PPv2 header length before parsing address information - BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: don't load more than once a pattern list. - BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: force a full GC in case of memory shortage - BUG/MINOR: config: don't inherit the default balance algorithm in frontends - BUG/MAJOR: frontend: initialize capture pointers earlier - BUG/MINOR: stats: correctly set the request/response analysers - DOC: fix typo in the body parser documentation for msg.sov - BUG/MINOR: peers: the buffer size is global.tune.bufsize, not trash.size - MINOR: sample: add a few basic internal fetches (nbproc, proc, stopping) - BUG/MAJOR: sessions: unlink session from list on out of memory - BUG/MEDIUM: patterns: previous fix was incomplete - BUG/MEDIUM: payload: ensure that a request channel is available Signed-off-by: Thomas Heil <heil@terminal-consulting.de>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Heil
parent
7c6557b9c3
commit
9912b6cbff
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@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=haproxy
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PKG_VERSION:=1.5.8
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PKG_RELEASE:=06
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PKG_VERSION:=1.5.9
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PKG_RELEASE:=02
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PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/src/
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PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
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PKG_MD5SUM:=7bffa1afa069d90ce03b7cd9aa0557cd
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PKG_MD5SUM:=b7672bb6a8aa188a655b418f3c96f65c
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PKG_MAINTAINER:=Thomas Heil <heil@terminal-consulting.de>
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PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
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From bad3c6f1b6d776e5d9951a3b3054b4dce8922c54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:17:03 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] BUG/MEDIUM: patterns: previous fix was incomplete
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Dmitry Sivachenko <trtrmitya@gmail.com> reported that commit 315ec42
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("BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: don't load more than once a pattern list.")
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relies on an uninitialised variable in the stack. While it used to
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work fine during the tests, if the uninitialized variable is non-null,
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some patterns may be aggregated if loaded multiple times, resulting in
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slower processing, which was the original issue it tried to address.
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The fix needs to be backported to 1.5.
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(cherry picked from commit 4deaf39243c4d941998b1b0175bad05b8a287c0b)
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---
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src/pattern.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/pattern.c b/src/pattern.c
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index 20547f9..208e33a 100644
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--- a/src/pattern.c
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+++ b/src/pattern.c
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@@ -2096,7 +2096,7 @@ int pattern_read_from_file(struct pattern_head *head, unsigned int refflags,
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struct pat_ref *ref;
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struct pattern_expr *expr;
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struct pat_ref_elt *elt;
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- int reuse;
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+ int reuse = 0;
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/* Lookup for the existing reference. */
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ref = pat_ref_lookup(filename);
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--
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2.0.4
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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
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From 184422d39df1aa27e6ef4c1ae75177489147ec99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Arcadiy Ivanov <arcadiy.ivanov@servicemesh.com>
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Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 07:06:13 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 1/6] BUILD: fix "make install" to support spaces in the
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install dirs
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Makefile is unable to install into directories containing spaces.
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(cherry picked from commit 3785311e64792787de78370fa126fd806734f7fe)
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---
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Makefile | 14 +++++++-------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
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index 707037b..9556069 100644
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--- a/Makefile
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+++ b/Makefile
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@@ -710,19 +710,19 @@ src/dlmalloc.o: $(DLMALLOC_SRC)
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$(CC) $(COPTS) -DDEFAULT_MMAP_THRESHOLD=$(DLMALLOC_THRES) -c -o $@ $<
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install-man:
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- install -d $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1
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- install -m 644 doc/haproxy.1 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1
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+ install -d "$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)"/man1
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+ install -m 644 doc/haproxy.1 "$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)"/man1
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install-doc:
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- install -d $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)
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+ install -d "$(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)"
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for x in configuration architecture haproxy-en haproxy-fr; do \
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- install -m 644 doc/$$x.txt $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR) ; \
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+ install -m 644 doc/$$x.txt "$(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)" ; \
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done
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install-bin: haproxy haproxy-systemd-wrapper
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- install -d $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
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- install haproxy $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
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- install haproxy-systemd-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
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+ install -d "$(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)"
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+ install haproxy "$(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)"
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+ install haproxy-systemd-wrapper "$(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)"
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install: install-bin install-man install-doc
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--
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2.0.4
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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From 1e89acb6be9ba6400fe4defd3b6b2cc94c6667d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:24:24 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] BUG/MEDIUM: payload: ensure that a request channel is
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available
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Denys Fedoryshchenko reported a segfault when using certain
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sample fetch functions in the "tcp-request connection" rulesets
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despite the warnings. This is because some tests for the existence
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of the channel were missing.
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The fetches which were fixed are :
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- req.ssl_hello_type
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- rep.ssl_hello_type
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- req.ssl_sni
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This fix must be backported to 1.5.
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(cherry picked from commit 83f2592bcd2e186beeabcba16be16faaab82bd39)
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---
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src/payload.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/payload.c b/src/payload.c
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index 4057f6f..f62163c 100644
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--- a/src/payload.c
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+++ b/src/payload.c
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@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned
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chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
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+ if (!chn)
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+ goto not_ssl_hello;
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+
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bleft = chn->buf->i;
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data = (const unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
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@@ -276,6 +279,9 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned
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chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
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+ if (!chn)
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+ goto not_ssl_hello;
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+
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bleft = chn->buf->i;
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data = (unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
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--
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2.0.4
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@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
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From 90951497008967f10ba8f9927b53c6e6bc138540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.comw>
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Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 17:35:37 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/6] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: fix bad ssl context init can cause
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segfault in case of OOM.
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Some SSL context's init functions errors were not handled and
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can cause a segfault due to an incomplete SSL context
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initialization.
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This fix must be backported to 1.5.
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(cherry picked from commit 5547615cdac377797ae351a2e024376dbf6d6963)
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---
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src/ssl_sock.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
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1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
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index f8bfbe7..620609f 100644
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--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
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+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
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@@ -2040,15 +2040,29 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
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return -1;
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}
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- SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
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- if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)
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- SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
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-
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/* set fd on SSL session context */
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- SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
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+ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
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+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
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+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
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+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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/* set connection pointer */
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- SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
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+ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
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+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
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+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
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+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
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+ if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) {
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+ if(!SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)) {
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+ SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
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+ objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL;
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+ }
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+ }
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/* leave init state and start handshake */
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conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
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@@ -2065,13 +2079,23 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
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return -1;
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}
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- SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
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-
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/* set fd on SSL session context */
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- SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
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+ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
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+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
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+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
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+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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/* set connection pointer */
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- SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
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+ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
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+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
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+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
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+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
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/* leave init state and start handshake */
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conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
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--
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2.0.4
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|
|
@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
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From 9bcc01ae25985dd540080f43b160beab1f1a2bc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 13:48:58 +0100
|
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Subject: [PATCH 3/6] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: force a full GC in case of memory
|
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shortage
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|
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When memory becomes scarce and openssl refuses to allocate a new SSL
|
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session, it is worth freeing the pools and trying again instead of
|
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rejecting all incoming SSL connection. This can happen when some
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memory usage limits have been assigned to the haproxy process using
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-m or with ulimit -m/-v.
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|
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This is mostly an enhancement of previous fix and is worth backporting
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to 1.5.
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(cherry picked from commit fba03cdc5ac6e3ca318b34915596cbc0a0dacc55)
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---
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src/ssl_sock.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
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index 620609f..f50efe5 100644
|
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--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
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+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
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@@ -2033,9 +2033,16 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
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/* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session
|
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in connect state otherwise accept state */
|
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if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
|
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+ int may_retry = 1;
|
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+
|
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+ retry_connect:
|
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/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
|
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conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
|
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if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
|
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+ if (may_retry--) {
|
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+ pool_gc2();
|
||||
+ goto retry_connect;
|
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+ }
|
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conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
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return -1;
|
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}
|
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@@ -2044,6 +2051,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
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if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
|
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SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
|
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conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
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+ if (may_retry--) {
|
||||
+ pool_gc2();
|
||||
+ goto retry_connect;
|
||||
+ }
|
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conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
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return -1;
|
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}
|
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@@ -2052,6 +2063,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
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if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
|
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SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
|
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conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
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+ if (may_retry--) {
|
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+ pool_gc2();
|
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+ goto retry_connect;
|
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+ }
|
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conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
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return -1;
|
||||
}
|
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@@ -2072,9 +2087,16 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
||||
else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) {
|
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+ int may_retry = 1;
|
||||
+
|
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+ retry_accept:
|
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/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
|
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conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->default_ctx);
|
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if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
|
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+ if (may_retry--) {
|
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+ pool_gc2();
|
||||
+ goto retry_accept;
|
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+ }
|
||||
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2083,6 +2105,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
||||
if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
|
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SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
|
||||
conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
||||
+ if (may_retry--) {
|
||||
+ pool_gc2();
|
||||
+ goto retry_accept;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2091,6 +2117,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
|
||||
if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
|
||||
SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
|
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conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
||||
+ if (may_retry--) {
|
||||
+ pool_gc2();
|
||||
+ goto retry_accept;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.0.4
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 1f96a87c4e1412ccdc6cfe81bfd6f20a1782886a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Cyril=20Bont=C3=A9?= <cyril.bonte@free.fr>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2014 22:41:27 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] BUG/MEDIUM: checks: fix conflicts between agent checks
|
||||
and ssl healthchecks
|
||||
|
||||
Lasse Birnbaum Jensen reported an issue when agent checks are used at the same
|
||||
time as standard healthchecks when SSL is enabled on the server side.
|
||||
|
||||
The symptom is that agent checks try to communicate in SSL while it should
|
||||
manage raw data. This happens because the transport layer is shared between all
|
||||
kind of checks.
|
||||
|
||||
To fix the issue, the transport layer is now stored in each check type,
|
||||
allowing to use SSL healthchecks when required, while an agent check should
|
||||
always use the raw_sock implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
The fix must be backported to 1.5.
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 9ce1311ebc834e20addc7a8392c0fc4e4ad687b7)
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/types/checks.h | 3 ++-
|
||||
include/types/server.h | 1 -
|
||||
src/checks.c | 2 +-
|
||||
src/server.c | 2 +-
|
||||
src/ssl_sock.c | 2 +-
|
||||
5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/types/checks.h b/include/types/checks.h
|
||||
index a50043b..42b7b07 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/types/checks.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/types/checks.h
|
||||
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ enum {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct check {
|
||||
+ struct xprt_ops *xprt; /* transport layer operations for health checks */
|
||||
struct connection *conn; /* connection state for health checks */
|
||||
unsigned short port; /* the port to use for the health checks */
|
||||
struct buffer *bi, *bo; /* input and output buffers to send/recv check */
|
||||
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ struct check {
|
||||
struct timeval start; /* last health check start time */
|
||||
long duration; /* time in ms took to finish last health check */
|
||||
short status, code; /* check result, check code */
|
||||
- char desc[HCHK_DESC_LEN]; /* health check descritpion */
|
||||
+ char desc[HCHK_DESC_LEN]; /* health check description */
|
||||
int use_ssl; /* use SSL for health checks */
|
||||
int send_proxy; /* send a PROXY protocol header with checks */
|
||||
struct tcpcheck_rule *current_step; /* current step when using tcpcheck */
|
||||
diff --git a/include/types/server.h b/include/types/server.h
|
||||
index 313f58d..c419b40 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/types/server.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/types/server.h
|
||||
@@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ struct server {
|
||||
|
||||
struct { /* configuration used by health-check and agent-check */
|
||||
struct protocol *proto; /* server address protocol for health checks */
|
||||
- struct xprt_ops *xprt; /* transport layer operations for health checks */
|
||||
struct sockaddr_storage addr; /* the address to check, if different from <addr> */
|
||||
} check_common;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
|
||||
index 5318f35..84bf0e5 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/checks.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/checks.c
|
||||
@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ static int connect_chk(struct task *t)
|
||||
|
||||
/* prepare a new connection */
|
||||
conn_init(conn);
|
||||
- conn_prepare(conn, s->check_common.proto, s->check_common.xprt);
|
||||
+ conn_prepare(conn, s->check_common.proto, check->xprt);
|
||||
conn_attach(conn, check, &check_conn_cb);
|
||||
conn->target = &s->obj_type;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
|
||||
index fdb63cc..94a31b6 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/server.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/server.c
|
||||
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int parse_server(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, struct proxy *curpr
|
||||
|
||||
newsrv->addr = *sk;
|
||||
newsrv->proto = newsrv->check_common.proto = protocol_by_family(newsrv->addr.ss_family);
|
||||
- newsrv->xprt = newsrv->check_common.xprt = &raw_sock;
|
||||
+ newsrv->xprt = newsrv->check.xprt = newsrv->agent.xprt = &raw_sock;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!newsrv->proto) {
|
||||
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : Unknown protocol family %d '%s'\n",
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
|
||||
index f50efe5..b73d6f9 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
|
||||
@@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv, struct proxy *curproxy)
|
||||
if (srv->use_ssl)
|
||||
srv->xprt = &ssl_sock;
|
||||
if (srv->check.use_ssl)
|
||||
- srv->check_common.xprt = &ssl_sock;
|
||||
+ srv->check.xprt = &ssl_sock;
|
||||
|
||||
srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
|
||||
if (!srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.0.4
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From cac307c020db7a938b73d4fef27a3b4ad2ecdf6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 15:04:29 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] BUG/MINOR: config: don't inherit the default balance
|
||||
algorithm in frontends
|
||||
|
||||
Tom Limoncelli from Stack Exchange reported a minor bug : the frontend
|
||||
inherits the LB parameters from the defaults sections. The impact is
|
||||
that if a "balance" directive uses any L7 parameter in the defaults
|
||||
sections and the frontend is in TCP mode, a warning is emitted about
|
||||
their incompatibility. The warning is harmless but a valid, sane config
|
||||
should never cause any warning to be reported.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix should be backported into 1.5 and possibly 1.4.
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 743c128580ee29c8f073b4a29771a5ce715f3721)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/cfgparse.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
|
||||
index 392a692..40d20ab 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/cfgparse.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
|
||||
@@ -2003,7 +2003,6 @@ int cfg_parse_listen(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm)
|
||||
curproxy->no_options = defproxy.no_options;
|
||||
curproxy->no_options2 = defproxy.no_options2;
|
||||
curproxy->bind_proc = defproxy.bind_proc;
|
||||
- curproxy->lbprm.algo = defproxy.lbprm.algo;
|
||||
curproxy->except_net = defproxy.except_net;
|
||||
curproxy->except_mask = defproxy.except_mask;
|
||||
curproxy->except_to = defproxy.except_to;
|
||||
@@ -2037,6 +2036,7 @@ int cfg_parse_listen(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (curproxy->cap & PR_CAP_BE) {
|
||||
+ curproxy->lbprm.algo = defproxy.lbprm.algo;
|
||||
curproxy->fullconn = defproxy.fullconn;
|
||||
curproxy->conn_retries = defproxy.conn_retries;
|
||||
curproxy->max_ka_queue = defproxy.max_ka_queue;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.0.4
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 8ba50128832bb31e95f06fe4cb2bd172f2b945fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 18:49:19 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] BUG/MAJOR: frontend: initialize capture pointers earlier
|
||||
|
||||
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported and diagnosed a nasty bug caused by TCP
|
||||
captures, introduced in late 1.5-dev by commit 18bf01e ("MEDIUM: tcp:
|
||||
add a new tcp-request capture directive"). The problem is that we're
|
||||
using the array of capture pointers initially designed for HTTP usage
|
||||
only, and that this array was only reset when starting to process an
|
||||
HTTP request. In a tcp-only frontend, the pointers are not reset, and
|
||||
if the capture pool is shared, we can very well point to whatever other
|
||||
memory location, resulting in random crashes when tcp-request content
|
||||
captures are processed.
|
||||
|
||||
The fix simply consists in initializing these pointers when the pools
|
||||
are prepared.
|
||||
|
||||
A workaround for existing versions consists in either disabling TCP
|
||||
captures in tcp-only frontends, or in forcing the frontends to work in
|
||||
HTTP mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Denys for the amount of testing and detailed reports.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix must be backported to 1.5.
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 9654e57fac86c773091b892f42015ba2ba56be5a)
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/frontend.c | 14 ++++++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/frontend.c b/src/frontend.c
|
||||
index 3f80774..2928047 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/frontend.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/frontend.c
|
||||
@@ -106,11 +106,17 @@ int frontend_accept(struct session *s)
|
||||
if (global.tune.client_rcvbuf)
|
||||
setsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &global.tune.client_rcvbuf, sizeof(global.tune.client_rcvbuf));
|
||||
|
||||
- if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_req_cap > 0 && (s->txn.req.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->req_cap_pool)) == NULL))
|
||||
- goto out_return; /* no memory */
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_req_cap > 0)) {
|
||||
+ if ((s->txn.req.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->req_cap_pool)) == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto out_return; /* no memory */
|
||||
+ memset(s->txn.req.cap, 0, s->fe->nb_req_cap * sizeof(void *));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
- if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_rsp_cap > 0 && (s->txn.rsp.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->rsp_cap_pool)) == NULL))
|
||||
- goto out_free_reqcap; /* no memory */
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_rsp_cap > 0)) {
|
||||
+ if ((s->txn.rsp.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->rsp_cap_pool)) == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto out_free_reqcap; /* no memory */
|
||||
+ memset(s->txn.rsp.cap, 0, s->fe->nb_rsp_cap * sizeof(void *));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
if (s->fe->http_needed) {
|
||||
/* we have to allocate header indexes only if we know
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.0.4
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user