exim: update to version 4.96.1
This is a security release.
JH/01 Bug 2999: Fix a possible OOB write in the external authenticator, which
could be triggered by externally-supplied input. Found by Trend Micro.
CVE-2023-42115
JH/02 Bug 3000: Fix a possible OOB write in the SPA authenticator, which could
be triggered by externally-controlled input. Found by Trend Micro.
CVE-2023-42116
JH/03 Bug 3001: Fix a possible OOB read in the SPA authenticator, which could
be triggered by externally-controlled input. Found by Trend Micro.
CVE-2023-42114
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Golle
parent
36566a99af
commit
7c8f4a2a1c
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@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=exim
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PKG_VERSION:=4.96
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PKG_RELEASE:=2
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PKG_VERSION:=4.96.1
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.exim.org/pub/exim/exim4/
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PKG_HASH:=299a56927b2eb3477daafd3c5bda02bc67e5c4e5898a7aeaf2740875278cf1a3
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PKG_HASH:=93ac0755c317e1fdbbea8ccb70a868876bdf3148692891c72ad0fe816767033d
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PKG_MAINTAINER:=Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
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PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0-or-later
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@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
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From florz@florz.de Sun Oct 1 10:33:31 2023
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Received: from [10.0.0.9] (helo=cumin.exim.org)
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by mailman with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2)
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(envelope-from <florz@florz.de>)
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id 1qmspP-003gpc-28
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for exim-dev@lists.exim.org; Sun, 01 Oct 2023 09:33:31 +0000
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Authentication-Results: exim.org;
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iprev=pass (rain.florz.de) smtp.remote-ip=2a07:12c0:1c00:40::1;
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dmarc=none header.from=florz.de;
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arc=none
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Received: from rain.florz.de ([2a07:12c0:1c00:40::1]:36467)
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for exim-dev@lists.exim.org; Sun, 01 Oct 2023 11:33:26 +0200
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Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2023 11:33:26 +0200
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From: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de>
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To: exim-dev@lists.exim.org
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Precedence: list
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Subject: [exim-dev] Hotfix for some of the ZDI vulnerabilities
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List-Id: Exim MTA development list <exim-dev.lists.exim.org>
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Message: 1
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Status: RO
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Content-Length: 5347
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Hi,
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below you find a patch that fixes some (probably three?) of what I guess are
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the vulnerabilities reported by ZDI.
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Please note that the patch is only mildly tested, it is developed based on
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the git master branch, but can be applied to older versions with minor
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massaging. If you go back far enough, proxy.c was part of smtp_in.c, but if
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you adjust for that, the patch can be made to apply there, too.
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Obviously, I have no idea whether this actually addresses what ZDI has
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reported, but if not, these probably should be fixed, too, and if so, given
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the fact that I managed to rather easily find these vulnerabilities based
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on the information that's publicly available, I don't think there is much
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point to trying to keep this secret any longer--if anything, it's
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counterproductive.
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Also mind you that this is a hot fix, it's neither elegant, nor does it do
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any useful error reporting, the goal was simply to prevent out of bounds
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accesses.
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Florian
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---
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--- a/src/auths/external.c
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+++ b/src/auths/external.c
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@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ if (expand_nmax == 0) /* skip if rxd da
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if ((rc = auth_prompt(CUS"")) != OK)
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return rc;
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+if (expand_nmax != 1)
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+ return FAIL;
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+
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if (ob->server_param2)
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{
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uschar * s = expand_string(ob->server_param2);
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--- a/src/auths/spa.c
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+++ b/src/auths/spa.c
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@@ -165,12 +165,18 @@ if (auth_get_no64_data(&data, msgbuf) !=
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return FAIL;
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/* dump client response */
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-if (spa_base64_to_bits(CS &response, sizeof(response), CCS data) < 0)
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+int l = spa_base64_to_bits(CS &response, sizeof(response), CCS data);
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+if (l < 0)
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{
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DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("auth_spa_server(): bad base64 data in "
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"response: %s\n", data);
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return FAIL;
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}
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+if(l < (char *)&response.buffer - (char *)&response)return FAIL;
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+unsigned long o = IVAL(&response.uUser.offset, 0);
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+if((l < o) || (l - o < SVAL(&response.uUser.len, 0)))return FAIL;
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+o = IVAL(&response.ntResponse.offset, 0);
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+if((l < o) || (l - o < 24))return FAIL;
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/***************************************************************
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PH 07-Aug-2003: The original code here was this:
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@@ -345,7 +351,10 @@ if (!smtp_read_response(sx, US buffer, b
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/* convert the challenge into the challenge struct */
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DSPA("\n\n%s authenticator: challenge (%s)\n\n", ablock->name, buffer + 4);
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-spa_base64_to_bits(CS (&challenge), sizeof(challenge), CCS (buffer + 4));
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+int l = spa_base64_to_bits(CS (&challenge), sizeof(challenge), CCS (buffer + 4));
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+if((l < 0) || (l < (char *)&challenge.buffer - (char *)&challenge))return FAIL;
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+unsigned long o = IVAL(&challenge.uDomain.offset, 0);
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+if((l < o) || (l - o < SVAL(&challenge.uDomain.len, 0)))return FAIL;
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spa_build_auth_response(&challenge, &response, CS username, CS password);
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spa_bits_to_base64(US msgbuf, US &response, spa_request_length(&response));
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--- a/src/smtp_in.c
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+++ b/src/smtp_in.c
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@@ -1172,6 +1172,8 @@ while (capacity > 0)
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do { ret = read(fd, to, 1); } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR && !had_command_timeout);
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if (ret == -1)
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return -1;
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+ if (!ret)
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+ break;
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have++;
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if (last)
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return have;
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@@ -1320,6 +1322,8 @@ if ((ret == PROXY_INITIAL_READ) && (memc
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goto proxyfail;
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}
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+ if (ret < 16)
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+ goto proxyfail;
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/* The v2 header will always be 16 bytes per the spec. */
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size = 16 + ntohs(hdr.v2.len);
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DEBUG(D_receive) debug_printf("Detected PROXYv2 header, size %d (limit %d)\n",
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@@ -1340,7 +1344,7 @@ if ((ret == PROXY_INITIAL_READ) && (memc
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{
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retmore = read(fd, (uschar*)&hdr + ret, size-ret);
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} while (retmore == -1 && errno == EINTR && !had_command_timeout);
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- if (retmore == -1)
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+ if (retmore < 1)
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goto proxyfail;
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ret += retmore;
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DEBUG(D_receive) debug_printf("PROXYv2: have %d/%d required octets\n", ret, size);
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@@ -1362,6 +1366,8 @@ if (ret >= 16 && memcmp(&hdr.v2, v2sig,
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switch (hdr.v2.fam)
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{
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case 0x11: /* TCPv4 address type */
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+ if (ret < 28)
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+ goto proxyfail;
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iptype = US"IPv4";
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tmpaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr.v2.addr.ip4.src_addr;
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inet_ntop(AF_INET, &tmpaddr.sin_addr, CS &tmpip, sizeof(tmpip));
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@@ -1388,6 +1394,8 @@ if (ret >= 16 && memcmp(&hdr.v2, v2sig,
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proxy_external_port = tmpport;
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goto done;
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case 0x21: /* TCPv6 address type */
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+ if (ret < 52)
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+ goto proxyfail;
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iptype = US"IPv6";
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memmove(tmpaddr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, hdr.v2.addr.ip6.src_addr, 16);
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inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &tmpaddr6.sin6_addr, CS &tmpip6, sizeof(tmpip6));
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@@ -1446,10 +1454,13 @@ else if (ret >= 8 && memcmp(hdr.v1.line,
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goto proxyfail;
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ret += r2;
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+ if(ret > 107)
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+ goto proxyfail;
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+ hdr.v1.line[ret] = 0;
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p = string_copy(hdr.v1.line);
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end = memchr(p, '\r', ret - 1);
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- if (!end || (end == (uschar*)&hdr + ret) || end[1] != '\n')
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+ if (!end || end[1] != '\n')
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{
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DEBUG(D_receive) debug_printf("Partial or invalid PROXY header\n");
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goto proxyfail;
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