libgcrypt: backport fix for CVE-2019-13627

Refresh patches due to offsets

Signed-off-by: Josef Schlehofer <pepe.schlehofer@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Josef Schlehofer 2019-09-26 20:27:41 +02:00
parent 6305d09b1a
commit 7ec22baf1e
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B950216FE4329F4C
4 changed files with 111 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=libgcrypt
PKG_VERSION:=1.6.6
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/

View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
diff -u --recursive libgcrypt-1.6.1-vanilla/Makefile.am libgcrypt-1.6.1/Makefile.am
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1-vanilla/Makefile.am 2014-07-18 00:31:21.020329371 -0400
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/Makefile.am 2014-07-18 00:31:49.076314616 -0400
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = --disable-ra
# (A suitable gitlog-to-changelog script can be found in GnuPG master.)
GITLOG_TO_CHANGELOG=gitlog-to-changelog
@ -12,10 +11,9 @@ diff -u --recursive libgcrypt-1.6.1-vanilla/Makefile.am libgcrypt-1.6.1/Makefile
EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh autogen.rc README.GIT LICENSES \
ChangeLog-2011 build-aux/ChangeLog-2011 doc/ChangeLog-2011 \
diff -u --recursive libgcrypt-1.6.1-vanilla/Makefile.in libgcrypt-1.6.1/Makefile.in
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1-vanilla/Makefile.in 2014-07-18 00:31:21.020329371 -0400
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/Makefile.in 2014-07-18 00:31:54.974311498 -0400
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -394,8 +394,8 @@ DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = --disable-ra
# (A suitable gitlog-to-changelog script can be found in GnuPG master.)
GITLOG_TO_CHANGELOG = gitlog-to-changelog

View File

@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
configure.ac | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 48e217947287..2acfa3630cac 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2272,7 +2272,16 @@ changequote([,])dnl
@@ -1994,7 +1994,16 @@ changequote([,])dnl
BUILD_FILEVERSION="${BUILD_FILEVERSION}mym4_revision_dec"
AC_SUBST(BUILD_FILEVERSION)
@ -38,6 +36,3 @@ index 48e217947287..2acfa3630cac 100644
AC_SUBST(BUILD_TIMESTAMP)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BUILD_TIMESTAMP, "$BUILD_TIMESTAMP",
[The time this package was configured for a build])
--
2.15.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
From 93718eeee932b95cbf6cea6ca0002554fd4583be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 17:42:02 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] dsa,ecdsa: Fix use of nonce, use larger one.
* cipher/dsa-common.c (_gcry_dsa_modify_k): New.
* cipher/pubkey-internal.h (_gcry_dsa_modify_k): New.
* cipher/dsa.c (sign): Use _gcry_dsa_modify_k.
* cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c (_gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign): Likewise.
* cipher/ecc-gost.c (_gcry_ecc_gost_sign): Likewise.
--
Cherry-picked master commit of:
7c2943309d14407b51c8166c4dcecb56a3628567
CVE-id: CVE-2019-13627
GnuPG-bug-id: 4626
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
---
cipher/dsa-common.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
cipher/dsa.c | 2 ++
cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c | 2 ++
cipher/ecc-gost.c | 2 ++
cipher/pubkey-internal.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
--- a/cipher/dsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/dsa-common.c
@@ -30,6 +30,30 @@
/*
+ * Modify K, so that computation time difference can be small,
+ * by making K large enough.
+ *
+ * Originally, (EC)DSA computation requires k where 0 < k < q. Here,
+ * we add q (the order), to keep k in a range: q < k < 2*q (or,
+ * addming more q, to keep k in a range: 2*q < k < 3*q), so that
+ * timing difference of the EC multiply (or exponentiation) operation
+ * can be small. The result of (EC)DSA computation is same.
+ */
+void
+_gcry_dsa_modify_k (gcry_mpi_t k, gcry_mpi_t q, int qbits)
+{
+ gcry_mpi_t k1 = mpi_new (qbits+2);
+
+ mpi_resize (k, (qbits+2+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB);
+ k->nlimbs = k->alloced;
+ mpi_add (k, k, q);
+ mpi_add (k1, k, q);
+ mpi_set_cond (k, k1, !mpi_test_bit (k, qbits));
+
+ mpi_free (k1);
+}
+
+/*
* Generate a random secret exponent K less than Q.
* Note that ECDSA uses this code also to generate D.
*/
--- a/cipher/dsa.c
+++ b/cipher/dsa.c
@@ -606,6 +606,8 @@ sign (gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s, gcry_m
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->q, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
}
+ _gcry_dsa_modify_k (k, skey->q, qbits);
+
/* r = (a^k mod p) mod q */
mpi_powm( r, skey->g, k, skey->p );
mpi_fdiv_r( r, r, skey->q );
--- a/cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input,
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ _gcry_dsa_modify_k (k, skey->E.n, qbits);
+
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
--- a/cipher/ecc-gost.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc-gost.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ _gcry_ecc_gost_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, E
mpi_free (k);
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ _gcry_dsa_modify_k (k, skey->E.n, qbits);
+
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
--- a/cipher/pubkey-internal.h
+++ b/cipher/pubkey-internal.h
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ _gcry_rsa_pss_verify (gcry_mpi_t value,
/*-- dsa-common.c --*/
+void _gcry_dsa_modify_k (gcry_mpi_t k, gcry_mpi_t q, int qbits);
gcry_mpi_t _gcry_dsa_gen_k (gcry_mpi_t q, int security_level);
gpg_err_code_t _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (gcry_mpi_t *r_k,
gcry_mpi_t dsa_q, gcry_mpi_t dsa_x,