python3: Update to 3.8.5

This version includes fixes for:
* CVE-2020-15801 - Fixes python3x._pth being ignored on Windows
* CVE-2019-20907 - Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted
  TAR files using the tarfile module

This also:
* Remove patches that are included in the update
* Add a dependency in python3-distutils for python3-email[1]

[1]: https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/v3.8.5/Lib/distutils/dist.py#L10

Signed-off-by: Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jeffery To 2020-07-27 04:00:15 +08:00
parent 3d4bf8cb31
commit 7d6fcf20e7
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: C616D9E719E868E4
6 changed files with 3 additions and 275 deletions

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# Note: keep in sync with setuptools & pip
PYTHON3_VERSION_MAJOR:=3
PYTHON3_VERSION_MINOR:=8
PYTHON3_VERSION_MICRO:=4
PYTHON3_VERSION_MICRO:=5
PYTHON3_VERSION:=$(PYTHON3_VERSION_MAJOR).$(PYTHON3_VERSION_MINOR)

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ PKG_VERSION:=$(PYTHON3_VERSION).$(PYTHON3_VERSION_MICRO)
PKG_SOURCE:=Python-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_HASH:=5f41968a95afe9bc12192d7e6861aab31e80a46c46fa59d3d837def6a4cd4d37
PKG_HASH:=e3003ed57db17e617acb382b0cade29a248c6026b1bd8aad1f976e9af66a83b0
PKG_MAINTAINER:=Alexandru Ardelean <ardeleanalex@gmail.com>, Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
PKG_LICENSE:=Python/2.0

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
define Package/python3-distutils
$(call Package/python3/Default)
TITLE:=Python $(PYTHON3_VERSION) distutils module
DEPENDS:=+python3-light
DEPENDS:=+python3-light +python3-email
endef
$(eval $(call Py3BasePackage,python3-distutils, \

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@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
From f56c75ed53dcad4d59dff4377ae463d6b96acd3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 06:05:44 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-41288: Fix a crash in unpickling invalid NEWOBJ_EX.
(GH-21458)
Automerge-Triggered-By: @tiran
(cherry picked from commit 4f309abf55f0e6f8950ac13d6ec83c22b8d47bf8)
Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
---
Lib/test/pickletester.py | 18 ++++++++++++
.../2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst | 2 ++
Modules/_pickle.c | 29 ++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/pickletester.py b/Lib/test/pickletester.py
index 9401043d78d18..ff7bbb0c8a9bf 100644
--- a/Lib/test/pickletester.py
+++ b/Lib/test/pickletester.py
@@ -1170,6 +1170,24 @@ def test_compat_unpickle(self):
self.assertIs(type(unpickled), collections.UserDict)
self.assertEqual(unpickled, collections.UserDict({1: 2}))
+ def test_bad_reduce(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)R.'), 0)
+ self.check_unpickling_error(TypeError, b'N)R.')
+ self.check_unpickling_error(TypeError, b'cbuiltins\nint\nNR.')
+
+ def test_bad_newobj(self):
+ error = (pickle.UnpicklingError, TypeError)
+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)\x81.'), 0)
+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nlen\n)\x81.')
+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\nN\x81.')
+
+ def test_bad_newobj_ex(self):
+ error = (pickle.UnpicklingError, TypeError)
+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)}\x92.'), 0)
+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nlen\n)}\x92.')
+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\nN}\x92.')
+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\n)N\x92.')
+
def test_bad_stack(self):
badpickles = [
b'.', # STOP
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3c3adbabf16ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Unpickling invalid NEWOBJ_EX opcode with the C implementation raises now
+UnpicklingError instead of crashing.
diff --git a/Modules/_pickle.c b/Modules/_pickle.c
index 55affb2c7c479..42ce62fc7cdf4 100644
--- a/Modules/_pickle.c
+++ b/Modules/_pickle.c
@@ -5988,23 +5988,30 @@ load_newobj_ex(UnpicklerObject *self)
}
if (!PyType_Check(cls)) {
- Py_DECREF(kwargs);
- Py_DECREF(args);
PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
"NEWOBJ_EX class argument must be a type, not %.200s",
Py_TYPE(cls)->tp_name);
- Py_DECREF(cls);
- return -1;
+ goto error;
}
if (((PyTypeObject *)cls)->tp_new == NULL) {
- Py_DECREF(kwargs);
- Py_DECREF(args);
- Py_DECREF(cls);
PyErr_SetString(st->UnpicklingError,
"NEWOBJ_EX class argument doesn't have __new__");
- return -1;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!PyTuple_Check(args)) {
+ PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
+ "NEWOBJ_EX args argument must be a tuple, not %.200s",
+ Py_TYPE(args)->tp_name);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!PyDict_Check(kwargs)) {
+ PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
+ "NEWOBJ_EX kwargs argument must be a dict, not %.200s",
+ Py_TYPE(kwargs)->tp_name);
+ goto error;
}
+
obj = ((PyTypeObject *)cls)->tp_new((PyTypeObject *)cls, args, kwargs);
Py_DECREF(kwargs);
Py_DECREF(args);
@@ -6014,6 +6021,12 @@ load_newobj_ex(UnpicklerObject *self)
}
PDATA_PUSH(self->stack, obj, -1);
return 0;
+
+error:
+ Py_DECREF(kwargs);
+ Py_DECREF(args);
+ Py_DECREF(cls);
+ return -1;
}
static int

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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
From c55479556db015f48fc8bbca17f64d3e65598559 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 05:30:53 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [3.8] bpo-39017: Avoid infinite loop in the tarfile module
(GH-21454) (GH-21483)
Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
(CVE-2019-20907).
(cherry picked from commit 5a8d121a1f3ef5ad7c105ee378cc79a3eac0c7d4)
Co-authored-by: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
Automerge-Triggered-By: @encukou
---
Lib/tarfile.py | 2 ++
Lib/test/recursion.tar | Bin 0 -> 516 bytes
Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 7 +++++++
.../2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst | 1 +
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Lib/test/recursion.tar
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
index d31b9cbb51d65..7a69e1b1aa544 100755
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
@@ -1241,6 +1241,8 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile):
length, keyword = match.groups()
length = int(length)
+ if length == 0:
+ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
# Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict"
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
index 15324a4e48819..b512168d6ea87 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
@@ -397,6 +397,13 @@ def test_premature_end_of_archive(self):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, "unexpected end of data"):
tar.extractfile(t).read()
+ def test_length_zero_header(self):
+ # bpo-39017 (CVE-2019-20907): reading a zero-length header should fail
+ # with an exception
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, "file could not be opened successfully"):
+ with tarfile.open(support.findfile('recursion.tar')) as tar:
+ pass
+
class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest):
def requires_name_attribute(self):
pass
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..ad26676f8b856
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module (CVE-2019-20907).

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@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods
(GH-18485)
reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection
(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e)
Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
.../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
+# to prevent http header injection.
+_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
+
# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
else:
raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state)
+ self._validate_method(method)
+
# Save the method for use later in the response phase
self._method = method
@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request):
# ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740.
return request.encode('ascii')
+ def _validate_method(self, method):
+ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
+ # prevent http header injection
+ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
+ if match:
+ raise ValueError(
+ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} "
+ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
+
def _validate_path(self, url):
"""Validate a url for putrequest."""
# Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2")
+class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
+ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
+ methods = (
+ 'GET\r',
+ 'POST\n',
+ 'PUT\n\r',
+ 'POST\nValue',
+ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
+ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
+ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
+ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
+ '\nPUT'
+ )
+
+ for method in methods:
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
+ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
+
+
class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase):
expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound"
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
+http.client.putrequest(...).